Tussle in cyberspace: Defining tomorrow

1
Tussle in cyberspace Defining tomorrows
internet (2002)

• D.Clark, J. Wroclawski, K. Sollins R. Braden
• Presented by Gergely Biczok
• (Slides in courtesy of Ao-Jan Su)

2
Introduction

• Different Internet players have interests that
  may be adverse to each other, and they vie to
  favor their particular interests.
• This is called TUSSLE.
• Accommodating this tussle is crucial to the
  evolution of the networks technical
  architecture.

3
Tussle Examples

• The different players
• Music lovers vs. the rights holders
• People who want to talk in private vs. the
  government that want to tap their conversation
• ISPs must interconnect but are sometimes fierce
  competitors
• New requirements on the internets technical
  architecture
• Motivate new design strategies to accommodate
  the growing tussle

4
Structure of this paper

• Difference between the mechanisms and society.
• Outline some proposed design principles
• Discussion of some tussle spaces

5
Natures of engineering and society

• Engineers solve the problems by designing
  mechanisms with predictable consequences.
• Society dynamic management of evolving and
  conflicting interests.
• Personal example Network Neutrality Measurement
  project

6
Internet players

• Users
• You and me
• Commercial ISPs
• ATT, Comcast
• Private sector network providers
• Governments
• Intellectual property rights holders
• Content providers and higher level services
• Google, Amzaon, Ebay

7
Principles

• Highest-level design for variations in outcome
• Be flexible
• Tussle in the design, not by violating the design
• Two specific principles
• Modularize the design along tussle boundaries
• Use modularity to manage complexity
• Like reusable software components
• Design for choice
• Users choice of mail systems
• ISPs has a different view (filtering/redirecting
  port 25)

8
Implications from principles

• Choice often requires open interfaces
• Allow competition among algorithms
• Tussles often happen across interfaces
• Example BGP connects competitive ISPs
• It matters if the consequence of choice is
  visible
• Public vs. secret (routing arrangement among
  ISPs)
• 2007 Comcasts choice of poisoning BitTorrent
  (loss of prestige)
• Tussles have different flavors
• Not certainly adverse interests, but
• Different interests (sender traffic carrier) ?
  pricing problem

9
Implications from principles (Cont.)

• Tussles evolve over time
• It is a multi-round game
• 1. 2005 BitTorrent got filtered
• 2. 2006 Encryption implemented
• 3. 2007 Updated filters based on flow-patterns
  and peer-tracker communication
• 4. 2008 TCP-over-UDP, dropping RST, VPNs
• 5.
• No such thing as value-neutral design
• No perfect design decisions.
• Dont assume that you design the answer
• You are designing a playing field, not the
  outcome.

10
Tussle spaces (1)

• Economics
• Providers tussles as they compete and consumers
  tussle with providers to get the service they
  want at a low price
• Our principle of design of choice into mechanism
  is the building block of competition
• Customers must have the ability to choose
  (switch) providers freely.

11
Examples

• Provider lock-in from IP addressing
• Incorporate mechanisms that make it easy for a
  host to change address
• Since 2002 Change you cell phone carrier without
  changing your cell phone number
• Value pricing
• Divide customers based on their willingness to
  pay
• Pay higher rate to run a server at home

12
Examples (continue)

• Residential broadband access
• Municipal deployment of fiber as a platform for
  competitors
• Competitive wide area access
• Support source routing with a recognition of the
  need for payment
• Pay toll
• Since 2002
• research on Internet economics shows interest of
  T1 ISPs contact end-users directly (larger
  revenue)
• Network Anti-Neutrality ISPs want to milk
  content providers

13
Tussle spaces (2)

• Trust
• Users do not trust each other
• Users dont trust parties they actually want to
  talk to
• Explicit choice of trusted 3rd party
• Less and less trust to their own software
• Non-technical solution seems feasible
• Design for choice privacy vs. security
• Identity
• Not forbidden is permitted vs. anonym users

14
Tussle space (3)

• Openness
• The openness to innovation that permits a new
  application to be deployed
• Economical motivations
• Proprietary interfaces give market power
• Vertical integration by ISPs
• Bundling infrastructure and services
• Somewhat restricted but better QoS
• Separate
• Tussle of vertical integration
• Tussle of sustaining innovation

15
Old principles

• End to end arguments
• Still valid, but need a more complex articulation
• Network could provide more information (ECN, QoS)
• Motivate ISPs to modify routers
• We need the tussle of competition!
• Separation of policy and mechanism
• Mechanism defines the range of policies
• No pure separation of policy from mechanism
• BUT do isolate tussle free regions of the system
• Fixed-points

16
Conclusion and effect

• Do not deny the reality of the tussle, but
  recognize our power to shape it.
• A different way of thinking for system designers
• 2006 NSF FIND initiative starts
• Clean-slate redesign of the Internet
• Economics
• Trust
• This paper is a very important precursor
• Great effect