Macdona Derailment Issues and Lessons Learned

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Macdona DerailmentIssues and Lessons Learned

• Scott Harris, Ph.D.
• Federal On-Scene Coordinator
• USEPA-R6

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What Happened?

• June 28, 2004
• Westbound Union Pacific
• Eastbound Burlington Northern
• Pulling onto siding to let UP pass
• Not yet clear of main line
• UP cuts through BNSF and derails
• Blocks road
• Flooded Medina River to rear
• Traps at least five families

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Initial 911 and Response

• 911 misunderstands
• Concludes medical call related to smoke
• VFD drives into chlorine cloud
• Firefighter down
• Rescue and withdraw
• Lesson
• 911 operators must have hazmat training

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Order to Evacuate

• Local IC orders ENS and evacuation
• Model predicts 57,000 residents
• No ENS sent
• No notification of failure to local IC
• Lesson
• Must not disregard without consultation

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911 and UP Contact

• 911 contacts UP
• Train-on-train
• Chlorine
• 911 advises of response and situation
• Lesson
• 911 took initiative
• May have prevented casualties

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NRC Notification

• UP notification to NRC
• 45 minutes after 911 / UP call
• Two trains collided, no cars derailed
• Unknown hazmat, impacts or actions
• Lessons
• NRC Report lacks information known to UP
• Minimized impact and urgency
• Cost response time while researching

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UC/ICS

• Major conflict between locals
• OSCs arrived, implemented UC/ICS
• UP resisted authority
• Refused to participate or cooperate
• Intended to act against direction of UC/OSC
• Worst-case scenario
• Threat of U.S. Marshall and Federalizing

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UC/ICS

• Lessons
• Immediate UC/ICS clearly aided response
• UP resistance created unnecessary drama
• OSCs must be familiar with authorities
• Prepared to follow through
• RPs and contractors must function in ICS
• NIMS / NRP
• Understand NCP authorities

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Federal Agency Coordination

• Limited
• NTSB process seemed outside ER / EPA
• NTSB off-site operations / FRA?
• Difficult logistics
• Declined UC role
• Declined ER Review participation
• Excluded EPA from ER Investigation
• Lessons
• Evaluate whether relationship value-added
• Consider future joint operations

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Coordination With Others

• Excellent
• State and local
• Co-location and security
• Scalable facilities
• Technical, operational areas segregated
• Lessons
• TCEQ Strike Team support invaluable
• Logistics, regulatory, UC

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RRT Involvement

• No specific request for RRT
• Twice-daily briefings with HQ and RRC
• Lessons
• Excellent support from RRC and HQ
• Process in place to convene as needed

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NTSB Investigation

• Report not yet published
• Initial site visit on Day 5
• EPA participation
• Site completely altered
• EPA provided digital photos from ASPECT
• Lessons
• Material evidence lost by delay
• Value of ASPECT photos and video

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NRC Tape

• Audio of NRC notification lost
• Tapes recycled after 60 days
• Not known to OSC
• System down from October-February
• Lessons
• Request ASAP for event record
• Digital upgrades
• Receive / retain record of all notifications

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Follow-up with UP

• ER Review
• March exercise in San Antonio
• Focus on NIMS / ICS
• Lessons
• Excellent coverage of lessons learned
• Improved capabilities and interoperability

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Questions?
http//www.epaosc.net/macdonatrainderailment
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Norfolk Southern DerailmentGraniteville, South
Carolina

• Kevin S. Misenheimer
• Federal On-Scene Coordinator

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Incident Description

• At approximately 0300 on January 6, 2005 a
  Norfolk Southern Train collided with a parked
  train in the town of Graniteville, SC
• Four hazardous materials tank cars derailed
  (three chlorine, one sodium hydroxide)
• One chlorine car was breached, releasing
  approximately 40 tons of chlorine vapor and
  liquid
• Nine fatalities and hundreds of victims reporting
  respiratory affects
• 1 mile radius evacuation (5,400 people) and 2
  mile radius shelterinplace

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Derailment Scene
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EPA Activities

• Oversight of NS response actions (hazmat cars)
• Maintenance of comprehensive air monitoring
  network
• ICS / Unified Command
• Support local hazmat entries for search and
  recovery
• Home re-entry sampling
• Business and infrastructure re-entry sampling /
  support
• Veterinary / Animal support

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Regional Response Team

• No formal activation of Region 4 RRT
• Coordination with RRT members through the
  Regional Response Center
• RRT members (SCDHEC, SCEMD, DOT-NTSB, DOT-FRA)
  had representatives in the Unified Command

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Lessons Learned

• Locals need NRP / NIMS ICS coaching
• PRP resisted use of ICS / UC / data sharing Not
  familiar Saw no value
• NTSB trying to conduct accident investigation in
  a hotzone without adequate training or equipment
  Close coordination with FOSC a necessity
• Order resources immediately to account for mobe
  time for ERT, USCG-NSF, etc

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Lessons Learned

• Standardize data collection immediately
• Unified Command works, but is one integrated ICS
  possible?
• Unified Command must share common workspace
  (resist tendency for individual agencies to
  hunker down in their own mobile command posts)
• What if this had been terrorism?