THEO FARRELL

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The British military campaign in Afghanistan

• THEO FARRELL
• DEPT OF WAR STUDIES
• KINGS COLLEGE LONDON

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ISAF takes over
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British task forces, 2006-2006

• 16 bde MayOct 2006
• 3 cdo Oct 2006April 07
• 12 Mech AprilOct 2007
• 52 bde Oct 2007April 2008
• 16 bde AprilOct 2008

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British brigades in Helmand

• 16 bde inkspot to platoon house
• 3 cdo offensive using MOGs
• 12 Mech big sweeps to clear green zone
• 52 bde clear, hold, build
• 16 bde protecting population and developing
  GIROA

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16x break-in battle

• Force cap (3,150 1500)
• Losing momentum parcel delivery
• Pressure to deploy North
• POR undoubtedly contributed to attrition of
  Taliban forces
• But fixed and kinetic

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16x break-in battle

• Force cap (3,150 1500)
• Losing momentum parcel delivery
• Pressure to deploy North
• POR undoubtedly contributed to attrition of
  Taliban forces
• But fixed and kinetic

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3x advance to ambush

• Main effort reconstruction of ADZ
• Main LOO security
• Security LOO dynamic unpredictability
• Tread softly 537 to 821 engagements
• Keeping the Taliban at bay 45 reduction in
  attacks

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12x mowing the lawn

• Return to original plan inkspot strategy
• Clearing the green zone 5 TF ops
• Failure to hold
• Escalation 821 to 1,096 engagements

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The Green Zone
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12x mowing the lawn

• Return to original plan inkspot strategy
• Clearing the green zone 5 TF ops
• Failure to hold
• Escalation 821 to 1,096 engagements

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52x people are the prize

• CONOPs clear, hold, build
• COG local population (not EF)
• Persistent presence committing FOBs
• Resourcing influence NKETs and TCAF
• Approach to battle taking MSQ

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Tactical Conflict Assessment Framework

1. Have there been changes in the village
   population, and why?
2. What are the most important problems facing the
   village?
3. Who do you believe can solve your problems?
4. What should be done first?

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16x go deep not broad

• CONOPS protect the population, promote GIROA,
  undermine Taliban influence
• Creating CMMH
• Kajaki Damn op

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More favourable context

• New Taliban tactics
• Growing ANA capabilities
• Increased resources

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Better resourced campaign

• 16 bde (mid 2006) 3,150
• 3 cdo (2006-07) 5,200
• 12 Mech (mid 2007) 6,500
• 52 bde (2007-08) 7,750
• 16 bde (mid 2008) 8,530

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Characteristics of British approach

• Slow learner
• Cracking-on make do attitude
• Discontinuity of command

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The long haul

• Natural cycle wearing down the Taliban
• Building up GIROA capacity
• Learning to be Comprehensive
• Sustainable victory