Title: Do Health Care Funding Levels Affect Patient Outcomes?
1Do Health Care Funding Levels Affect Patient
Outcomes?
- Margaret Byrne
- University of Pittsburgh
- Laura Petersen, Kenneth Pietz
- Baylor College of Medicine
2Background
- Health care costs continue to rise
- Debate over how much spending is appropriate
- One approach is to look at differences in
outcomes with different levels of funding
3Background
- Health expenditures and utilization vary greatly
across different countries and regions - Research not conclusive as to difference in
outcomes
4International (OECD) studies
- Insignificant relationships found between
- per capita medical care expenditures and mean
age at death (LeGrand 1987) - health expenditure and mortality rates (Judge et
al. 1998) - U.S. doesnt have better health outcomes despite
higher spending (Andersen 2000)
5Life Expectancy and Spending
6International (OECD) studies
- Hitiris and Posnett (1992), only study with cross
sectional and time series data - Find increases in health expenditures per capita
significantly lower mortality rates, although
effect is small
7U.S. regional variation in
- Medicare payments to physicians per beneficiary
in 1989 - Miami 1874
- San Francisco 872
- Welch et al. 1993, New Engl J Med
8U.S. regional variation in
- Age, sex, race adjusted total beneficiary
spending in Medicare in 1996 - Miami 8,414
- Minneapolis 3,341
- Difference of over 50,000 over average lifetime
- Wennberg and Cooper.
- Darthmouth Atlas of Health Care 1999
9US regional variation in
10Expenditures and outcomes
- Fisher et al. Annals of Internal Medicine 2003
- Medicare hospitals categorized to different
levels of spending based on end of life spending
(unrelated to illness level) - Assigned to quintiles of EOL-EI
11Expenditures and outcomes
- Cohorts of patients with
- Colorectal cancer
- Hip fracture
- Acute MI
- Random sample
- Patients in higher spending regions receive 60
more care - More inpatient care
- More specialist care
- More procedures and tests
12Expenditures and outcomes
- Access and quality of care no better or worse in
higher spending regions - No difference in rates of decline of functional
status over 5 years - Small increase in mortality rates in regions with
higher spending levels
13Limitations to Fisher study
- Mostly cohort study
- Risk adjustment inadequate
- Used a proxy for spending, not actual spending
levels - Cross sectional design for measuring spending
levels
14Objectives
- Determine whether VA Networks risk adjusted
funding levels differ - Determine whether differences in funding levels
affect mortality rates
15Advantages of study design
- Complete cohort of VA patients
- Funding allocations rather than expenditure or
expenditure proxy - Comprehensive risk-adjustment methodology
- Longitudinal design
16Outline of analyses
- Correlation between Network funding and mortality
- Cross sectional logit regressions of effect of
risk adjusted funding levels on mortality in 22
VA Networks - 4 year fixed effects logit to distinguish effect
of funding level from Network and year effects
17Cohort of users
- All users of the VA in each fiscal year 1998-2001
with patient level costs - Excluded veterans with ages lt17 or gt120 years
- Males and females analyzed separately
18Funding levels
- VA headquarters allocates to the 22 regional
Networks - Allocations based on a 3 category capitation
system - Assignment of veterans to a capitation class
based on most serious diagnoses and some
utilization - Allocations adjusted for education, equipment,
non-recurring maintenance - Not adjusted for local labor costs
- Deflated to 1998 dollars
19Illness burden measure
- Calculated for each VA user
- Diagnosis based risk adjustment methodology (DxCG
software) - All diagnoses used to develop a relative risk
score
20Funding per illness burden
- Funding per unit of illness burden calculated
as - Where Nnumber of veterans in that Network
- Funding per illness burden calculated for each
Network for each year
21Mortality
- Determined using BIRLS file (death benefits
applications) and checking with Patient Treatment
File
22Average RRS
23Funding per illness burden
24Differences in FIB
FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01
Average 6476 6346 6697 6627
St. dev. 505 558 522 619
Minimum 5615 5498 5828 5552
Maximum 8021 8075 7531 7478
Size of Range 2406 2577 1703 1926
25Mortality and FIB FY98
26Mortality and FIB FY99
27Mortality and FIB FY00
28Mortality and FIB FY01
29Cross sectional regressions
- Dependent variable
- Mortality
- Independent variables
- Network FIB level, scaled to show the effect of a
1000 change - Individual RRS and age (including squared and
cubed terms)
30Cross section regressions
 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01
All Males
All Women
Males, age lt 60
Males, age gt 80
Males, RRSlt0.4
Males, RRSgt2.0
31Cross section regressions
 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01
All Males .866 .854, .878 .905 .894, .917 .944 .930, .958 .981 .969, .993
All Women
Males, age lt 60
Males, age gt 80
Males, RRSlt0.4
Males, RRSgt2.0
32Cross section regressions
 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01
All Males .866 .854, .878 .905 .894, .917 .944 .930, .958 .981 .969, .993
All Women
Males, age lt 60 .890 .859, .921 .916 .888, .946 .914 .889, .941 .960 .938, .982
Males, age gt 80 .817 .790, .845 .885 .860, .911 .948 .916, .982 .987 .962, 1.014
Males, RRSlt0.4 .905 .885, .925 .841 .823, 8.59 .950 .926, .975 .988 .967, 1.01
Males, RRSgt2.0 .809 .790, .828 .930 .911, .949 .924 .902, .946 .972 .953, .991
33Cross section regressions
 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01
All Males .866 .854, .878 .905 .894, .917 .944 .930, .958 .981 .969, .993
All Women .923 .820, 1.039 1.027 .926, 1.140 .891 .792, 1.003 1.013 .924, 1.111
Males, age lt 60 .890 .859, .921 .916 .888, .946 .914 .889, .941 .960 .938, .982
Males, age gt 80 .817 .790, .845 .885 .860, .911 .948 .916, .982 .987 .962, 1.014
Males, RRSlt0.4 .905 .885, .925 .841 .823, 8.59 .950 .926, .975 .988 .967, 1.01
Males, RRSgt2.0 .809 .790, .828 .930 .911, .949 .924 .902, .946 .972 .953, .991
34Fixed effect logit regressions
- Model 1 lump all 4 years of data together
- Model 2 include year fixed effects
- Model 3 include year and Network fixed effects
35Fixed effect logit regressions
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
FIB .947
Age .845
Age2 1.002
Age3 .999
RRS 2.349
RRS2 .956
RRS3 1.001
FY99
FY00
FY01
Model 3 includes Network fixed effects Model 3 includes Network fixed effects Model 3 includes Network fixed effects Model 3 includes Network fixed effects
36Fixed effect logit regressions
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
FIB .947 .934
Age .845 .843
Age2 1.002 1.003
Age3 .999 .999
RRS 2.349 2.344
RRS2 .956 .956
RRS3 1.001 1.001
FY99 0.994
FY00 .965
FY01 .896
Model 3 includes Network fixed effects Model 3 includes Network fixed effects Model 3 includes Network fixed effects Model 3 includes Network fixed effects
37Fixed effect logit regressions
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
FIB .947 .934 1.037
Age .845 .843 .843
Age2 1.002 1.003 1.003
Age3 .999 .999 .999
RRS 2.349 2.344 2.344
RRS2 .956 .956 .956
RRS3 1.001 1.001 1.001
FY99 0.994 1.017
FY00 .965 .968
FY01 .896 .926
Model 3 includes Network fixed effects, results not shown here Model 3 includes Network fixed effects, results not shown here Model 3 includes Network fixed effects, results not shown here Model 3 includes Network fixed effects, results not shown here
38Summary of results
- Funding across the VA Networks varies both across
Networks and over time - Maximum differences in FIB among Networks ranged
from 2532 in FY99 to 1791 in FY01
39Summary of results
- Correlations between contemporaneous funding
levels and Network-level risk adjusted mortality
rates - Association holds for all 4 years of the study
40Summary of results
- For cross section regressions of all men and all
subsample of males, FIB was significantly related
to mortality over all 4 years - FIB not significantly related to mortality for
women - Network fixed effects in the 4 year panel logit
regression nullify the effect of FIB
41Conclusions
- Strong funding levels in the past create physical
and human capital in Networks - Build up human and physical capital
- Stability in hiring
- Ability to purchase and use new technology
- Allows Networks to provider higher quality acute
care which reduces mortality - Allows networks to provide more preventive care
42Implications
- Higher funding or expenditures may not be
associated with contemporaneous health outcomes,
but will have an effect over the long term
43Implications
- Research on the relationship between
funding/expenditures and outcomes must use panel
data to distinguish fixed effects and direct
effects of funding
44Correlations of FIB over time
 FY99 FY00 FY01
FY98 0.909 0.657 0.614
FY98 0.000 0.001 0.002
FY99 0.810 0.731
FY99 0.000 0.000
FY00 0.96
FY00 0.000
45Cross section regressions
 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01
All Males 2,841,181 .866 .854, .878 .905 .894, .917 .944 .930, .958 .981 .969, .993
All Women 134,978 .923 .820, 1.039 1.027 .926, 1.140 .891 .792, 1.003 1.013 .924, 1.111
Males, age lt 60 1,318,974 .890 .859, .921 .916 .888, .946 .914 .889, .941 .960 .938, .982
Males, age gt 80 139,976 .817 .790, .845 .885 .860, .911 .948 .916, .982 .987 .962, 1.014
Males, RRSlt0.4 1,715,045 .905 .885, .925 .841 .823, 8.59 .950 .926, .975 .988 .967, 1.01
Males, RRSgt2.0 267,442 .809 .790, .828 .930 .911, .949 .924 .902, .946 .972 .953, .991
46VERA payment levels FY00
- Basic unvested (single outpatient)
- 636,696 patients
- 105 per patient
- Basic vested 18 classes
- 2,882,051 patients
- 3,249 per patient
- Complex 24 classes
- 139,607 patients
- 42,153 per patient
47DCG Models
- DCGs (Ash et al, 1989 Ellis et al 1996)
- Diagnoses first classified by clinicians into 543
clinically homogeneous DxGroups. - Cluster DxGroups into 118 Condition Categories
(CCs) according to expected similarities in
future costs (eg there are 8 Neoplasm CCs.
Neoplasm1 is metastatic cancer, Neoplasm8 is
benign neoplasms).
48DCG Models (2)
- To avoid reimbursement for separate coding of the
same condition (eg metastatic cancer neoplasm
of lung, brain, bone), Hierarchical Condition
Categories (HCCs) are imposed - Next, assign a patient to one of many mutually
exclusive DCGs
49DCG (25)
HCC (118)
CC (118)
Dx Groups (545)
ICD9 (15K)
CLASSIFYING PATIENTS BY GROUPING DIAGNOSES
MSG
50Appendix 2 CCs with Hierarchies
51How do DCGs work?
DCG
MSG
52Example of HCC Classification
ICD-9-CM DxGroup CC HCC
250.13 IDDM, uncontrolled with ketoacidosis 23.01 Diabetes with acute complications 14 Diabetes with Acute Complications 14
250.01 IDDM, not stated as uncontrolled, without mention of complications 22.01 Diabetes without complications 15 Diabetes with No or Unspecified Complications 14
MSG
53HCC Payment Example All Patient Model Basic
Patient, capped _at_ 1 W/REGISTRY FLAGS
- Patient has HCC013Diabetes with Chronic
Complications (N about 89,000) with Payment
Average Cost of 807 often (with Ngt35,000) also
has - HCC004 (Other Infections) with Payment of 856
- HCC018 (Other Endocrine) with no Payment (part
of NoHCC31) - HCC026 (Other Musculoskeletal) with no Payment
(part of NoHCC31) - HCC052 (Chronic Heart) with Payment of 281
(Constrained) - HCC057 (Hypertension) with Payment of 281
(Constrained)) - HCC072 (High Cost Eye) with Payment of 281
(Constrained) - HCC092 (Other Dermatological) with no Payment
(part of NoHCC31) - HCC100 (Minor Symptoms) with Payment of 601
- HCC117 (Screening) with no Payment (part of
NoHCC31) - HCC Cost Prediction 807 856 281 281 281
601 3,107 - Payment 3,107 Falls into DCG Payment Group 9
3,061
MSG
54HCC Payment Example All Patient Model Complex
Patient, capped _at_ 1 W/REGISTRY FLAGS
- Patient has HCC040Quadriplegia (N9451) with
Payment Average Cost of 5731 and VSCIFLG with an
average cost of 6237 often (with Ngt2500) also
has - HCC075 (Low Cost Ear) with Payment of 281
- HCC080 (Other Urinary) with Payment of 1216
- HCC091 (Chronic Skin Ulcer) with Payment of
3591 - HCC092 (Other Dermatological) with no Payment
(part of NoHCC31) - HCC097 (Other Injuries) with Payment of 1060
- HCC099 (Major Symptoms) with Payment of 1149
- HCC117 (Screening) with no Payment (part of
NoHCC31) - HCC Cost Prediction 5731 6237 281 1216
3591 1060 1149 19,265 - Payment 19,265 Falls into DCG Payment Group 17
26,120 - If THIS patients actual cost exceeded 70,000,
payment would be 26,120 (actual cost-70,000)
MSG
55Network fixed effects
56Fixed effects logit bias Katz 2001