Lessons Learned and Earned Value Management System Assessment

1
Lessons Learned and Earned Value Management
System Assessment
GLAST Large Area Telescope Lowell A.
Klaisner Stanford Linear Accelerator
Center Project Manager Klaisner_at_slac.stanford.edu
650-926-2726
2
Background

• Pathfinder project
• First flight instrument integrated at SLAC
• Most of the staff at SLAC were unfamiliar with
  the effort required to meet space instrumentation
  requirements
• Challenging project
• Largest silicon detector, 800K channels
• Limited bandwidth to ground
• Event processing on board
• Space qualifying state of the art instrumentation
• Rigorous requirements of space instrumentation
• Low power
• Withstand launch loads
• Vacuum
• Challenging thermal environment
• Reliability

3
EVMS Assessment

• The EVMS system could not anticipate problems
  that arose from insufficient engineering in
  critical areas early in the project and showed up
  in environmental testing as the project moved
  into the flight hardware fabrication phase
• The EVMS system did not track earned value for
  work being done by foreign partners on
  independent budgets (eg the work in Italy
  supported by INFN and ASI)
• The GLAST mission office exercised rigorous
  control of the requirements while the Office of
  Science exercised rigorous control of the funding
  which limited ability to respond to cost growth
  and schedule stretch out

4
Tracker example of anomaly response
Technical Issue Tracker (Past Year) Root Cause Incurred Delay
(months)
Bias circuit design error and coupon plating problems. Design Problem 0
MCM and cable termination resistors. Design Problem 0
MCM-sidewall clearance issues. Design Problem 1
Pitch-adapter flex circuit trace cracking. Process Problem 1
Cable-closeout short circuit. Design Problem 0
Encapsulation of wire bonds on heavy trays. Process Problem 1
Bonding of Kapton bias circuits to tungsten. Process Problem 3
Tracker-Grid interface fastener failure and alignment issues. Design and Process Problem 9
MCM encapsulation delamination. Process Problem 1
PWB short circuits. Process Problem 0
ASI funding problems. Funding Problem 3
Conformal coating workmanship. Process Problem 0
Flex-circuit cable via problems. Process Problem 0
Flex-circuit cable workmanship problems. Process Problem 0
5
Lessons Learned

• The Joint Oversight Group is too removed to
  resolve schedule and funding issues for the
  project
• When a DOE laboratory takes on a project in a new
  discipline such as GLAST, extra effort is
  required at the beginning to assure that the
  scope of the project is well understood.
• Also, the new infrastructure that is required
  needs to be identified and adequately planned
• Facilities
• Staffing particularly special expertise
  required
• Management staffing, systems and procedures
• The DOE does not have the technical staff, QA
  support, management support, and funding
  flexibility that are available from the GLAST
  Mission Office
• In particular, lack of funding flexibility
  limited the DOEs ability to assist in
  identifying the issues and provide adequate
  response
• The DOE TEC was defined before the project was
  adequately engineered
• GLAST predates PED funds

6
Path Forward

• SLAC now has the facilities in place to integrate
  a space instrument
• Key staff are in place to execute future
  space-based instrumentation projects
• In particular, a strong data acquisition system
  staff is in place with experience with space
  hardware and software
• The Kavli institute is attracting renown
  astro-physicists
• Executing key science with GLAST
• Planning and executing future astro-physics
  projects.