Philosophy of Mind

1
Philosophy of Mind
Dualism
The Mind/Brain Identity Theory
Analytical Behaviourism
Multiple Realisability
Liebnizs Law
How the Mind and Body Interact an Introduction
Introduction
Phenomenological Features of Mental States
Type- Type Identity
Intentionality
Soft Behaviourism
Pre-Established Harmony
Outright Rejection of Pretence and Stoicism
Type- Token Identity
Naturalistic Theory
Hard Behaviourism
Parallelism
Token- Token Identity
Reliable Indication
The Turing Test
Occasionalism
Property Dualism
The Problem of Other Minds
Dualism
Supervenience
Biological Naturalism
Introduction
Wittgenstinian Positive Accounts
Persons, not brains, as possessors of mental
states
Epiphenomenalism
Analogy for the Existence of Other Minds
Functionalism
Completeness of Physics Doctrine
Consciousness
The Turing Test
Wittgenstinian Criticisms
Personal Identity
General Information
Revision Material
Substance and Property Dualism and the Mind-Brain
Identity Theory
Syllabus
Syllabus
Key Terms
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General Information
Substance Dualism
What is the difference between Substance and
Property Dualism, and how do they relate to the
Mind-Brain Identity Theory?

• There are two fundamental types of things
  non-physical minds and material bodies.
• Persons the subjects of experience and
  consciousness in general, are to be identified
  with non-physical minds or souls (Descartes
  termed these as incorporeal, as they
  essentially have no body)
• Mental properties attach to non-physical minds
  or souls, and physical properties attach to
  material bodies.
• A substance dualist believes implicitly that
  persons have no physical features (hence the
  term personality seeming to be more than just
  the physical presence), and the body possesses no
  mental features.

Property Dualism

• Accepts a dualism SIMILAR to substance dualism,
  but rejects the notion of substance as defined
  therein, instead claiming that substances are
  only material things.
• This therefore renders Property-Dualists to be
  both property-dualists and non-reductive
  monists, as it combines dualism with regards to
  properties and monism with regard to substances,
  as there is only one type.
• Mental properties are not identical with
  physical properties, nor reducible to them

Mind-Brain Identity Theory

• Asserts that mental properties are nothing more
  than physical brain-properties and are logically
  and efficiently reducible to them

These definitions need to be considered in the
context of Supervenience, where it seems that
mental events are synonymous with brain/physical
events, as (as John Searle claimed) they are
effectively one and the same, seen from different
perspectives
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Property Dualism
The Completeness of Physics Doctrine
Having taken that Epiphenomenalism and/or
Supervenience have provided us with sufficient
indication that there is no such thing as mental
causation upon the world and that, therefore, the
concept of consciousness and mental causation are
reducible to mere effects of physical events,
the Completeness of Physics Doctrine helps to
complicate matters further. This one may
possibly slow down Descartes continual
grave-turning activities!
We start in the same way that one would start if
expounding epiphenomenalism, but thats where it
ends. The base tenet of The Completeness of
Physics Doctrine is that every physical event
has a physical cause that is sufficient to bring
it about, given the law of physics. The diagram
below continues to show that there is no mental
causality, until one looks at the text on the
left, which is an insight into the logic (even
though the logic and the argument overall are
rather week)
. rather week)
A physical event, B1 causes a mental event, M1,
and a physical event, B2, causes a mental event,
M2. B1 is causally sufficient to bring about B2,
therefore meaning that M1 has no place with
regards to being causally involved with B2, nor
does it cause M2 because all of the causal effect
comes down to B1 and B2 .
M1
However, there are grounds to argue that although
B1 is indeed causally sufficient to bring about
B2, why shouldnt M1 also play a role in bringing
it about and therefore avoid it being a mere
epiphenomenon?
This is a problematic theory, as it leads to the
concept of over-determination. Over
determination claims that an effect can have more
than one cause and each cause operating alone,
without the other, would have brought about the
end effect.
causes
causes
An example is as follows Two soldiers constitute
a firing squad, A soldier on the left shoots the
prisoner and, at the same time, the soldier on
the right does the same thing. Hence, even
though the shot from either soldier acting alone
would have sufficed to kill the prisoner, the
prisoner is killed by both soldiers.
Brain Event 1 B1
causes
Click to continue
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Property Dualism
Epiphenomenalism
One of the most important differences between
Epiphenomenalism and Supervenience is that
Epiphenomenalism does not start from the concept
of a Subvenient Base supervenient Mental
States need to permeate this hypothetical base,
whereas in the case of Epiphenomenalism the
element of causality as opposed to Supervenience
renders this unnecessary (see the diagram below)
M1
However, due to the nature of the relationship
between the two, you must know that the following
CANNOT happen!
M1
In essence the Mental State does not have its own
causality, therefore rendering it a property and
NOT a substance. M1 is caused by B1 this means
that, like Supervenience, the Mental States are
contingent, relying, in this case, upon B1.
Temporal causality
B1
B1
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Property Dualism
The Completeness of Physics Doctrine
The main problem thrown up here is that had
either soldier not fired a shot, the effect would
still have been brought about, as the prisoner
would have ultimately been killed. The fact that
the prisoner was being shot at by two people is a
similar problem to that of the identity theory,
as the Multiple-Realisability of how the effect
was caused (e.g. soldier A or soldier B) is
similar to the question of the nature of types
and tokens (cf. token-token Identity Theory and
Intentionality). However, the problem of how
mental events can still be given causal roles
remains a problem. It is generally accepted that
we can reject the principle of causal closure of
the physical world because certain things do not
happen just because of physical causation my
body only moving itself involuntarily is a
strange concept, given that many of my bodily
movements are voluntary and therefore require
mental involvement/events (well, it seems that
this is as thus, but as we know this cannot be
taken for granted in the realm of Philosophy of
Mind!). A better alternative offered by K. Maslin
is that although brain processes give rise to
mental events, they lead to our actions in
conjunction with physical events. This is not
extremely well explained, but seems to base
itself partially on the idea that total
non-mental causation is simply absurd.
An example is as follows Two soldiers constitute
a firing squad, A soldier on the left shoots the
prisoner and, at the same time, the soldier on
the right does the same thing. Hence, even
though the shot from either soldier acting alone
would have sufficed to kill the prisoner, the
prisoner is killed by both soldiers.
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Property Dualism
Biological Naturalism
In Minds, Brains and Science, John Searle
proposed that brains cause minds, and minds in
themselves are features of the brain. This form
of approach to the Philosophy of Mind is called
Biological Naturalism. Biological Naturalism
was an attempt to reconcile the biological order
of the world (such as fibres firing, synapses
opening and closing etc) with the natural order
of things (such as the nature of minds) using
only natural means (natural in the context of
the natural sciences). Searle devised this
theory and many other people took it and made it
into their own, along with the theories and
guidance of Searle. However, Searle
established the logic and veracity of his
theory. One of the ways that he introduced his
theory was by asking one to think about water.
On the one hand we have a normal everyday
understanding of water e.g. that it moves
easily and is non-viscous and is see-through on
the other hand we have an understanding that
looks more scientifically at what it is e.g.
H2O, a series of molecules that relate to each
other, their temperature defined by how much they
collide with each other, etc. Searle uses this
to explain the mind like the water, the mind
works on both a macro-level and a micro-level.
Click here to continue with Supervenience
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Property Dualism
Supervenience
The Biological Explanation of Supervenience
The Problem That Arises The main problem that
arises is that, in the case of Supervenience, the
mental states are the only ones that are
available to us as we cannot, at present, access
the physical states with our technology and/or
without killing people. We also cannot tell
what physical/brain state is represented by the
mental state. Therefore, by using the
type-token theories, we realise that either
P, M or B states are either (I) constantly
relating, (II) differing with regards to the
subvenient base, or (III) both P/B and M
states are multiply realisable.
_at_ the Macro-Level (above the subvenient base)
we see/observe mental states, these being
supervenient upon the Micro-Level
physical/brain states. The way that we interpret
these isnt important in this theory the issue
is avoiding the question of causation as, in
essence, it doesnt exist!
_at_ the Macro-Level, we can the surface of the
water moving the wave is supervenient upon the
molecules because it is ridiculous to say that
one causes the other, as they are ontologically
the same/identical.
_at_ the Micro-Level (below the subvenient base),
you can presume the presence of physical/brain
states (e.g. P1, which is equal to B1)
_at_ the Micro-Level, the water is molecules
moving at different speeds according to the
temperature
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Property Dualism
What is Supervenience?
Davidson rejected the type-type identity theory
(mind/brain identity theory) and adopted a more
logical token-token identity theory. This was
because he rejected substance dualism, which
therefore led to his belief that there is no such
thing as non-physical mental events.
Non-physical mental events obviously have
physical properties which become physical events,
but also irreducible mental properties too.
Davidson wholly rejected the idea that an event
might have mental and physical properties that
coexisted as a matter of fact and which were/are
merely accidentally related and nothing further.
He rejected this on many grounds, one of which
was probably the consideration that it was not
backed-up by proof or evidence. It was this
conclusion that led to Davidson proposing the
doctrine of Supervenience, the idea that mental
events supervene on physical properties.
Although the position I describe denies that
there are psycho-physical laws, it is consistent
with the view that mental features are in some
sense dependant on, or supervenient, on physical
characteristics. Such supervenience might be
taken to mean that there cannot be two events
alike in all physical respects, but differing in
some mental respects, or that an object cannot
alter in some mental respect without altering in
some physical respect. Davidson Essays
on Actions and Events 214

• These words are basically the reason for
  clarification of Supervenience. The three ways
  of clarifying supervenience are (1)
  Irreducibility, (2) Co-Variation and (3)
  Dependence. LEARN THESE THEORIES!!!

Click here to continue with Supervenience
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Property Dualism
Persons Possess Mental States!
Brains dont!!!
Only of a living human being and what resembles
in (behaves like) a human being can one say it
has sensations it sees is blind hears is
deaf is conscious or unconscious. Wittgenstei
n Philosophical Investigations
This obviously opens the gate to the possibility
and plausibility of Qualia. Does it
suggest(tricky word, yes, but you know what I
mean) that pure subjectivity, (existential?)
Qualia account for what it is to be a person and
that we can have consciousness? Does the issue
of Qualia have to be linked to consciousness and
self-hood?

• As Maslin says in Understanding Philosophy AQA
  
• In attributing mental states to the brain one is
  attributing what properly belongs to the whole to
  the whole person to a part of that person, albeit
  an admittedly vital part. He continues to say
  the following
• My car has the capacity to accelerate quickly,
  and to reach a top speed of 100 miles an hour
  (show-off!) because of its engine. But it is not
  engines that accelerate and speed along the road,
  but cars. On its own an engine is capable of
  very little indeed. A helpful way to link this
  with other areas of Philosophy is to think of
  Platos Analogy of the Ship. In the same way
  that the captain is required to control a shop,
  you wouldnt say that the captain is ploughing
  through the crests and troughs of the ocean waves
  the ship is. It is a sort of category error to
  claim that it is the captain, and it is
  disregarding/ignoring the holistic nature of the
  ship and, indeed, the body.
• Brains own their own can do nothing. They
  cannot speak, fall in love, betray people, save
  lives, express gratitude, or any of the myriad
  things that people do in everyday life. As parts
  of people, however, they ground the capacities
  for speech and action which take place in a
  public world. Aristotle said that the brain is
  the vehicle of the capacities for thought,
  language and action possessed by people (sic).

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• For and Against Consciousness
• For
• Intentionality of Mental States
• Qualia (c/f the difference between absent and
  inverted qualia - examiners want you to know
  this!)
• Wittgenstein (persons as possessors of mental
  states)
• Private Ostensive Definition (only because it
  hints at a personal, private understood language.
  Dont go overboard on this one though as it
  isnt 100 relevant and will only be a mark
  adder, not a mark-grabber
• Subjectivity (c/f Frank Jackson)
• Against
• The Mind/Brain Identity Theory
• Logical/Philosophical Behaviourism
• Chinese Room Argument (Functionalism)
• Turings Computational Functionalism doesnt
  really address the problem of explaining/explainin
  g away consciousness, but as a passing comment
  does hint as to whether the brain has subjective
  experience or is merely a highly intelligent
  advanced processor/set of interacting processors.
• The Chinese Mind Argument

• Remember Supervenience and Epiphenomenalism
  actually serve to look at the nature of mental
  states. To apply these arguments to the issue of
  consciousness would be relatively futile as there
  could be no possible conclusion to give. If a
  question was about the causal nature of mental
  states, then you would be right to cite both of
  these arguments and Biological Naturalism
  therein. This is logical because it is based upon
  arguments of Property-Dualism.

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• Syllabus - 1

Approaches to Mentality and the Nature of Mind

• The criteria for distinguishing mental states
  from physical states and the adequacy of these
  criteria immediate, privileged, and infallible
  access qualia, feelings, images and sensations,
  intentionality, beliefs and aims.
• Theories concerning the nature of the mind
  substance and property dualism materialist
  theories including behaviourism, identity theory,
  eliminative materialism, functionalism and
  biological naturalism
• Polarities and tensions between these approaches,
  particularly those concerning subjectivity and
  naturalism areas of overlap and compatibility.

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• Syllabus - 2

The Mind and Body Problem

• The problem of explaining the relationship
  between mentality and physicality. Is mentality
  dependent upon but distinct from the physical?
  Or is mentality physical?
• How dualist and materialist theories conceive the
  relationship between body and mind and how they
  explain, or explain away, the problem of mental
  causation (2).
• The utility, or otherwise, of consciousness as an
  explanatory concept. Can consciousness be
  reduced or dispensed with?

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• Syllabus - 3

Knowledge of Self and Self-Consciousness

• Introspection as a source of knowledge privacy
  and certainty, immediate and infallible
  accessibility
• Can we begin from our own case? What role can
  conscious, conceived as private and objective,
  experience have in explanations of the meaning of
  mental terms? How do we learn to self-ascribe?
  Could we be language users?

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• Syllabus - 4

Knowledge of Others

• Solipsism and the problem of other minds. The
  inaccessibility of others and the issue of the
  evidential criteria necessary for the ascription
  of mental states to others
• Do some machines satisfy these criteria?
• Attempts to solve the problem, including
  arguments from analogy, behaviour-disposition
  accounts and criteriological arguments.

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• Syllabus - 5

Persons

• What is a person? The properties and powers
  necessary for selfhood.
• The problem of personal identity through time.
  Criteria for personal identity bodily
  continuity, psychological continuity.

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The Problem of Other Minds
Click here to continue with Problem of Other Minds
In this section of Philosophy of Mind, we turn to
the epistemological question of The Problem of
Other Minds. The essential question which we
endeavour to answer here is what we can ascertain
and learn about other minds. The Mind Brain
Identity Theory left us with no way of
determining the states of other minds, as did
Analytical Behaviourism which, although led us to
be able to determine states of mind in an
extremely shallow and limited way, is not really
satisfying per se. The total and eventual
reduction of patterns of actual and potential
behaviour to the mind was seemingly deemed a
failure. Dualism was relatively helpful as it
allowed the accommodation of the privacy of the
mind, but left us with an after-taste of
incorporeality, which is seemingly too
far-fetched a theory to be believable. We really
get going with this theory when we accept that we
have a relative level of privacy of mind, but not
necessarily total. I appear to have a direct and
privileged access to my own mind, but not those
of other people. I cannot directly observe their
mental states, so where am I left? The most that
I can directly witness of others is their
behaviour in the form of their speech and
actions. It is therefore upon this basis that we
must start and finish. See the next slide in
order to continue from this point onwards.
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The Problem of Other Minds
Click here to continue with Problem of Other Minds
There are two kinds of inference about the nature
of other minds available to us. They are as
follows
Deductive Inference Deductive Inference is
basically the application of (inverse)
reductionist theory. The main (and key) problem
with this concept is that talk about mental
states is not analytically or ontologically
equivalent to talk about behaviour for the same
reasons discovered in Behaviourist theories.
Furthermore, it is relatively clear that
statements about mental states are different in
meaning from talk about public behaviour. As
Hilary Putman has said, it seems ridiculous to
think that pains as the cause of pain behaviour
can be reduced to their effects. This would
entail putting more into the conclusion that is
contained in the premises (behaviour).
Therefore, out of the proverbial window goes
deductive inference.
Inductive Inference There are various inductive
theories, but without doubt the most well known
is John Stuart Mills Argument from Analogy for
the Existence of Other Minds. The arguments
key premise is neatly summarised by Maslin in the
following quote I conclude that other human
beings have feelings like me, because, first,
they have bodies like me, which I know in my own
case, to be the antecedent (derivant) condition
of feelings and because, secondly, they exhibit
the acts and other outwards signs, which in my
own case I know by experience to be caused by
feelings (Mill An Examination
of Sir William Hamiltons Philosophy, 1889) In
other words, what John Stuart Mills primary
postulation is is that when I feel sad, I cry and
when I feel happy I smile. Therefore, when I see
other people cry I can accurately presume that
they are sad, and when I see other people smile I
can accurately presume that they are happy,
because they have the same type of body as me.
If I walk past someones house and see them
moving about inside through the shadows projected
onto the blinds I can presume that they are
having dinner. However, when I get to my house
and see that that is exactly what is happening, I
can confirm my initial thoughts. This is the
same as the mind if I see other people smiling
I can presume that they are happy because that is
the reflection of my mind upon my face when I am
happy.
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The Problem of Other Minds
Click here to continue with Problem of Other Minds

• Wittgensteins Main Criticisms
• Surprise, surprise, Wittgenstein is bang on the
  nail again! Wittgenstein points out some key
  problems for this theory, these being as follows
  (the first two are not exclusively
  Wittgenstinian)
• How can I generalise from my own case? Is it
  really sufficient to presume that because I react
  and behave in a certain way, because other people
  have bodies they therefore automatically have
  identical reactions? There are approximately 6.2
  billion people in the world was Mill really
  claiming that we would all react in exactly the
  same way?
• The argument from analogy for the existence of
  other minds incurs the same criticism that
  Behaviourism did, this being that pretence and/or
  stoicism often deny accurate ascription of Mental
  States
• (Wittgenstinian) Lets just accept that the
  primary premise of the argument from analogy for
  the existence of other minds is that I know what
  I mean by the words I use to describe mental
  states because I deal with those terms everyday
  in the privacy of my mind. The question that
  Wittgenstein posed is that, if this is so, how
  can I extend a radically private descriptive
  language that I have formulated and regulated to
  other people and other minds?

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The Problem of Other Minds
Click here to continue with Problem of Other Minds
The Rejection of Private Ostensive Definition and
Private Rule Following
If this is true, then Wittgenstein has
unwittingly blown Solipsism out of the water,
because how can one be doubtful about the
existence of other minds without the basic
premise that such a world exists to allow the
existence in the first place? (rather like
Anselms Classic Foundationalist Ontological
Theory)
Wittgenstein starts from the premise of Cartesian
Solipsism, this being that only myself, my
thoughts and my experiences exist. If this is
so, then the words and expressions that I use
acquire meaning purely within my mind.
Wittgenstein rejects this outright he says
that, as Maslin puts it, words can only acquire
their meanings in a public social context.
Things are defined by a third-person social
setting . If a term is devised within the
radical privacy of one mind, it seems illogical
that it can be applied to another, because the
derivation of that word is private and,
therefore, non-ostensive. Wittgenstein asks us
to imagine a discussion about the colour blue
(see AQA Maslin, pp. 62-63). It is only through
comparison and (passive) analysis of the colour,
usually through interaction with other people.
that one comes to an understanding of what the
colour blue is or looks like. Its a category
error to claim or suppose that this definition
can be decided upon through radical privacy,
because this would lead to the absence of a
universal definition of what blue is. The
application of Private Ostensive Definitions
seems as logical as speaking in English to a man
in Arabic about a train set and expecting him to
know exactly what you are talking about. Just
because you know what you are talking about, it
doesnt automatically follow that he does!
Wittgenstein takes this even further through more
brilliant argument and rhetoric. Wittgenstein
says that Private Rule following is not possible
(as the title says!). The example he gives is as
follows Suppose someone has a particular
sensation. As I am typing this, I have an
extraordinarily strange pain down my right leg.
Suppose, then, that I call that pain S. This
means that whenever I experience this pain in the
future, I need to recall the categorisation and
thus infer that I am suffering pain with this
sensation I have called S. However, the first
hurdle I reach is that I need to remember exactly
what S was, otherwise I will be using the terms
incorrectly. I therefore need to follow a rule
within the radical privacy of my mind, but how
can I actually tell whether I am following that
rule? Unless I have an exceptionally brilliant
mind, I cannot (and do not). I need a way to
check this outside of my mind, but by then I have
circumvented the private-rule-following, thus
making true private-rule-following logically
impossible.
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The Problem of Other Minds
Wittgensteins Positive Account of how Mental
Terms Acquire Meaning and a Use
Wittgenstein says that mental terms acquire their
meanings in a third-person public social context.
Behaviour can be used to assess mental states,
but holistically. An example given is that if
someone is tickled and giggles and laughs and
then says that he/she is in pain, he/she can be
corrected for using an inappropriate term. Even
in my own case, when I report my state of mind
without recourse to observation of my behaviour,
criterionless self-ascription as it is known, my
words must fit in with the rest of my behaviour
if they are to be used correctly (AQA Maslin,
page 64).
Wittgensteins Replacement of Natural Pain
behaviours By The Use of Mental States
Wittgenstein said that mental terms (e.g. pain)
naturally come to replace exclamations of the
mental term (e.g. Ouch!). The exclamation
Ouch! doesnt describe the pain but is an
expression of the pain which eventually comes to
be replaced with sentences such as I am in
pain, Its hurting a lot and Im in
agony. However, here we encounter a problem.
The sentences given above have truth-values (e.g.
I am in pain is a truthful statement), whereas
an expression of pain such as Ouch! does not,
therefore they are categorically different from
one another. Another problem is that a
non-behavioural inner-state causes an outward
behavioural one. An example Maslin gives is that
if someone has the measles, the condition seems
to cause the spots. This can be empirically
quantified, yet it is not empirically
quantifiable that a given pain causes a certain
reaction. This is, again, similar to (not
identical to) the problems with behaviourism.
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Mind Over Matter
Click Here To Continue With a Basic Introduction

• The Matter
• Exists in Res Extensa
• Something extended
• Empirically quantifiable
• Divisible in nature

• The Mind
• Exists in Res Cogitans
• Something incorporeal
• Empirically a non-quantifiable
• Non divisible in nature

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The Key Problem
Our perceptual experiences depend on stimuli
which arrive at our various sensory organs from
the external world and these stimuli cause
changes in our mental states ultimately causing
us to feel a sensation, which may be pleasant or
unpleasant.
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How, then, do the two interact???
Physical States
Mental States
Pre-Established Harmony
Pre-Established Harmony is one of Leibniz's less
ingenious ideas! He was a strict ontological
monist (believing that reductionism could be
applied to everything until we get to monads
similar to atoms in a way), but believed that
what we perceive as M States and what we
perceive to be P States are not causally
effective or related. The only reason why they
work in harmony is because (get this) God
intended it to be that way before our births.
Hhhmmmmmmmm nice one!
God...
24
How else, then, do the two interact???
Physical States
Mental States
Parallelism
Essentially identical to Pre-Established Harmony,
but with a different name. M States have a
causal interaction with other M States, and P
States have causal interaction with other P
States. It is, therefore, to call Leibniz a
Parallelist as well as a Pre-Established
Harmonist (a good way to remember that Leibniz
was a Monist!)
25
How, then, do the two interact???
Physical States
Mental States
Occasionalism
Occasionalism was proposed by Nicholas
Malebranche, who that there was/is no causal
relationship between mental and physical states
or events. He said that, yes, mind and body are
ontological different substances, but their
seeming causal inter-relation is purely down to
the intervention of God.
GOD
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Philosophical Functionalism

• According to www.wikipedia.org
• Functionalism is a theory of the mind in
  contemporary philosophy, developed largely as an
  alternative to both the Identity Theory and
  Behaviourism. Its core idea is that mental states
  (beliefs, desires, being in pain, etc.) are
  constituted solely by their functional role
  that is, their causal relations to other mental
  states, sensory inputs, and behavioural outputs.
  Since mental states are identified by a
  functional role, they are said to be multiply
  realisable in other words, they are able to be
  manifested in various systems, even perhaps
  computers, so long as the system performs the
  appropriate functions. While functionalism has
  its advantages, there have been several arguments
  against it, claiming that it is an insufficient
  account of the mind.
• Multiple Realisability
• An important part of some accounts of
  functionalism is the idea of multiple
  realisability. Since, according to standard
  functionalist theories, mental states are the
  corresponding functional role, mental states can
  be sufficiently explained without taking into
  account the underlying physical medium (e.g. the
  brain, neurons, etc.) that realizes such states
  one need only take into account the higher-level
  functions in the cognitive system. Since mental
  states are not limited to a particular medium,
  they can be realized in multiple ways, including,
  theoretically, within non-biological systems,
  such as computers. In other words, a
  silicon-based machine could, in principle, have
  the same sort of mental life that a human being
  has, provided that its cognitive system realized
  the proper functional roles. Thus, mental states
  are individuated much like a valve a valve can
  be made of plastic or metal or whatever material,
  so long as it performs the proper function (say,
  controlling the flow of liquid through a tube by
  blocking and unblocking its pathway).
• However, there have been some functionalist
  theories that combine with the identity theory of
  mind, which deny multiple realisability. Such
  Functional Specification Theories (Levin, 3.4),
  as they are called, were most notably developed
  by David Lewis (1980) and David Malet Armstrong
  (1968). According to functional specification
  theory, mental states are the particular
  "realisers" of the functional role, not the
  functional role itself. The mental state of
  belief, for example, just is whatever brain or
  neurological process that realizes the
  appropriate belief function. Thus, unlike
  standard versions of functionalism (often called
  Functional State Identity Theories) (FSITs),
  FSITs do not allow for the multiple realisability
  of mental states, because the fact that mental
  states are realized by brain states is essential.
  What often drives this view is the belief that if
  we were to encounter an alien race with a
  cognitive system composed of significantly
  different material from humans' (e.g.,
  silicon-based) but performed the same functions
  as human mental states (e.g., they tend to yell
  "Ouch!" when poked with sharp objects, etc.) then
  we would say that their type of mental state is
  perhaps similar to ours, but too different to say
  it's the same. For some, this may be a
  disadvantage to FSITs. Indeed, one of Hilary
  Putnam's (1960, 1967) arguments for his version
  of functionalism relied on the intuition that
  such alien creatures would have the same mental
  states as humans do, and that the multiple
  realisability of standard functionalism makes it
  a better theory of mind.

• Chinese Room Criticism

• Chinese Nation Criticism

27
Criticisms of Functionalism The Chinese Room
This criticism of Functionalism, called The
Chinese Mind argument is a mind experiment
created by John Searle in response to the
(ridiculous) claim by Functionalists that
machines can display consciousness. This is in
response to the claim that computers can pass the
Turing Test a test by Alan Turing which
asserts that computers can display consciousness
to the extent that a computer can hear Chinese,
respond to it using a syntactical and grammatical
application of Chinese, and convince a Chinese
person that he/she is speaking to another Chinese
person. Searle claimed that he could be in a
room, isolated from everyone and everything else,
equipped with a Chinese/English dictionary and
respond to any inputs accordingly. Although he
can apply the linguistics of Chinese, this
doesnt mean that he actually understands it!
Searle applied this idea to Functionalism saying
that there is no such thing, therefore, as
Strong Artificial Intelligence (S.A.I.) where
a computer can actually have consciousness and/or
display consciousness. Searles counter-argument
is generally more convincing to the field of
Philosophy of Mind than Functionalism.

• Back to Definition of Functionalism

28
Criticisms of Functionalism The Chinese Mind
This criticism of Functionalism, called The
Chinese Nation argument was proposed by Ned
Block. It is slightly more straight-forward than
The Chinese Room Argument, but does rely to some
extent on presumption and the joint recognition
of absurdity!!! This theory asks us to imagine
that all the people in China behave in a way that
is typical of a brain (that is, according to
Functionalism), this being that all of the cells
work together and share the knowledge in the
brain in order that the brain works as a whole.
Each of the people contain the knowledge and each
of the individuals thus acts like a neuron.
Functionalism asserts that, as long as the people
perform their proper roles, with the proper
causal-inter-relation between inputs and outputs,
the system would be an actual mind, with
consciousness and mental states (etc.). Block
then tells us that this is pure absurdity and
that, in the same way that the Chinese Nation
working as a mind is absurd, so is the idea of
Functionalism.

• Back to Definition of Functionalism