RULES Part III

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RULES Part III

• Victor Kaptelinin 06-10-09

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Outline

• Games as systems of information
• Games as cybernetic systems
• Games as game theory systems
• Games as systems of conflict
• Breaking the rules

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Games as systems of information

• Information
• according to information theory (a measure of
  uncertainty, not knowledge)
• as knowledge
• Example an exam grade info
• 11 vs. Passed/ With distinction
• How to handle knowledge in a game
• Perfect vs. imperfect information
• Information economy
• Hiding and revealing systems

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How to handle knowledge in a game

• In this schema we consider games as interactive
  systems that put knowledge or information at
  play. Depending on the game, information can be
  randomized, acquired, transformed, hidden,
  rearranged, remembered, or forgotten.
• SZ p. 204

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Perfect vs. imperfect information

• Perfect information
• all players have complete knowledge about
  every element in the game at all time
• Imperfect information
• some information may be hidden from players
  during the game
• Examples Roulette (perfect) vs. Blackjack
  (imperfect)
• Both can provide meaningful play
• analytically competitive games (p) or treachery
  and deception (ip)
• Four types of games according to Celia Pearce
• information known to all players, information
  known to only one player, information known to
  the game only, randomly generated information

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Information economy

• The value of the information known to a player
  gains meaning within a larger system of the game
  an economy of information

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Hiding and revealing systems

• The fog of war
• Secret locations and hidden moves
• Item economies (e.g., earn points to learn and
  use new resources)
• Rules as information (discovering rules during a
  game, e.g., MYST)

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Games as cybernetic systems

• Cybernetic feedback loop
• sensor
• comparator
• activator
• Positive feedback (instability)
• Negative feedback (stability)
• Dynamic difficulty adjustment

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Games as game theory systems

• Game theory
• A branch of economics, the mathematical study of
  decision making it looks at how people behave in
  specific circumstances that resemble simple games
• Assumptions
• Rational players, who simultaneously reveal a
  strategy to arrive to an outcome that can be
  defined in a strict measure of utility

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Decision tree strategy

• Decision tree
• a branching tree-like diagram that describes
  all possible moves
• Strategy in game theory
• NOT a set of general guidelines and rules of
  thumb that guide us as we play
• A complete description of how you should act at
  every moment of the game

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Decision tree an example
a. Two players take turns marking empty squares,
starting from opposite ends b. A player can mark
1, 2, or 3 squares during his/her turn c. The
player, who marks the last square, LOOSES
1
2
3
4
P1
P2
start
P1 1
P1 12
P1 1,23
P2 2,34
P2 4
P2 34
P2 4
P2 4
P2 34
P1 wins
P1 wins
P1 wins
P1 2
P1 23
P1 2
P1 2
P2 3
P2 wins
P2 wins
P2 wins
P1 wins
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Some game theory concepts and phenomena

• Payoff matrix
• A grid describing the possible outcomes of a game
  theory problem
• Zero-sum games
• The utilities of two players are the inverse of
  each other (one players gain is another players
  loss)
• Degenerate strategy (exploit)
• A way to play a game that leads to victory every
  time. Are to be avoided
• The prisoners dilemma

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Games as systems of conflict

• Types of conflict
• Single player vs. a single player
• Group vs. Group
• One against many
• Every player for themselves
• Single player against a game
• Individual players competing independently
  against a game system
• A group of players cooperating against a game
• The New Games Movement
• The role of the goal
• The level playing field of conflict

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Breaking the rules

• Types of players
• The standard player
• The dedicated player
• The unsportsmanlike player
• The cheat
• The spoil-sport
• SZ p. 276