P1253297519bmYsk

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JANSANGHARSH MANCH 104, Maharanapratap Complex,
Ellisbridge, Ahmedabad. Ph. 07926577280
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• An arsonist named Marinus van der Lubbe, 24,
  from Holland, had been wandering around Berlin
  for a week attempting to burn government
  buildings.. The exact sequence of events will
  never be known, but Nazi storm troopers under the
  direction of Göring befriended the arsonist and
  helped him to burn the Reichstag that night.

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• The storm troopers, led by SA leader Karl
  Ernst, used the underground tunnel that connected
  Göring's residence with the cellar in the
  Reichstag. They entered the building, scattered
  gasoline, then hurried back through the tunnel.
  The Reichstag was set on fire on 27th Feb. 1933.

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The German Reichstag that was burnt on 27th
February, 1933
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When told of the arrest of the arsonist, Van der
Lubbe, Hitler became enraged "The German
people have been soft too long. Every Communist
official must be shot. All Communist deputies
must be hanged this very night. All friends of
the Communists must be locked up.
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Hitler left the fire scene and went straight to
the offices of his newspaper, the Völkischer
Beobachter, to oversee its coverage of the fire.
He stayed up all night with Goebbels putting
together a paper full of tales of a Communist
plot to violently seize power in Berlin. Over
4000 communists were killed thereafter.
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Chalo Ayodhya
PURNAHUTI MAHA YAGNA AT AYODHYA
    It all began with the mobilization by the
Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) for a programme at
Ayodhya, which they have called Purnahuti Maha
Yagna
1.1.1
8
Starting for Ayodhya from Ahmedabad station
1.1.1
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PURNAHUTI MAHA YAGNA AT AYODHYA
    Three groups of about 2000 each of Ram Bhakt
Karsevaks were to go to Ayodhya. The first group
was to leave Ahmedabad on 22nd February 2002 and
reach Ayodhya on 24th February 2002
1.1.1
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TRAVEL OF KARSEVAKS FROM GUJARAT TO AYODHYA
    The group of 2200 Ramsevaks which had gone
to Ayodhya from Ahmedabad on 22nd February 2002,
had started their return journey from Ayodhya to
Ahmedabad on 25th February 2002.
1.2.1
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From Ayodhya to Godhra by Sabarmati express
    There is absolutely no evidence that any
person in Gujarat (except may be the VHP) knew
about the specific date of the travel of the
Karsevaks from Ayodhya to Gujarat on 25th
February 2002. The Central, State and local
intelligence agencies have deposed before the
Commission that they did not have any information
about the travel plan of the Karsevaks!
2.1.7
12
From Ayodhya to Godhra by Sabarmati Express
and therefore, in the absence of this most vital
piece of evidence regarding the specific
information of the travel of the Karsevaks, there
could not have been any conspiracy hatched by any
person to burn the S6 coach of the Sabarmati
Express on 27th February, 2002.
2.1.7
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Chief Minister sets the agenda

• Yet the Chief Minister on 27th February, 2002
  had made the following press statement which was
  published all over Gujarat

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Chief Minister sets the agenda

• The abominable event that has occurred in Godhra
  does not befit any civilized society, is not a
  communal event but is an one sided collective
  terrorist attack by one community .. He further
  said that this incident is not a simple incident
  of violence or communal event but is a preplanned
  incident.

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Chief Minister sets the agenda

• Who could fit the bill of International
  Terrorist?
• They found a Maulana after one year of the
  incident - Maulana Umarji

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WHO WAS THIS TERRORIST?

• An innocent, old, semi-invalid respected muslim
  leader of the Ghanchi Community of Godhra who
  under the Orders of the District Collector
  Godhra, was in-charge of the official relief camp
  at Iqbal Primary School since 5.3.2002!
• He had met Atal Behari at Godhra on 4.4.2002,
  Deepak Swarup, IG Baroda range, DSP, Godhra and
  District Collector Jayanti Ravi on 3.3.2002 and
  regularly thereafter.

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Arrival of Sabarmati Express at Godhra
Late Arrival at Godhra
On 27th Feb.2002, the Sabarmati Express from
Ayodhya had arrived on platform no.1 at Godhra
Station at 7.43 hours in the morning almost five
hours late.
3.1.1
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Altercations between Karsevaks and Vendors
   Sheelaben Virpal, (Exh.167), Punamkumari
Tiwari, (Exh.169), Saitishkumar Ravidutt Mishra
(Exh.160), Sadhwiji Minakshi Deviji, a Karsevak,
(Exh.5678) and Smt.Savitaben Tribhovandas Sadhu,
a Ramsevak and activist of VHP (Exh.150) said
that there had been quarrels on the platform
with some tea vendors.
3.2.1-3.2.5
19
Attempted abduction of Sohiya
   There was also a reported incident involving
attempted abduction of a Muslim girl by the
Karsevaks. Ms Sophia Banu M. Shaikh, a minor girl
has deposed before the Commission and has stated
as under
3.2.8
20
Attempted abduction of Sohiya
   Ø    the persons wearing Saffron bands came
down on the Platform for tea and snacks. They
took their tea and snacks and at that time one
bearded person was there whom the persons wearing
the saffron bands started beating for some
reason.
3.2.8
21
Attempted abduction of Sohiya
   Ø    Seeing this, we got scared and we went
away a little far. In the meantime one person
wearing saffron band came and he covered my mouth
and started dragging me towards the station.
3.2.8
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Attempted abduction of Sohiya
 As I started shouting, he released me. As this
incident happened, I went inside the Platform
near the ticket counter. Along with me, my
mother and sister also went inside. We people
had become very scared because of which we
postponed the idea of going to Vadodara and
decided to go back to my auntie.
3.2.8
23
THE CONFLICTS IN THE STATION
  There are many such similar evidences to
establish that there was indeed a scuffle between
the Karsevaks and the tea vendor on the platform
of Godhra station including the Karsevaks
stopping a Muslim tea vendor from serving tea
inside the coach S-6 and also pushing him out of
the train.
3.2.9
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Departure of Sabarmati Express Chain pulling
by Karsevaks
   The Guard Shri Pachuram Verma has deposed at
Exh.34 that the chain was pulled after the train
had left Godhra station at a short distance and
the Driver had informed him in this regard.
3.3.3
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Departure of Sabarmati Express Chain pulling
by Karsevaks
   Guards specific statement is that- At 8.00
am, the train had started and at this time
persons wearing safforn head and neck bands came
running and boarded the train. I came to know
that the chain pulling had happened because these
karsevaks had not been able to get up.I did not
take any action since there was a big corwd of
karsevaks and I could not know who had
specifically pulled the chain.
3.3.3
26
Cont Departure of Sabarmati Express and
chain pulling by Karsevaks
It is therefore quite clear that the first chain
pulling was done from the train itself for the
reason that some of the Karsevaks who had got
down on the platform, were left out when the
train started at 7.48 am. In
all probability, the left out Karsevaks were
those who were involved in the quarrel and
scuffle with the tea vendor and because of their
engagement in this activity, they did not notice
starting of the Sabarmati Express.
3.3.6
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The Conflict after the first chain pulling

• After the first chain-pulling, the engine
  stopped just outside the platform with the S6
  coach near the parcel office. By this time due to
  the altercation in the station and specially as
  the news had spread that a Muslim girl had been
  abducted by the Karsevaks, a crowd of local
  Muslims gathered behind the parcel office.

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Shri Mohan Jagdish Yadav, the RPF constable
another eye witness, has deposed before the
Commission as under

• We saw stone throwing between the train
  passengers and the outside people. Some
  passengers were shouting slogans of Jai Shree
  Ram. We told those passengers to go and sit in
  the train and raising our sticks, we told the
  outsiders to go away and chased them away.

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Shri Mohan Jagdish Yadav, the RPF constable
another eye witness, has deposed before the
Commission as under
The passengers who were shouting and throwing
stones, were passengers of two coaches. The
people who were throwing stones from Signal
Falia, were doing so from behind the wall and
some of them were trying to jump across the wall
to enter the station.
3.3.7
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THE TRAIN RESTARTED FROM THE PARCEL OFFICE
STOPPED AGAIN NEAR THE A CABIN
3.3.7
31
The train that divided Gujarat
2.2.1
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HOW DID THE TRAIN STOP NEAR A CABIN?
THE GOVERNMENT OF GUJARAT AFTER SIX MONTHS,
EXTRACTED TWO CONFESSIONS, ONE FROM ANWAR
KALANDAR AND ANOTHER MUSLIM BOY, CONFESSING
THAT THEY HAD STOPPED THE TRAIN BY BOARDING THE
RUNNING TRAIN AND ROTATING THE ALARM CHAIN DISC
FROM OUTSIDE THE TRAIN!
4.1.4
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HOW DID THE TRAIN STOP NEAR A CABIN?
ANWAR KALANDAR HAS HOWEVER WITHDRAWN THE
CONFESSION AS IT WAS EXTRACTED UNDER TORTURE. BUT
WHAT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT THE RAILWAY HAD
MODIFIED THE DESIGN OF THE ALARM CHAIN PULLING
SYSTEM SINCE 1995 TO CURB THE MISUSE OF THE
SYSTEM BY TICKET LESS PASSENGERS WHO USED TO JUMP
OFF THE TRAIN BY ROTATING THE DISC FROM OUTSIDE
AND STOPPING THE TRAIN OUTSIDE THE PLATFORM. THIS
FACT HAD ESCAPED THE ATTENTION OF THE GUJARAT
POLICE WHILE EXTRACTING THE CONFESSION FROM ANWAR!
4.1.4
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4.1.4
35
HOW DID THE TRAIN STOP NEAR A CABIN?
    On enquiry with the railway authorities it
is learnt that all the 18 coaches of the
Sabarmati Express that had arrived at Godhra on
27/2/2002 had the modified alarm chain system and
therefore, the vacuum brakes could not be
activated by turning the alarm disk from outside
since the connecting rod is bifurcated as per the
new design. The ACP could be effected only from
inside the coaches and corrected from outside.
4.1.5
36
The bifurcated rod of alarm disc of S6
4.1.5
37
The bifurcated rod of alarm disc of S6
4.1.5
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HOW DID THE TRAIN STOP NEAR A CABIN?
The Guard Shri Verma has admitted that he along
with Shri Mukesh Pachhori had corrected the chain
pulling of the coach nos. 83101, 5343, 91263 and
88238 when the karsevaks had pulled the chain.
Thus from the clear statements made by both the
Guard as well as the Asst. Driver, on that day
they had set right the ACP in four coaches. In
this view of the matter, the ACP which was
noticed by Shri Harimohan Meena from coach no.
90238 was not corrected.
4.2.1
39
Setting right the ACP and departure of the train
after first ACP
    In practice, railway employees have to
physically rotate the alarm disk to reset the
Clappet valve. In the instant case as the facts
point out, the first chain pulling was done from
5 coaches, whereas the ACP was put right in four
coaches thereby leaving one Clappet valve
uncorrected..The Driver therefore dragged the
train upto A cabin and could not go farther!
4.2.4
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A Cabin
41
What did the Assistant Station Master see from
A Cabin
Shri Rajendraprasad Misrilal Mina, the Assistant
Station Master, who was an eye witness deposed as
under On 27-2-2002 I was on duty as Assistant
Station Master at A cabin of Godhra railway
station from 12 at night to morning upto 8.00 am.
4.3.1
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ContWhat did the Assistant Station Master see
from A Cabin
Sabarmati Express train arrived at Godhra
railway station at 7.43 am. Since the line was
clear, departure signal was given at 7.45 am. The
train started at 7.48 am. After some time the
train stopped by blowing the whistle. I could
see from the cabin that the train had stopped. At
that time no crowd was seen between A cabin and
the train.
4.3.1
43
ContWhat did the Assistant Station Master see
from A Cabin
When the train started again I looked at the
clock in the cabin and the time was 7.55 am. When
the train reached near the cabin I was standing
near window of the cabin for showing alright
signal. When the train arrived at A cabin, the
engine was blowing the whistle indicating chain
pulling.
4.3.1
44
ContWhat did the Assistant Station Master see
from A Cabin
The period between the restarting of the train
and its arrival at A cabin would have been
around 5 to 6 minutes. I did not see any crowd
at that time. It was about 8 Oclock when the
train had stopped.
4.3.1
45
ContWhat did the Assistant Station Master see
from A Cabin
When the train was moving with slow speed I had
seen a crowd running towards and alongwith the
train. When I got down from the cabin, at that
time some people from the crowd had come near the
cabin. Few persons from the mob were throwing
stones on the train...
4.3.1
46
ContWhat did the Assistant Station Master see
from A Cabin
The mob did not arrive together but ten to
fifteen persons were coming and
gathering....There were women and children also
in the mob. I did not see personally as to who
set the fire and how.
4.3.1
47
WHAT DID THE DSP PANCMAHAL, SHRI RAJU BHARGAV
SEE INSIDE S6 COACH
Shri Raju Bishankumar Bhargava, Police
Superintendent of Godhra, deposition before the
commission is very important to understand the
severity of the fire and the spped of its spread
He said that he had reached the burning coach at
about 8.30 a.m.
Cont.
5.1.14
48
WHAT DID THE DSP PANCMAHAL, SHRI RAJU BHARGAV
SEE INSIDE S6 COACH
He had seen people with black faces and with
some burn injuries on the head, coming out of the
coach.... seen ten to twelve passengers coming
out of that coach.... They were coming out of the
door on the Godhra side.... The injuries which he
noticed on the passengers were on the upper part
of their bodies.... he had not noticed any injury
below their waist portion.
5.1.14
49
WHAT DID THE DSP PANCMAHAL, SHRI RAJU BHARGAV
SEE INSIDE S6 COACH
Raju Bhargav said that he had not seen any
raising of flames in the area of that coach which
I could see from the door. I had seen only smoke
in that area.... I had not noticed any flames on
the floor of the area between the two doors. I
had also not smelt any inflammable fuel like
petrol kerosene, diesel etc.
5.1.15
50
Injured people
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Injured people
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Injured people
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Injured people
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Injured people
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Injured people
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The Governments version of the cause of
fire The fourth charge-sheet by Noel Parmar
The 4th Charge-sheet added the terrorist
conspiracy angle. The police version has not
qualitatively changed thereafter till the present
16 supplementary charge-sheet. The Case of the
2nd and 3rd Charge-Sheet was refined by adding
a conspiracy story. The conspiracy was claimed
to have been hatched on 26th February, 2002 by
Razak Kurkure, Salim Panwala, Haji Bilal and few
others around 9pm in the evening in room No. 8 of
Aman Guest house owned by Razak Kurkure.
5.3.6
57
The Governments version of the cause of
fire The fourth charge-sheet by Noel Parmar
The conspiracy included the plan to burn down
Sabarmati Express on 27th February, 02 and for
that purpose 140 liters of Petrol was allegedly
bought from Kalabhais Petrol pump in the night
and kept in Kurkures house. It is alleged that
Maulana Umarji had directed on 26th February, at
around 9-10.30pm that S6 coach should be burnt.
5.3.7
58
The Governments version of the cause of
fire The fourth charge-sheet by Noel Parmar
THE ENTIRE CHARGE OF THE PROSECUTION THAT THE S6
COACH WAS BURNT DOWN AS A PREPLANNED CONSPIRACY
RESTS ON A FSL REPORT THAT SOME RESIDUAL
HYDROCARBONS WERE FOUND IN SOME SAMPLES COLLECTED
AND PETROL FOUND IN TWO CARBOYS.
5.3.7
59
The Governments version of the cause of
fire Kerosene or Petrol ??
The reliability of the report of FSL of the
samples is very doubtful since hundreds of
onlookers and visitors including the Chief
Minister/other ministers had visited the site as
well as entered the S6 coach and therefore any
material taken from inside the coach or outside
on 28.2.2002 could be tampered and/or planted
material.
5.2.6
60
The Governments version of the cause of
fire Kerosene or Petrol ??
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The Petrol was used to burn a Garage and not S6

• SECONDLY, THE CARBOYS CONTAINING PETROL WERE NOT
  FOUND FROM NEAR THE S6 COACH BUT NEAR A DISTANT
  PLACE ADJACENT TO A MUSLIM GARAGE WHICH WAS BURNT
  DOWN BY THE KARSEVAKS AROUND 11 AM ON THE SAME
  DAY AS A REACTION TO THE BURNING OF THE S6 COACH.

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Burnt Trucks
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The Burning of S-6 Coach-Evidences
Hariprasad Joshi, in berth
No. 43 told the whole
story Thereafter the
smoke had reached the place where I was standing
inside the coach and as I inhaled the smoke that
reached there, I got suffocated and had fallen
down on the floor but as the smoke was less in
the lower side, my breathing was restored and I
found relief
5.1.1
65

The Burning of S-6 Coach-Evidences
Hariprasad Joshi, in berth
No. 43 told the whole
story As there was a huge rush
near berth no.72 of the coach, to save my life, I
had traveled to the opposite side towards seat
No1 by crawling on the floor and had reached to
right hand side door . backside of my jacket
near the shoulder and jacket cap had got burnt
due to flames of fire. I had burns on both the
ears and on the face and I had jumped down of
the coach from the door near Seat No.1.
5.1.1
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The Burning of S-6 Coach-Evidences
Hariprasad Joshi, in berth
No. 43 told the whole
story The moment I jumped out of the
coach and fell on the ground my breathing was
restored on getting the fresh air and it had then
struck me that my wife was inside the coach.
Therefore I had walked up to the side near the
seat where my self and my wife were sitting
near the window.
5.1.1
67
Flash Over
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Flash Over

• by Rob Aldcorn, Feb. 22, 2006
• Rapid Fire Progress
• Flashover - Backdraft - Fire Gas Ignition
• Marleau had become separated from his fellow
  firefighters when a room in an apartment building
  suddenly exploded into flames in what is commonly
  called a flashover or backdraftCapt. Marcel
  Marleau, 47, died battling a fire in a Montreal
  apartment buildingwhen he was caught in a
  backdraft, or a sudden explosion of flames.

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Flash Over

• FLASHOVER
• A sudden and sustained transition of a growing
  compartment fire to a fully developed fire that
  occurs when all of the combustible materials
  present reach their auto ignition temperature.
  Flame-over or roll-over can be an indication that
  flashover is imminent. It is important to note
  that ventilation may initially cause the fire to
  burn more intensely and as a result more heat
  energy may be released into the compartment than
  can be lost through the ventilation opening.

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WARNING SIGNS FOR FLASHOVER

• Flashover can occur when a developing
  compartment fire produces flames in the thermal
  layer near the ceiling. The flames in the thermal
  layer can roll or dance across the ceiling as the
  unburned products of combustion ignite and burn
  off more completely. Heat will increase and force
  firefighters to the floor. This lowering of the
  thermal layer is often accompanied by the sudden
  lowering of an existing smoke layer.

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BACKDRAFT

• A ventilation induced ignition of the gases or
  combustible products accumulated in an under
  ventilated compartment fire. With the
  introduction of ventilation the accumulation of
  unburned particles suddenly ignite and can blast
  out of the opening used for ventilation.

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Conclusions by Jansangharsh Manch

1. The official version of Government of Gujarat
   regarding the burning of the coach as developed
   through 9 charge-sheets does not inspire any
   confidence since the said version suffers from
   innumerable contradictions obvious on the face of
   records.

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Conclusions by Jansangharsh Manch

• B1. The theory that Razak Kurkuyre, Salim Panwala
  and few other Muslims of Signal Falia had
  conspired on 26.2.02 at about 9pm in the Aman
  guest house to burn down S6 coach at the behest
  of Maulana Umarji and for that purpose had bought
  140 liters of Petrol at 10pm and hid the same in
  Razaks house and after coming to know that the
  train was running late, organized the burning of
  S6 on 27.2.2002 at 8am

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Conclusions by Jansangharsh Manch

• B2. by first mobilsing a mob of 1000 to stone the
  train and thereafter sending a few boys inside
  the coach by cutting thru the vestibule canvas
  with 140 liters petrol and pouring the same
  inside and then setting fire to the coach etc
  suffers from the following obvious defects

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Conclusions by Jansangharsh Manch

• i) Absolutely no indication as to what was the
  original plan in case the train had arrived at
  the right time

82
Conclusions by Jansangharsh Manch

• ii) Absolutely no evidence as to how the
  conspirators came to know that Karsevaks were
  traveling by the Sabarmati express which would
  reach Godhra on 27.2.02. The police and the
  intelligence department consistently claims they
  had no such information!

83
Conclusions by Jansangharsh Manch

• iii) In the first three charge-sheets prepared
  by two separate I.O.s absolutely no allegations
  regarding the buying of 140 liters of Petrol from
  Hakims pump.

84
Conclusions by Jansangharsh Manch

1. On the contrary, the two employees (Prabhat Patel
   and the other) had given their statement before
   the police on 10.4.02 but did not mention such a
   huge sale of Petrol on 26.2.02 and went to a
   Magistrate to make in March, 2003 to make such
   allegations!

85
Conclusions by Jansangharsh Manch

• V) There is specific evidence on record to show
  that Karsevaks had pulled the chain and stopped
  the train in the station and not the Muslims!

86
Conclusions by Jansangharsh Manch

• Vi) The FSL has not found any petrol hydrocarbon
  in 500kg or so burnt materials from inside the
  coach and no Black Carboy was found any where
  inside or outside in which 140 ,liters of Petrol
  was carried!

87
Conclusions by Jansangharsh Manch

1. FSL did not find any remains of any carboy inside
   the coach. Where did the eight carboy in which
   the 140 liters of Petrol was allegedly carried
   vanish?

88
Conclusions by Jansangharsh Manch

• viii) In case 140 liters of Petrol was actually
  poured inside a coach and set on fire, it would
  create a massive explosion specially the coach
  being a confined space.

89
Conclusions by Jansangharsh Manch

• ix) In case of such a burning would a single
  passenger come out alive? In the present case
  over 70 passngers with superficial injuries above
  the knee have survived. Can such a pattern of
  burning of injured passengers be explained by
  fluid induced burning ?

90
Conclusions by Jansangharsh Manch

• The burning of the S6 Coach of Sabarmati Express
  on 27th February, 2002 was not by way of any
  preplanned conspiracy by the Muslims. It was not
  due to petrol or inflammable fluid that S6 had
  burnt but due to the flash fire that followed the
  initial ignition. The luggage caught fire
  thereafter and burnt the coach at a slower rate.

91
Conclusions by Jansangharsh Manch

• That the Honble Commission ought to recommend
  the ordering of fresh investigation by body of
  experts who have special knowledge of fire in
  enclosed spaces.
• That the Investigation Officer should be changed
  immediately.