POS 353453: 04282005

1
POS 353/453 04/28/2005

• Website.
• http//faculty.roosevelt.edu/erickson/courses/pos3
  53-453/
• Course agenda (overview).
• Topics/Concepts introduced by readings.
• Presentations.
• Surveillance.
• Cyberwarfare.
• Final Web Project Requirement.
• Post web version of final paper between paper due
  date and final exam.
• http//www.geocities.com/cerickson_ru/pos353
• Video Cases (as time allows).
• No Place to Hide Continued.
• Media Jihad - Webveillance of Extremists,
  Cyberwarfare.

2
Surveillance Society/Cyberwarfare Video Cases.

• Presentations.
• Cyberwarfare.
• Network Crashes.
• Surveillance Society/Cyberwarfare Video Cases.
• CIR Archived ABC video No Place to Hide.
• Border Control.
• Webveillance and Cyberwars of Terror.
• Clip from Media Jihad (NHK television fall 2004).
• Aaron Weisburd.
• Internet Haganah.
• Ties together surveillance and cyberwarfare
  readings.
• Complexity and difficulties of Grays postmodern
  war.

3
Surveillance Society

• Surveillance Society.
• Setting the stage.
• Long range trends, US and UK compared.
• Examples.
• City of Chicago Unified Camera Network.
• Open Loop Chicago.
• Surveillance Camera Players.
• MATRIX.
• Stanley and Steinhardt.
• Growing Surveillance Monster.
• Cultural representation of fears of surveillance
  society.
• Minority Report etc.

4
Surveillance Society

• Components of the Monster.
• Video surveillance proliferates.
• Dataveillance.
• Private data gathering industry.
• Cell phone location data.
• Genetics and privacy.
• Biometrics.
• Black boxes.
• RFID chips.
• GPS implants.
• Synergies of surveillance.
• Data profiling.

5
Surveillance Society

• ACLU recommendations.
• Changing terms of the debate.
• Not inexorable.
• Comprehensive privacy law commission.
• Rapid update of laws to catch up with
  technologies.
• Strengthening and updating 4th amendment.

6
Surveillance Society - FBI.

• New Slide3.

7
Surveillance Society - Democratic ISA Activity.

• New Slide4.

8
Surveillance Society - US Federal Wiretaps.
9
Surveillance Society - UK Wiretaps.
10
Surveillance Society - US Federal and State
Wiretaps.
11
Surveillance Society - US CIA Mail Intercepts.
12
Theory of Border Control - Libcki1

• Securing borders.
• Ideally.
• Know who the bad people are before they arrive.
• Detect them crossing border.
• Distinguish, apprehend them.
• Reality.
• Dont detect before entry.
• Large scale surreptitious flows (likely in the
  millions).
• Identity falsification pervasive and easy.

13
Theory of Border Control - Libcki2

• Basic tenets of border control.
• Contest between attackers and defender.
• Information, especially distinguishing threats.
• Internal and External wide are surveillance
  (focus on internal).
• Political/Psychopolitical.
• Borders.
• Immune System.
• National borders and terrorism.
• Cyberspace.
• Frontlines.
• Disease surveillance.

14
Transformation of Global Surveillance - Landau

• Technologies and Strategies of Surveillance.
• HUMINT.
• SIGINT.
• COMINT.
• Global surveillance.
• Cold war construction of global spanning
  surveillance networks.
• United States.
• National Security Agency.
• National Geospatial Intelligence Agency.
• ECHELON. FAS
• US and allied states.
• EU Report.
• Echelonwatch.
• Statewatch.

15
Privacy and Secrecy Post 9/11 - Rotenberg.

• Rotenberg, Marc.
• EPIC.
• Observing Surveillance Project.
• Diminishment of Privacy by legal means.
• CALEA, USA PATRIOT Act.
• Loss of Privacy via technical means.
• National ID Card.
• Face Recognition.
• Border Control.
• Expansion of Government Secrecy.
• Diminished access.
• Closed hearings.
• Consequences of government secrecy.

16
Privacy and Secrecy Post 9/11 - Rotenberg.

• Privacy and Power.
• Recognizing and governing information and power
  asymmetries.
• What are we to do?
• Build on existing constitutional traditions.
• Assess new systems of public surveillance.
• Balance of authority to surveil and the
  surveillance of authority.
• Descriptive vs. Normative evaluations of
  surveillance.
• Oppose fatalism regarding loss of privacy.

17
Cyberwarfare - Deibert and Stein.

• Network as organization form and useful analytic
  concept.
• Network as useful analogies for understanding
  cyberwarfare.
• Social networks and cyber-networks.
• Network on network warfare.
• Disruption of networks.
• Decay and debilitation.
• Traffic (overflow, congestion).
• Elimination of hosts.
• Protection
• Denial of targets.
• Goal.
• Hacking networks of terror w/o resentment and
  blowback.

18
Cyberwarfare - Lenoir.

• Military-Entertainment Complex.
• DARPA.
• Americas Army.
• Institute for Creative Technologies.
• Mods and gaming.
• Consequences of gaming conflict.
• Inevitable.
• Naturalizes assumptions.
• Enemy construction.
• Battlespace construction.
• Mistaking the map for the territory.
• Enemy gathers intelligence on tactics.

19
Cyberwarfare - Gray.

• Revolution in Military Affairs.
• Permanent Revolution in Military Affairs.
• Postmodern War?
• Fog of War and IT.
• Interaction of combatants and terrain/battlespace.
  
• Perfect information is impossible (Gödel/Church
  and Turing).
• Bleeding Reality versus dreams of tek
  perfection.
• Asymmetric globalization and conflict.
• Globalization and PM War.
• IT Central.
• Velocity.
• Bricolage of forms of war.
• Cyborgization.

20
Cyberwarfare - Gray.

• Globalization and PM War (continued).
• No dominant narrative for RMA.
• Complexification of gender.
• Peace as justification of war.
• Precision.
• Unmanned Vehicles.
• Non-lethal technologies.
• Shock and Awe versus Bleeding reality of Iraq
  occupation.

21
Cyberwarfare - Yurick and Doss.

• Information cycle and IW attack.
• Cyberwar video illustrates many of the key.
• States and Non-States developing significant IW
  capabilities.
• Rules of engagement.
• IW must fit w/n Geneva, Hague, UN and US law and
  doctrine.
• Ex ITU prevents signal interference but .
• Current US rules (fig 1, p. 15).
• Hostile intent.
• Declaration of forces as hostile.
• Future US rules
• Counter-offensive IW.
• Preemptive.
• Second strike.

22
Cyberwarfare - Yurick and Doss.

• Defensive Options available.
• IW attacks may be legal.
• Response may be counterproductive.
• US requires international cooperation.
• International Law ambiguous, should be exploited.
• Enemies will exploit ambiguities.
• IW dynamic but should be addressed now.