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American Escalation in Vietnam

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In a news conference, President Eisenhower discussed the importance of Indochina ... This document represents the response by the United States to the Geneva pact. ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: American Escalation in Vietnam


1
American Escalation in Vietnam
2
Envoys Probe Indochina Rebellion (1947)
  • Questions to consider
  • 1)Who is coming to Vietnam? Why is he there? Why
    is his country concerned with Vietnam?
  • 2)Who is in charge of French military operations
    in Vietnam?
  • 3)How is the Minister received in the city of
    Laos?
  • 4)To what do the French compare the Hanoi
    attack?
  • 5)How does the reporter refer to Vietnam in
    relation to France?
  • This is a Universal Newsreel story of the French
    Foreign Minister's visit to Indochina (Vietnam)
    to determine the cause of an uprising in Hanoi.

3
Report by the National Security Council on the
Position of the U.S. with Respect to Indochina
(27 February 1950)
  • This report by the National Security Council
    illustrates the U.S. concern about the spread of
    communism in South East Asia following World War
    II.
  • The policy of containment was adopted by the U.S.
    fairly early on.
  • The Problem To undertake a determination of all
    practicable United States measures to protect its
    security in Indochina and to prevent the
    expansion of communist aggression in that area.

4
War in Indochina Goes On (1953)
  • Questions to consider
  • 1)Who are the two factions in conflict in this
    story?
  • 2)What types of weaponry is each side using?
  • 3)The reporter refers to Indochinas Hot War.
    How is this different from a Cold War?
  • This news story from 1953 shows French Union
    forces under attack in Indochina. The French
    employ Napalm to defeat their ambushers.

5
Dwight D. Eisenhower on the War in Indochina
(1953)
  • This is an excerpt from a speech on the
    geopolitical considerations of the war in
    Indochina relative to France and the United
    States.
  • Questions to consider
  • 1)What are the types of reasons Eisenhower uses
    to support the French in Indochina?
  • 2)What countries does he predict would fall next?

6
Dwight D. Eisenhower Domino Theory Principle
(1954 )
  • In a news conference, President Eisenhower
    discussed the importance of Indochina in terms of
    the containment of Communism and international
    trade.
  • You have broader considerations that might
    follow what you would call the "falling domino"
    principle. You have a row of dominoes set up, you
    knock over the first one, and what will happen to
    the last one is the certainty that it will go
    over very quickly. So you could have a beginning
    of a disintegration that would have the most
    profound influences.
  • When we come to the possible sequence of events,
    the loss of Indochina, of Burma, of Thailand, of
    the Peninsula, and Indonesia following, now you
    begin to talk about areas that not only multiply
    the disadvantages that you would suffer through
    loss of materials, sources of materials, but now
    you are talking really about millions and
    millions and millions of people.
  • Finally, the geographical position achieved
    thereby does many things. It turns the so-called
    island defensive chain of Japan, Formosa, of the
    Philippines and to the southward it moves in to
    threaten Australia and New Zealand.

7
John Foster Dulles Indochina - Views of the
United States (29 March 1954)
  • Secretary of State Dulles expressed his concern
    for the nationalist movement in Indochina,
    declaring it is being influenced directly by the
    Soviet Union.
  • He also expressed a fear of Red China using its
    forces in the region to support an uprising.
  • The Communists are attempting to prevent the
    orderly development of independence and to
    confuse the issue before the world. The
    Communists have, in these matters, a regular line
    which Stalin laid down in 1924.
  • If the Communist forces won uncontested control
    over Indochina or any substantial part thereof,
    they would surely resume the same pattern of
    aggression against other free peoples in the
    area.

8
The Geneva Agreements(20 July 1954)
  • Agreement on the cessation of the hostilities in
    Vietnam
  • The Geneva Agreements theoretically ended the war
    between French Union forces and the Vietminh in
    Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam.
  • These states were to become fully independent
    countries, with the last-named partitioned near
    the 17th parallel into two states pending
    reunification through "free elections" to be held
    by July 20, 1956.
  • The United States and Vietnam were not
    signatories to these agreements.

9
Southeast Asia Collective Defensive Treaty The
Manila Pact (8 September 1954)
  • This document represents the response by the
    United States to the Geneva pact.
  • Each Party recognizes that aggression by means
    of armed attack in the treaty area against any of
    the Parties or against any State or territory
    which the Parties by unanimous agreement may
    hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace
    and safety, and agrees that it will in that event
    act to meet the common danger in accordance with
    its constitutional processes.

10
The Origins of the Insurgency in South Vietnam
(1954-1960)
  • Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, American
    leaders were determined to prevent Vietnam from
    becoming a unified communist state, even
    supporting an openly corrupt Ngo Dinh Diem until
    his assassination in 1963.
  • This document discusses the failure of the Geneva
    Settlement and recounts the steps which led to
    the U.S. support of Diem.
  • The Geneva Settlement of 1954 was inherently
    flawed as a durable peace for Indochina, since it
    depended upon France, and since both the U.S. and
    the Republic of South Vietnam excepted
    themselves.
  • The U.S. began to channel aid directly to South
    Vietnam, rather than through France. The
    convolution of French policy then thrust upon the
    U.S. a choice between supporting Diem or the
    French presence in Indochina. The U.S. opted for
    Diem.

11
Indochina News Brief (1955)
  • Questions to consider
  • 1)What new army was being used in the battle?
    From whom did they receive their training?
  • 2)What types of prisoners were taken?
  • 3)Who won the battle? What kinds of surrender
    terms were imposed?
  • This newsreel story covers a battle near Saigon
    in which Diems new forces are employed. Hundreds
    are killed or wounded, and many prisoners were
    taken.

12
Civil war in Saigon (1955)
  • Questions to consider
  • 1)Who would the civil war have been between?
  • 2)From whom was the victorious side receiving
    aide?
  • This story was part of the Summer 1955 review. It
    summarizes the story of the Civil War which broke
    out in Saigon and was eventually brought to a
    successful end for the South Vietnamese
    government.

13
President Kennedy UN Speech on Vietnam (1961)
14
President Kennedy Its Their War. (1963)
  • During an interview with Walter Cronkite,
    President Kennedy stated that the people of
    Vietnam, not Americans, must win their war
    against communism.
  • During the same Cronkite interview, the President
    dismissed the notion of US withdrawal from
    Vietnam on the grounds of protecting Indochina
    from the domination of communist powers.

Clip One
Clip Two
15
The Gulf of Tonkin Incident (1964)
16
President Johnson Message to Congress (5 August
1964)
  • President Johnson outlined what the U.S. policy
    should be in answer to the Gulf of Tonkin
    Incident.
  • Our policy in southeast Asia has been consistent
    and unchanged since 1954 America keeps her word.
    Here as elsewhere, we must and shall honor our
    commitments.
  • As President of the United States I have
    concluded that I should now ask the Congress, on
    its part, to join in affirming the national
    determination that all such attacks will be met.

17
Joint Resolution of Congress H.J. RES 1145 (7
August 1964)
  • Popularly known as the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution,
    this piece of legislation was passed by Congress
    in support of Johnsons proposals.
  • The Congress approves and supports the
    determination of the President, as Commander in
    Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel
    any armed attack against the forces of the United
    States and to prevent further aggression.
  • The United States is prepared to take all
    necessary steps, including the use of armed
    force, to assist any member or protocol state of
    the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty
    requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.

18
Johnson on Vietnam Vows to Fight On Until Reds
Parley (1965)
  • Questions to consider
  • 1)What analogy does President Johnson use to
    describe Red China and North Vietnam?
  • 2)What does Johnson say he is doing to alleviate
    tensions in Vietnam?
  • 3)What does he claim will bring an end to the
    war?
  • In this speech to the Association of American
    Cartoonists, Johnson expresses his hopefulness
    for a peaceful Vietnam. He also puts forth a
    policy of staying the course until the
    Communists are ready to negotiate peacefully.

19
Multimedia Citation
  • Slide 1 http//www.remember.gov/history/images/v
    ietnam/vietnam_march.jpg
  • Slide 2 http//www.archive.org/details/1947-01-16
    _New_Head_Of_Church_Installed
  • Slide 3 http//alumni.usc.edu/travel/images/2004_
    images/Indochina-2.jpg
  • Slide 4 http//www.archive.org/details/NewsMaga_4
  • Slide 5 - 6 http//www.cia.gov/csi/monograph/firs
    tln/955pres18.gif
  • http//www.earthstation1.com/pgs/vietnam/des-Eisen
    howerOnVietnamWar1953.mp3.html
  • Slide 7 http//www.dhm.de/lemo/objekte/pict/Biogr
    aphieDullesJohnFoster_photoDullesJohnFoster/index.
    jpg
  • Slide 8 http//www.earthstation1.com/pgs/vietnam/
    dev-GenevaAccordsSigningCeremony540721.mpg.html
  • Slide 9 http//www.afa.org/magazine/aug2004/0804d
    ien9.jpg
  • Slide 10 http//history.acusd.edu/gen/20th/images
    /36-3001a.gif
  • Slide 11 http//www.archive.org/details/1955-07-1
    5_President_Foreign_Students_Hear_Peace_Hopes
  • Slide 12 http//www.archive.org/details/NewsMaga_
    5
  • Slide 13 http//www.earthstation1.com/pgs/vietnam
    /dev-KennedyUNOnVietNam61.mpg.html
  • Slide 14 http//www.earthstation1.com/pgs/vietnam
    /des-JFK-'It'sTheirWar'630902.mp3.html
  • http//www.earthstation1.com/pgs/vietnam/des-JFK-W
    ithdrawalFromVietnam'WhollyWrong'630902.mp3.html
  • http//www.cia.gov/csi/monograph/firstln/955pres24
    .gif
  • Slide 15 http//www.earthstation1.com/pgs/vietnam
    /dev-NavyVersionOfGulfOfTonkinIncident.mpg.html
  • Slide 16http//www.ee.princeton.edu/jay/lbj.jpg
  • Slide 17 http//edusolution.com/myclassroom/photo
    gallery/congress.jpg
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