USA and RUSSIA in a comparative perspective

1
USA and RUSSIA in a comparative perspective

• Lecture in political science course political
  systems I
• PART 2 RUSSIA
• Winter semester 2004 - 2005
• University of Fribourg
• Prof. Nicolas Hayoz
• Nicolas.hayoz_at_unifr.ch

2
Topics covered

• What kind of political system?
• Aspects of the political system
• Elections
• Political parties
• Interest groups
• State structure
• Executive power
• Relations between Parliament and Executive power
• Territorial structure of the state
• Big or small government?

3
Russia size, centralisation, imperial
tendencies
4
Thesis Russia as a semi-authoritarian regime

• Presidential elections in Ukraine and what they
  tell us about Putins Russia
• Russia is not just a democracy with adjective,
  for example a defective democracy. Russia fits
  with a special type of hybrid regimes, that we
  may call semi-authoritarian
• Classification of regimes is important
  potential of change direction of change
  democracy or something different?
• Ukrainian scenario? New democratization process
  as a result of uprising following electoral fraud
• The case of Ukraine shows A chance for a new
  democratic beginning in semi-authoritarian
  structures needs specific conditions

5
Democracy and authoritarianism in Russia

• One approach Russia is a democracy-with-adjectiv
  e-thing
• Formally it looks like a democracy, the state
  seems to function and some important economic
  reforms have been implemented
• Putins regime may be called illiberal, but the
  political system may still be described as
  democratic, although not without a negative
  qualifier
• defective or deficient democracy (Merkel,
  Croissant) for example, since factors like the
  absence of rule of law or the predominance of the
  executive are not allowing to present the regime
  as a full democracy
• Illiberal democracy (Zakaria)
• After all a flawed democracy is still a
  democracy really?
• Problem with this approach
• transition paradigm ? illusion that even a
  deficient democracy will become a full democracy
  in a near future
• How to explain Putins drifting towards more
  authoritarianism by calling Yeltsins regime a
  democracy?

6
Democracy and authoritarianism in Russia II

• Another approach Russia comes rather close to a
  kind of authoritarianism with adjectives, see for
  that view for example
• Competitive authoritarianism (WayLevitsky),
• Bureaucratic authoritarianism (L. Shevtsova)
• Semi-authoritarianism (M.Ottaway)
• Why should we privilege the semi-authoritarianism
  type for the case of Russia?
• ? Overview on a possible typology of illiberal
  regimes

7
Minimal and extended criteria for a democracy

• Procedural criteria?Robert Dahl (1971 und 1998)
• Elected officials
• Free, fair and regularly held elections
• Freedom of expression
• Alternative sources of information
• Political pluralism
• Inclusive  citizenship 
• Rule of law
• System of checks and balances

8
Half-authoritarian Regimes a special type among
illiberal regimes
For semi-authoritarianism see Marina Ottaway,
Democracy challenged. The rise of
semi-authoritarianism 2003
9
What are half-authoritarian Regimes?

• Not democracies but hybrid systems allowing
  little real competition for power facades of
  democracies, although minimal competitive
  elections do exist
• No illusion, that there will a transition to
  democracy as in the defective democracy
  approach
• The regime wants to avoid a change of power
• Semi-authoritarian regimes makes live difficult
  for the opposition parties
• Weak institutions
• ?power is concentrated in the executive,
  separation of powers is not really working, rule
  of law is not really effective, violations of
  human rights are frequent, control of mass media
  is current practice
• ? Personalized Regimes  Strong men 
• To what extent such regimes are accepted by the
  population?
• What is the direction of possible change
• Towards autoritarian regimes
• Towards a new start of the democratization
  process ? Ukraine

10
What is the main problem with Russia? Whats the
name of the game?

• Endless Transition Russia is not going
  anywhere it seemed to have reached the point it
  wished to reach not democracy or rule of law but
  the actual state of suspended transformation (?
  White 2003 434, Ottaway 2003 ) Was democracy
  ever an objective?
• Putin has systematically weakened or destroyed
  every check on his power, while at the same time
  strengthening the states ability to violate the
  constitutional rights of individual citizens
  (McFaul, Petrov, Ryabov 2004 293)
• In regimes like Russia competitive elections
  coexist with elites and executives who do not
  recognize the rule of law and are trying to
  control the natural opposition forces in society,
  such as the media, the economy, the judiciary or
  civil society.
• The existing power structure (call it
  half-democratic, or half-authoritarian) suits
  or favours the post communist elites.
• continuity from soviet times
• increase of power
• elites not really interested in democracy

11
Assessment of Russia by Freedomhouse I

• Worrisome setbacks in Russia, which continues to
  backslide in key areas of democratic practice.
  According to Nations in Transit 2004, President
  Putins policies have sought to centralize
  power, leaving little room for a vibrant civil
  society, independent media, or political
  opposition While Russia has emphasized the
  importance it places on maintaining strong ties
  to the West, it is headed in an increasingly
  authoritarian direction.
• Examples repression of NGOs, of independent
  media, important influence on elections by
  Government
• Authoritarian tendencies are quite recognizable
• But example Ukraine Change is possible

12
Assessment of Russia by Freedomhouse II
13
Authoritarian tendencies elimination of checks
and balances - overview

• Authoritarian elements can be found in the
  Constitution excessive powers of president,
  power concentrated on the top, almost as under
  soviet rule
• ?Accumulation of power in the presidency
• ?Prime minister as an auxilary of the
  omnipotent president
• Political parties as instruments of
  bureaucracies, inefficient
• ? Parliament as one-party-parliament ? Putins
  party United Russia dominates
• ?No pluralism, destroyed by Kremlin -gtIn fact
  abolition of politics
• Weak civil society
• The Judiciary not independent, ineffective,
  corrupt
• State and bureaucracy as solution for everything,
  overcentralisation
• Chechnya as a symbol of the violation of
  fundamental rights in Russia as well as the case
  of Khodorkovsky
• Effects of the war in Chechnya on the political
  system reinforcement of already existing
  authoritarian pattern, cult of personality,
  nationalism, centralism
• Militarisation of elites
• Media economically and politically dependant on
  regime and oligarchs

14
Media

• Control of the media control of elections
• Kremlin controls now all national television,
  namely ORT, RTR, NTV which are instrumentalized
  for political purpose ? their role is (once
  again) the governments propaganda apparatus
  (Ryabov)
• Most of the mass media are neither economically
  nor politically independant

15
Elections in Russia less free and less
competitive over time

• Surprising continuity in presidential elections
  no change of party. Several factors explaining
  why elections, especially presidential elections,
  have become less competitive over time (see
  McFaul, Petrov 2004 24)
• Old elites learned how to regain control of
  elections
• Overwhelming State Power old elites regained
  control of the state and learned to use state
  ressources to achieve the electoral outcomes they
  want
• Irregularities in elections have increased fraud

16
Elections 1999 - 2001

• Vulnerable Yeltsin Regime after 1998
• Challenger Primakov presidential elections
  promised to bi competitive change of power
  possible?
• Kremlin joined battle against Primakov in
  parliamentary as well as in presidential
  elections
• Invention of a new pro-presidential electoral
  bloc Unity ? role of Berezovsky -
  Instrumentalization of ORT and RTR TV stations to
  promote Unity
• Role of armed forces ? war effort in Chechnya
  1999 ? Rise of Putin, prime minister at that time

17
Elections 1999 2001

• Results of parliamentary elections changed
  balance of power gt direction pro-Putin
• Communist party 24
• Unity 23
• OVR 13 (? Primakov out)
• Union of right forces gt 8
• Liberal Democratic Party lt 6
• Yabloko lt 6
• Results of 1999 elections gt winner of 2000
  presidential elections would be Putin
• Support of ORT and RTR
• Oligarchs change their camp
• Fraud in the elections

18
Elections 1999 - results
19
Presidential elections 2000
20
Elections Rising Importance of the State

• State Ressources
• State as a major player in determing winners and
  losers

21
Elections State Duma 2003 1
22
Elections State Duma 2003 2

• Putins control of the media allowed him to push
  for a major victory for United Russia in fall
  2003
• The parties loyal to the Kremlin won the election
  with a majority of almost two third of the vote.
  The United Russia faction includes 300 members.
• On the same time The Communist party looses its
  role as an important player in Parliament and the
  liberal parties are not able to cross anymore the
  5 threshold needed to win seats ? What remains
  of the already flawed party system?
• This vote has shown also, that the presidential
  elections in 2004 will not be competitive!
• ?See for these aspects McFaul, Petrov, Ryabov
  2004

23
Elections State Duma 2003 3 An assessment by
Freedomhouse

• The December 2003 State Duma elections were
  blatantly unfair as authorities worked to ensure
  that their chosen candidates won seats in the
  lower house of the national legislature. The
  authorities' failure to treat parties and
  candidates equally fueled voter apathy and drove
  down turnout. International observers decried the
  abuses.
• It is unclear how much these manipulations
  changed the outcome of the vote because the
  electorate was already inclined to support
  President Vladimir Putin and his allies without
  coercion. Nevertheless, despite the president's
  consistently high ratings in opinion polls, Putin
  left nothing to chance. After the elections,
  United Russia, Putin's favored party, controlled
  a bloc of 300 seats in the 450-member Duma and
  will therefore have sufficient support to
  initiate the process of amending the constitution
  if Putin so desires. The new legislature elected
  as speaker Boris Gryzlov, leader of United Russia
  and the former head of the Russian police. With
  these elections, the Duma has been effectively
  turned into a subservient helpmate in support of
  an increasingly authoritarian president.

24
Duma alignments change of parties
25
Presidential elections 2004
26
Importance and fonctions of elections in Russia

• Contrary to elections in 90/91/93 the elections
  after 1993 represent a positive development for
  Russian democracy
• Elections have become the only game in town
  but the political elites learned how to master
  the rules of the game in order not to lose the
  elections ? see for that aspect McFaul/Petrov
  2004 53
• Elections have become more and more tools for the
  consolidation of the power of the soviet elite,
  with the consequence that new actors or
  challengers of the establishment were more and
  more marginalized
• Parties of power able to mobilize state
  ressources in order to stay in power have
  enormous advantages ? turnover of power can be
  avoided ? our thesis of semi-authoritarianism
• The State controls more and more the outcome of
  election ? controlling access of candidates to
  the ballots, ? falsification of elections
• KEEPING ELECTIONS BUT CONTROLING THEM

27
Political parties in Russia
28
Political parties and elections 1993 - 2003

• Siehe Olga Kryschtanowskaja, Anatomie der
  russischen Elite. 2005 73
• (Kiepenheuer und Witsch)

29
The weakness of political parties in Russia I

• Reasons of the weakness of parties in Russia
• Soviet legacy distrust against parties
• Socioeconomic transformation
• Cultural factors
• Institutional design ? elites ? electoral law ?
  proportional representation ? emergence of a
  multiparty system
• Proportional representation led to the emergence
  of 4 parties CPRF, Yabloko, the LDRP and the SPS
  Three of them Yabloko, LDPR, SPS wouldn't
  exist without proportional representation
• Ex. Yabloko has won 67 seats throught party list,
  but only 25 single-mandate seats

30
The weakness of political parties II the
Presidential system

• In delegative or semi-authoritarian regimes are
  not really needed gt impact of presidential
  system ? strong executives
• Important here factor of this institutional
  dimension has to be combined with the mixed
  electoral system of the State Duma
• In this mixed system no single party could win
  more than a quarter of the vote in any
  parliamentary election.
• And in the runoff majoritarian system of the
  presidential election leaders have to win 50 of
  the electorate

31
The weakness of political parties III - Rational
choices for presidentialism

• The creation of a super-presidential constitution
  has impeded party emergence
• Powerful actors choosing these presidential
  institutions have created huge obstacles for the
  development of parties
• Control of the state resources as best strategy
  for winning the presidential election

32
Political parties and the Presidency the
Presidents Administration

• The Presidents Administration most important
  position in the political system
• Parties have only a marginal influence on the
  presidential level ? Putin not a party member
• Party penetration of the federal government is
  also weak Parties had some influence after
  crises

33
Political parties and the Duma

• This is the one battlefield for parties the only
  party-centric institution
• Parties are privileged by the electoral system
• 50 of the Duma members are selected according to
  proportional representation
• See next slide for details on the electoral
  system ?
• core of a multiparty system seemed to be
  consolidating (4 parties with well-defined
  political orientations CPRF,Yabloko, LDRP, SPS),
  but after 2003 elections Yabloko and SPS are not
  represented anymore in the Duma
• After the 2003 elections the political
  orientations in the Duma are not clear anymore
• Rise of parties of power Unity and OVR since
  1999 electoral blocs created to promote the
  presidential aspirations of their leaders
  poorly defined identities new electorate
• ? Important impediment of consolidation of
  established parties

34
The electoral system for the Duma representation

• The Duma election result is made up by adding
  together the 225 seats allocated in the
  nationwide proportional representation (PR)
  ballot and seats allocated in 225 single-member
  districts (SMD) on the first-past-the-post
  principle.          POINT TO WATCH. Since 1993,
  overall party strength in the Duma has reflected
  the combined success of parties in winning seats
  in the PR and in the SMD ballots.
           POINT TO WATCH. In September 2004,
  President Putin proposed the abolition of the two
  ballot system, so that all candidates would be
  elected on party lists see Opinions about
  Electoral System Reform

35
The electoral system Proportional representation
and single member districts

• THE PR BALLOT. Up to and including the 2003
  elections, seats were awarded by proportional
  representation to parties securing at least 5.0
  percent of the total vote cast nationwide. In
  2003, with 23 parties on the PR ballot, the
  average party vote was 4.4 percent. Both eligible
  political parties and social organizatons were
  allowed to nominate lists of candidates, and in
  addition they had to gather in support of a
  nominated list at least 200,000 signatures, of
  which no more than seven percent could be from
  any one region of the federation. Alternatively,
  parties could register a list by paying a deposit
  of 37.5 million roubles (about 1.25 million
  dollars), returnable if the party won at least 3
  percent of the vote. In 2003, only one party, the
  Real Patriots of Russia, paid the deposit to
  register a list, and since it won less than one
  percent of the vote, the deposit was not
  returned.
• THE SMD BALLOT. The Duma representative from
  each of the 225 single-member districts is the
  candidate with the most votes. In the 2003
  election there was an average of 15 candidates
  per district (up from 10 candidates per district
  in 1999). To become an SMD candidate or to
  nominate an SMD candidate, an individual or party
  had to collect the signatures of one per cent of
  the electors in the constituency. Alternatively,
  they could put up a deposit equal to 900,000
  roubles (about 30,000 dollars), returnable if the
  candidate won at least 5 percent of the vote or
  was elected.

36
Proportional representation as a catalyst of
party emergence

• Yes proportional representation was a
  lifeline (McFaul) for Party Development
• See Slide see 27 Thanks to proportional
  representation Yabloko or LDRP could rise as
  national organizations
• This observation however has to be put in
  perspective when considering the rise of the
  parties of power
• According to transition theory parties tend to
  increase in importance after a democratic
  transition not in Russia!

37
Forms of political parties

• Bureaucratic parties dominate Parties created
  by Kremlin or on initiative of other policial
  actors
• Parties of power
• Parties of the elites
• Parties of power electoral blocks founded by
  Kremlin in order to create a own fraction in
  parliament.
• ? See Kryschtanowskaja 2005 72

38
Forms of political parties II

• Development of parties of power
• Rivalry in the election 93 99, for every
  election creation of new party formations
• 1999 elections unity gets definitely the
  status of an uncontested power-party regaining
  control over persons moving to power position
• Under Putin State is controling once again the
  elections
• Parties of elites
• Created by former state officials
• Focussing on leaders
• Origins of multi-party system only elite-parties
  could gain power and enter parliament 2003
  among 23 electoral blocks only 4 parties could
  gain access to the state-duma

39
The political system of Russia I
40
The political system of Russia II
41
Federalism in Russia
42
The basic elements of Russian Federalism

• Ethnofederalism Territorial and national
• Asymmetrical federalism
• Centrifugal and centripetal forces
  decentralisation and centralisation
• Importance of elections for federalism
• Importance of federal treaty of 1992
• Constitution of 1993 Russia real federation
• Bicameralism ? Federation council has lost its
  role as arbiter
• Instable federalism process of decentralization
  till 1998

43
Putins antifederal policy - Overview

• Recentralisation ? Construction of an unitary
  state
• How?
• Presidential representatives in regions
• Pressure on regional leaders
• Creation of federal districts aiming at
  increasing the federal governments presence in
  the regions

44
Putin recentralisation of the State I

• Strengthening of the Centre
• reinforcing the grip of federal institutions on
  the regions presidential representatives
• Tightening control over the use of federal
  budgetary resources in the regions
• Shaping regional legislation into conformity
  with federal legislation
• Media Sector ORT and Radio Company incorporating
  state-owned regional tv and radio companies

45
Putin recentralisation of the State II

• 2000 elections acceleration of recentralisation
• Creation of seven supraregional executive
  districts aiming at enforcing Putins policies at
  the regional level control of federal agencies
  located in the regions construction of a new,
  intermediate level of government between the
  federal an regional governments
• New laws allowing the removal of Governors
• New Tax Code Greater control over tax receipts
  and greater share of taxes going to the centre
• Rise of St. Petersburg weakening of Moscow
  Elite flow from St. Petersburg to Moscow
  importance of FSB
• Conclusion In 2002 Transformation of the
  Federation in a unitary State with regional and
  ethno-regional elements (? Petrov in McFaul,
  Petrov, Ryabov 2004 233)

46
Center-Regions relations before Putins reforms

• Nicolai Petrov, Federalism, In McFaul, Petrov,
  Ryabov 2004, p. 232

47
Center-Regions relations reflecting changes
introduced by Putins reforms

• Nicolai Petrov, Federalism, In McFaul, Petrov,
  Ryabov 2004, p. 234

48
Center-Regions relations reflecting changes
introduced by Putins reforms II

• Siehe Olga Kryschtanowskaja, Anatomie der
  russischen Elite. 2005 128
• (Kiepenheuer und Witsch)

49
Effectiveness of centralisation?

• Restoring the vertical power hierarchy has the
  USSR as reference
• Implications of an overcentralised system? Too
  weak steering possibilities, too inflexible,
  Petrov (p. 236)  such an encumbered system
  simply functions too slowly to respond to the
  numerous and different reactions that can be
  needed for different parts of a huge structure.
  In general, the bigger and more centralized a
  system is, the greater the difficulty with which
  it accommodates changing conditions 
• Misunderstandings among elites about meaning of
  federalism the system understands only  a rank
  and file  logic
• Consequences for democratization less democracy,
  less autonomy less democracy because state
  becomes stronger. Less autonomy on the regional
  level because of the centers grip on the regions
• Division of power horizontally shifting in favor
  of the executive, vertically the division of
  power is now also shifting to the center More
  decision power in the center means less democracy
  in the regions!!!
• Instrumentalisation of United Russia to control
  regions

50
Resume The Kremlins control of the regions
Vertical chains of command

• The Kremlins dominance over the regions is based
  on the following steps
• Creation of seven supraregional executive
  districts aiming at enforcing Putins policies at
  the regional level a failure! The result was
  first of all the creation of more administrative
  levels
• De facto elimination of the second chamber of the
  parliament, the federal council, as an autonomous
  legislative body the two representatives of each
  region in that chamber have to be appointed by
  the regional executives and legislatures. The
  election process of these representatives is
  considerably influenced by the Kremlin on the
  informal level
• The Kremlins control of regional politics is
  also increased by the way it is using its new
  party United Russia as a tool to keep regional
  executives under its control.

51
The new State Power under Putin

• Siehe Olga Kryschtanowskaja, Anatomie der
  russischen Elite. 2005 128
• (Kiepenheuer und Witsch)

52
The case of Khodorkovsky and other oligarchs

• Part of the game interference of the oligarchs
  in the political sphere will not be tolerated
• The case of Khodorkovsky has to be placed in the
  context of the battle between the Kremlin /
  siliowiki and the oligarchs which is about
  state control of the economy
• The case of Khodorkowski confirms the character
  of the regime
• Arbitrariness of the bureaucracy
• Absence of an independent judiciary no rule of
  law
• No protection of private property
• Public debates about such cases are supposed to
  underline the efficiency of the state in fighting
  corruption, whereas in fact corruption is
  increasing

53
Structural conditions facilitating the rise of
semi-authoritarianism in Russia

• Duration and scale of communism in Russia ?
  political culture ? mentalities, ? elites ?
  absence of renewal
• Low income and weak economic performance as
  conditions for endless transformations and
  semi-authoritarianism.
• A weak socio-economic structure facilitates the
  rise of a democracy Potemkin-style
• What kind of political change is possible under
  conditions of weak socio-economic structures?
  Where are the new classes and interest groups
  which could operate as agents of change ? see
  the case of Ukraine!
• Economic polarisation
• Ethnic polarisation?
• Problems of identity and stability of the Russian
  State ? war on terror and nexus with strong
  leadership
• ?See on these aspects Ottaway 2003

54
Russia moving towards more authoritarianism?

• What can be seen in Russia today comes close to a
  type of regime which M. Ottaway describes as
  semi-authoritarianism of decay (200321) which
  could regress toward full-fledged
  authoritarianism.
• Is an Ukrainian scenario possible?
• Reforms of the political system would imply new
  socio-economic actors.
• Its not enough to call for fair elections, a
  better party system, rule of law, more
  parliamentary democracy etc. A completely
  different state-society and state-economy
  relationship would be necessary, with a state and
  a Kremlin giving up their grip on society