Issue

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Land Conflict in the 21st Century Some
Implications for the UK Comprehensive
Approach Maj Gen Paul Newton CBE Director
General Development, Concepts and Doctrine 12
June 2008
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• Caveats
• DCDC conceptual view.
• Not an endorsed pan-MOD view.
• Certainly not a pan-Whitehall view.
• Scope
• What is the CA?
• Progress?
• Development filling the hourglass.

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FSEC Group Photo
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A Comprehensive Approach
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A Flawed Paradigm
Concurrent not Sequential
Phase
Phase

• WAR

Post-Conflict Reconstruction
Civil Lead
Military Lead
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The major security challenges require an
integrated response that cuts across departmental
lines and traditional policy boundaries.
(Cabinet Office, National Security Strategy,
Mar 08.)
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The Comprehensive Approach

• A Comprehensive Approach requires clear national
  objectives, strong political leadership and
  coordination across Departments to ensure the
  coherent application of all instruments of
  national power.
• British Defence Doctrine 3rd Edition (Draft)

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The Four Guiding Principles

• Proactive Engagement Requires a shared approach
  to the collection and interpretation of crisis
  indicators and warning systemsrelies on existing
  relationships and familiarity built up over time.
• Shared Understanding Should be engendered
  through cooperative working practices, liaison
  and education in between crises.
• Outcome-Based Thinking Planning and activity
  should be focussed on a single purpose and
  progress judged against mutually agreed measures
  of effectiveness.
• Collaborative Working Institutional
  familiarityIntegrated information management,
  infrastructure and connectivity.

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• Two National Security Action Memoranda of August
  1962 recommended that the United States
• adopt a strategy of integrating economic and
  political development along democratic lines with
  counterinsurgency effects in order to enable
  threatened governments to eliminate the roots of
  popular discontent and suppress guerrilla attacks
  upon their freedom.

Hew Strachan, Strategy and the Limitation of War,
Survival Feb-Mar 2008
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• Great progress has been made on the ground by
  our civilians and our military, who have learned
  to work together and have adapted in innovative
  ways to meet these challenges. But for every
  ingenious adaptation we see in the field, we
  should ask ourselves what institutional failure
  were they trying to overcome? What tools did we
  fail to provide them?
• Amb Eric Edelman, Under Secretary of Defense for
  Policy, 28 Sep 2006

David Ucko, Innovation or Inertia The U.S.
Military and the Learning of Counterinsurgency,
Spring 2008
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General Raad Majid al-Hamdani
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• Missing BBC journalist, Abdul Samad Rohani, was
  found shot dead in Afghanistan on Sunday 8 June
  2008.
• He disappeared from Lashkar Gah in Helmand
  province the day before.

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• 1 year and 12 days since 5 British contractors
  were taken hostage.

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Non-Permissive

• Non-permissive environments are assessed as too
  dangerous for civilians to move around in
  freelyCivilian Stabilisation Advisers can only
  work in more secure conditions with
  non-permissive situations (i.e. in a compound or
  other secured area) for short periods to help
  draw up strategies and tasks that are essential
  for stabilisation.
• Stabilisation Unit Guidance Note (Draft 18 Mar
  2008)

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The Americans are more deeply committed to
winning in Afghanistan -militarily, economically
and in terms of mental effort than any of their
allies.
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FM 3-24

• In a sense the doctrine was written by the wrong
  people. Perhaps more accurately, it emerged of
  necessity from the wrong end of the COIN
  equation. Because counter-insurgency is
  predominantly political, military doctrine should
  flow from a broader strategic framework..But the
  doctrine is a moon without a planet to orbit.

Sarah Sewall, A Radical Field Manual,
Introduction to the University of Chicago Press
Edition of the Counterinsurgency Field Manual
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• We have to be able to plan well, in depth and in
  coordination with others.
• Donald Braum, Dept of State, 8 May 08

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• We oversaw the full spectrum of operations
  simultaneously across the OE (I am not sure where
  the 3 Block War concept went to but we did it).
  We were clearing streets with Air-Ground
  Integration (AGI), Strykers and main battle tanks
  on one side of the city while opening Zoos and
  handing out footballs on the other!
• Major John Russell BLO, British Army
• Chief of Operations MND-B

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USMC Changes the Strategic Geometry
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The Late Sheikh Abd al-Sattar Baziya al-Rishawi
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Southern Belts - Aug 07
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Different Organisational Perspectives within the
CA

• Different Government departments deliver Quick
  Impact Projects (QIPs) that outwardly look very
  similar but
• There are often marked differences in the
  objectives, priorities and concerns.1
• Military tend to focus on consent.
• FCO tend to view QIPs as instruments of political
  engagement or strategic communication.
• DFID tend to focus on their direct contribution
  to sustainable development and immediate
  alleviation of suffering.
• These differences result from strong Departmental
  preferences and are, to some extent, inevitable.

1 Stabilisation paper on QIPs
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• CERP (Commanders Emergency Response Fund) is a
  nuclear weapon it is the asymmetrical weapon of
  choiceI really pity other nations that dont
  have it.for every bad CERP project there are ten
  good ones.
• Col Mark Johnstone 173rd Airborne Brigade
• The Economist 24 May 2008 Afghanistan Briefing

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• If you dont get progress in the short term,
  there will be no long term.
• Gen David Petraeus
• US Army

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The Mesopotamian Stampede
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