Title: Globalisation and the new challenges for maritime security
1Globalisation and the new challenges for maritime
security
- Dave Mugridge
- Phd Student _at_ Plymouth Business School
- Associate Research Fellow _at_ CFPS, Dalhousie
University
2Content
- The nature of the new security challenges within
todays strategic environment. - What value the constabulary role within national
maritime security strategy? - How should the 'new security challenges drive
force structure changes? - NAFTA Models (little similarity between nations
but what of complementary operations?) - Operationally - should we have institutional
overlap between all government arms tasked to
contribute to maritime security? - Strategically - how should we deal with the
challenges of terrorism and organized crime? - Concluding remarks - components of National
Maritime Strategy to deliver a more comprehensive
approach
3Todays Strategic Environment
- Increasing religious, ethnic, social and
cultural unrest - Unequal wealth distribution
- Increasing competition for natural resources
- Inequitable social policies
- Repressed historic enmities
- Rise and overlap of Organised Crime and Non-State
Terrorism - Asymmetric Warfare State and Non-State
- Reus Smit (04) - Engage with the world and deal
with the underlying sources of insecurity and
alienation
4New Reality
- Need to see threat beyond traditional military
view avoid over use of military to counter
criminality and criminals - Use all tools in the government tool-box to
counter modern threats - Lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan
- Proactive response requires imagination and
co-ordination. - Assessment NAFTA choice is either myopic
(military) or panoramic (comprehensive) - New thinking offers opportunity for co-ordinated
government(s) international bodies to respond
to realities of new security threats
5Multi-faceted maritime crime
6The Nature of the Threat
7Criminal / Terrorist Modus Operandi
- Small disparate groups
- Irregular force structure
- Unconventional and asymmetrical methods
- Wide-ranging and disparate objectives
- Promotes a climate where symbiotic relationships
with other criminal and terrorist groups are
advantageous so ... My enemies enemy is my
friend - But to counter requires all the tools of
government, they co-operate so must you!
8Globalisation sees Maritime Security deteriorate
- Maritime Piracy, Kidnapping Smuggling are on
the rise - NATO SG RUSI (Dec 08) - Non State Terrorists have transformed the
strategic environment - Coker (08) - Shifting balances of power, military tension
WMD do not bode well for future - Chalk (07) - Failure of legal initiatives like ISPS Code (02),
UNCLOS (82) PSI (08) - Why? Transnational terrorists and non state
actors not only disregard national boundaries
they often exploit the margins Rear Adm Tay RSN
9What value the constabulary function?
- Arguably the most important function for todays
Maritime Security - Conventional naval threats are low and have lead
in time to respond. - UK experience in Iraq and Nigeria
- Balance of probabilities new security
challenges are uppermost so... - Time to forget Cold War doctrine?
10Justification for these views
- I believe that our uncertain strategic
environment will result in a growing burden of
operations, particularly in constabulary type
functions. These operations may flow from ISPS
Code, regional instability or specific government
direction but will be in addition to and not
instead of our war fighting role. - (V-Adm C Ritchie RAN) (04)
11A military option is only part of the solution
- A war on terror is not a military exercise. It
is a political, diplomatic, economic and social
exercise in which military force must always be
available and occasionally used. - John Scott Cowan (2006)
12How should 'new security challenges drive
change within the maritime security force
structure?
- The Asymmetric Threats
-
- Irregular
- Prevalence of criminal and terror related
activities - Regional differences (value of x-pollination of
lessons learnt) - Growing sophistication of modus operandi and
overlap in methods - Avoid current hang-up over what constitutes a
nexus. (Does it matter whether it is
collaboration or co-operation?) - Constabulary functions need to be in ascendancy
- value of USCG model (Armed enforcement
capability)
- Required Government Response
-
- Political Primacy
- Co-ordination of Government Machinery
- Intelligence Information management
- Separating the target from their supporters
- Neutralise / Incarcerate target, greater
relevance for constabulary operations - Long-term strategy
- Robert Thompson 1966
13NAFTA National Models
- Disparity in models based upon capability, size,
organisations resources - But significant value in joint operations
- Collaboration (Intel)
- Co-operation (Unit tasking)
- Complementary (Model Strengths)
- Convergence (Best Practice)
14Operational Over-lap
- Journeys End Comprehensive Approach
15Strategic Comprehensive Approach
- Revision of Israeli Model
- Sociological
- Legal
- Economic
- Environmental
- Political
- Security
- Mode of Action (Spectrum of sanctioned activity)
- Political Objective (Recognition of regional
effects) - Selected Strategy (Attrition to Annihilation)
- Scale of Operation (Finances, Personnel and
Equipment)
16Components of Maritime Security Strategy
- Provide for a layered, complementary defence
- Review current force structures to achieve a
coherent balance of maritime forces - Capacity build through domestic and foreign
training initiatives agreements - Recognise and co-ordinate maritime security as a
sub-set of a broad (3 D) approach to delivering
national security - Regularly review future activities of those who
threaten maritime security - Consult with and educate the population as to the
importance of maritime security - Establish a series of national / regional
partnerships with relevant non-governmental
bodies and organisations to achieve national /
regional support for maritime security policies - Look to enshrine humanitarian and disaster relief
within the mission sets of all deployable
maritime forces - Enforce and uphold International Law
- Maintain sufficient high readiness maritime
forces to respond to emergent regional threats or
events
17Conclusion
- We hold that our strategy does not embrace
purely military affairs. War must be
comprehensive and combined strategy. - Mao(1958)