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Bertrand (1883) price competition.

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Consumers buy from the lowest price firm. ( If p1=p2, each firm gets half the consumers. ... There are two firms A and B. Customers buy from the lowest price firm. ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Bertrand (1883) price competition.


1
Bertrand (1883) price competition.
  • Both firms choose prices simultaneously and have
    constant marginal cost c.
  • Firm one chooses p1. Firm two chooses p2.
  • Consumers buy from the lowest price firm. (If
    p1p2, each firm gets half the consumers.)
  • An equilibrium is a choice of prices p1 and p2
    such that
  • firm 1 wouldnt want to change his price given
    p2.
  • firm 2 wouldnt want to change her price given p1.

2
Bertrand Equilibrium
  • Take firm 1s decision if p2 is strictly bigger
    than c
  • If he sets p1gtp2, then he earns 0.
  • If he sets p1p2, then he earns 1/2D(p2)(p2-c).
  • If he sets p1 such that cltp1ltp2 he earns
    D(p1)(p1-c).
  • For a large enough p1 that is still less than p2,
    we have
  • D(p1)(p1-c)gt1/2D(p2)(p2-c).
  • Each has incentive to slightly undercut the
    other.
  • Equilibrium is that both firms charge p1p2c.
  • Not so famous Kaplan Wettstein (2000) paper
    shows that there may be other equilibria with
    positive profits if there arent restrictions on
    D(p).

3
Cooperation in Bertrand Comp.
  • A Case The New York Post v. the New York Daily
    News
  • January 1994 40 40
  • February 1994 50 40
  • March 1994 25 (in Staten Island) 40
  • July 1994 50 50

4
What happened?
  • Until Feb 1994 both papers were sold at 40.
  • Then the Post raised its price to 50 but the
    News held to 40 (since it was used to being the
    first mover).
  • So in March the Post dropped its Staten Island
    price to 25 but kept its price elsewhere at 50,
  • until News raised its price to 50 in July,
    having lost market share in Staten Island to the
    Post. No longer leader.
  • So both were now priced at 50 everywhere in NYC.

5
Collusion
  • If firms get together to set prices or limit
    quantities what would they choose. As in your
    experiment.
  • D(p)15-p and c(q)3q.
  • Price Maxp (p-3)(15-p)
  • What is the choice of p.
  • This is the monopoly price and quantity!
  • Maxq1,q2 (15-q1-q2)(q1q2)-3(q1q2).

6
Anti-competitive practices.
  • In the 80s, Crazy Eddie said that he will beat
    any price since he is insane.
  • Today, many companies have price-beating and
    price-matching policies.
  • A price-matching policy (just saw it in an add
    for Nationwide) is simply if you (a customer) can
    find a price lower than ours, we will match it. A
    price beating policy is that we will beat any
    price that you can find. (It is NOT explicitly
    setting a price lower or equal to your
    competitors.)
  • They seem very much in favor of competition
    consumers are able to get the lower price.
  • In fact, they are not. By having such a policy a
    stores avoid loosing customers and thus are able
    to charge a high initial price (yet another
    paper by this Kaplan guy).

7
Price-matching
  • Marginal cost is 3 and demand is 15-p.
  • There are two firms A and B. Customers buy from
    the lowest price firm. Assume if both firms
    charge the same price customers go to the closest
    firm.
  • What are profits if both charge 9?
  • Without price matching policies, what happens if
    firm A charges a price of 8?
  • Now if B has a price matching policy, then what
    will Bs net price be to customers?
  • B has a price-matching policy. If B charges a
    price of 9, what is firm As best choice of a
    price.
  • If both firms have price of 9, does either have
    an incentive to undercut the other?
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