The Great Northeast Blackout of 2003

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The Great Northeast Blackout of 2003

• Deputy Assistant Chief John Norman
• Chief of Special Operations
• Deputy Assistant Chief James Manahan
• Chief of Planning and Strategy
• New York Fire Department

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The Blackout affected millions
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Timing was fortunate, but also created problems

• Time of day
• Time of year
• Weather
• Daylight
• Vacations

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For New Yorkers, it was a nuisance..
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not a catastrophe, public responded
appropriately.

• WTC attack
• 1977 Blackout
• 1965 Blackout

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Many stepped up to assist
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A spirit of mutual support prevailed
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Others found innovative ways to cope
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The Manhattan Business District empties after
workday ends
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Geography plays a large role in evacuation
planning
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MTA Moves 8,000,000 riders /day

• All electric powered in Manhattan and tunnels

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Time of day/ weather assisted evacuation
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No alternate cross river means exists
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This created serious overcrowding issues
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Telephone service was severely curtailed. Most
cells OOS.
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Telephone system failures

• 911 service disrupted several times
• EMS CADS dispatch disrupted for up to 90 minutes
• Communications between units/commands disrupted
• Fire dispatching affected by loss of CAD twice,
  but no interruption in dispatch
• Fire alarm boxes not affected
• 800 Mhz radios used for routine comms

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Thousands of commuters were stranded in the city
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Many sought refuge in hotels

• Overcrowding
• Creative lighting

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By dusk, most had left the area
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Some buildings had their own power. These were
magnets for the stranded.
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(No Transcript)
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Very low crime rate reported
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The Social Situation 1977 vs 2003
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Difference- Police response
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NYPD is well versed in handling mass events
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Societal changes as well
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Many coping mechanisms adapted
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These created their own problems for responders
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Fire Operational Concerns

• Loss of power to fire pumps, alarm systems
• Increased Fire workload
• Increased EMS workload
• Increased emergency workload
• Debilitating effects on responders

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Water Pressure in Street Not an Issue

• NYC system is gravity fed
• Other jurisdictions depend heavily on pumps,
  diesels need attendance and maintenance

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Lack of power to fire pumps

• Some Generators
• Fire Reserve in Tanks
• Siamese Connections

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Traffic congestion impeded response
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Generators in Hospitals

• Post 1977 in all critical areas
• Not in Nursing Homes

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Many large facilities had no generators
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Increased Fire Activity

• 3,619 Responses from 4 PM 8/14 to 4 PM 8/15,
  more than triple normal volume
• No major disruption of dispatch system
• Response time increased from 450 to 758

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Increased Fire Activity

• 55 Serious
• Fires caused by candles, improvised power
  supplies.

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Increased EMS Activity

• 6,979 Responses from 4 PM 8/14 to 4 PM 8/15,
  more than double normal volume
• Significant Disruptions to EMS dispatch system
• Response times tripled

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FDNY Operational Decisions

• Off going Fire Ops tour held over at 6 PM,
  provides approximately 250 officers and 850
  firefighters, for total of 3,000 fire personnel.
• Off going EMS Ops tour held over, provides
  approximately 122 additional ambulance tours, for
  total of 662
• Mutual Aid units provide 173 additional ambulance
  tours.

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FDNY Operational Decisions

• 20 Reserve Engines and 7 Reserve Ladder Companies
  Activated

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FDNY Operational Decisions

• 21 Rapid Response Vehicles were activated to
  handle minor emergencies

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Increased Emergency Activity

• Over 3,000 emergency responses

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Increased Emergency Activity

• 800 stuck elevators

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Increased Emergency Activity

• Stalled Trains

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Increased Emergency Activity

• FD Units assisted Transit personnel in evacuating
  passengers

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Division 3 Operations

• Administration and Staffing
• Logistical Support
• Fire and Emergency Operations
• Power Restoration

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Division 3 Operations

• Administration and Staffing
• Within 2 hours of tour change
• Staffing held over
• All Engines with 5 FFs
• Reserve Apparatus Staffed
• RRVs Staffed
• Administrative areas staffed

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Division 3 Operations

• Logistical Support
• Division and Battalion phone systems down
• Fire Houses- No power
• Fuel Pumps OOS
• Gasoline pumps OOS
• Food, etc.
• Only the staples of survival

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Division 3 Operations

• Fire and Emergency Operations
• Rush hour gridlock
• Limited Communication
• Units crisscrossing though out Manhattan

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Division 3 Operations

• Fire and Emergency Operations
• No elevators- Stuck elevators
• No building pumps- Water Supply
• No Alarm systems
• As traffic cleared- Uncontrolled intersections

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Division 3 Operations
Hotel Fire-Emergency Generator Three NFP Apt
House- 2 candles one when power was restored Hi
Rise Residential 18 Fl- Candles SRO Hotel- Arson
suicide 13 Floor
X
X
X
X
X
X
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Division 3 Operations

• Power Restoration
• Limited areas on line
• Block by block
• Fire Hazards

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Incident Action Plan-RRV

• Staffed two person trucks with emergency
  equipment- Normal Use SSL
• Freed up normal units
• Successful first deployment
• Written into an Incident Action Plan

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The EndQuestions?

• Stay safe!