Synthetic Biology

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Synthetic Biology Biosafety/Biosecurity Town Hall
Meeting
UC Berkeley April 18, 2006
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Welcome Not a talk, not a workshop. Considering
action as a community. Why Us? If you
believe that steps are necessary you have a
choice Community Elites
(Asilomar) Government Community
solutions are inherently elegant and
democratic.
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Why Now? Knowledge Base We know enough to
take (at least) some actions today. We
should be skeptical of more study is needed
even though it is sometimes
true. Institutions SynBio2.0 is a chance
for self-governance. Not acting will
become a habit. Support MacArthur
Carnegie have funded this project to give the
process the best possible chance.
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Goal Find places where a SynBio2.0 vote is
both possible and useful. Process
Interviews/Collecting Ideas White
Paper Supporting Papers Town
Halls On-Line Discussion Experts Day 3
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This Meeting Short Presentation Questions
and Floor Discussion. Straw Votes
Should There Be a Vote? How Would You
Vote Today?
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A1. Screening. Problem Technology should
not allow terrorists to evade type
collections. Technology should not allow
terrorists do genetic engineering on the
cheap. Initiative The community should not
do business with companies unless they
screen. Issue Cost. Screening on
People?
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A1. Screening.
Resolved Gene synthesis companies have an
ethical responsibility to screen orders
consistent with best practices within the
industry, including but not limited to the
routine use of automated searches (equivalent to
current Blackwatch release or higher) and hand
examination of all suspect sequences by qualified
scientists. Companies that practice such
screening should publicly certify the fact by
January 1, 2007. Thereafter, community members
pledge not to place orders with any company that
fails to comply with this resolution.
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A2. Screening. Problem Screening is
inadequate. Initiative The community can
supply and endorse better tools. Issues
(Technical)
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A2. Screening.
Resolved Better screening software and
machine-readable, detailed sequence watch-lists
are urgently needed to improve screening. A
community-wide initiative is currently underway
to create these tools on or before December,
2006. Members will have an opportunity to review
and endorse these products when they meet for
Synthetic Biology 3.0
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B1. Experiments of Concern Problem NAS and
Wellcome Trust have both said that members
need better biosecurity advice.
Initiative Carnegie Foundation has
funded UCB to create a Bioethics
Advisory Committee to provide informal,
expert, written advice on security
issues. We hope that other
institutions follow. Issue Unnecessary
duplication of official bodies?
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B1. Experiments of Concern.
Resolved Experimenters considering an
experiment of concern within the meaning of the
Fink Report should obtain expert independent
advice before proceeding. The community has an
ethical obligation to make such advice freely
available, particularly to non-members who lack
access to university- or company-funded safety
committees.
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B2. Experiments of Concern Problem Are
members sufficiently willing to investigate
and report dangerous or inappropriate
behavior? Initiative Endorse ethical duty to
investigate and, if necessary, report
dangerous or inappropriate behavior. Issue
What is the right balance?
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B2. Experiments of Concern.
Resolved Members have an ethical obligation to
investigate and, if necessary, report behavior
that they believe poses a significant danger to
human life, the environment, and property.
Members may satisfy this obligation through
existing channels, by calling authorities, or by
contacting community bodies established for this
purpose.
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C1. Tracking Developments Problem How to
track the safety/security implications of a
fast-moving technology. Initiative Create
an on-line reporting site and use the
information to issue advisories and annual
reports at SynBio conferences.
Issues Unwarranted focus on synthetic
biology? Duplication of
journals? Public, confidential, or anonymous?
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C1. Tracking Developments
Resolved Members have an ethical obligation to
share facts, experiences, and conjectures that
increase community awareness of, and ability to
manage, biosafety and biosecurity risks.
Community members are encouraged to establish
confidential clearinghouses to collect, analyze,
and disseminate this information.
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D1. Endorse Biosafety/Biosecurity RD
Priorities Problem Accelerate
safety/security technologies to reduce the
already- small dangers posed by synthetic
biology. Initiative Endorse promising RD
directions. Issues Avoid one-size-fits-all
solutions. Which technologies should be
endorsed?
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D. RD Priorities.
Resolved Funding agencies should invest in
research to explore the use of bar code
technology to detect and trace the origins of
genetically modified organisms.
Resolved Funding agencies should invest in
research to engineer host organisms for synthetic
biology experiments that have little or no chance
of surviving, propagating, or interacting with
organisms outside the laboratory.
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D. RD Priorities.
Resolved Your Technology Here.
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E. What Have We Missed?
Other
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Synthetic Biology Biosafety/Biosecurity Town Hall
Meeting
UC Berkeley April 18, 2006