Gomery Report Part 1: Reshaping Public Management?

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Gomery Report Part 1 Reshaping Public
Management?

• Peter Aucoin
• Dalhousie University
• Presentation to Nova Scotia Regional Group,
• Institute of Public Administration of Canada
• Halifax, December 7, 2005

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OUTLINE

1. The Sponsorship Scandal
2. Prospects for change
3. Gomery Part 1 Analysis and Conclusions
4. Reshaping Public Management?
5. Issues for Gomery 2

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The Sponsorship Scandal

• Breaking the rules deficient management
  structure and processes (PMO PWGSC)
• Breaking the law program managers, advertising
  agencies, and Liberal Party of Canada (Quebec
  wing)
• Breaking the bargain ministers, political staff
  and public servants (and Crown corporations)

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Prospects for change?

• Scandal - isolated incident or systemic issue?
• Government response implies that public sector
  management at fault hence 2004-2005 proposals
  to strengthen public sector management
• New Public Management takes a hit justifies
  strengthening internal oversight and internal
  audit as check on empowered managers
• Program Review (1994-95) excuse reduced
  financial management capacity OCG and
  comptrollers to the rescue
• Command and Control overkill seeking to bury
  Gomery?

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Prospects for change?

• 2. Systemic issues on Gomery agenda for Report
  2 Implicitly accepts need to address the New
  Public Governance
• Concentration of power under PM
• Increased number/expanded roles/influence of
  political staff
• Personal/partisan interventions in senior
  public-service staffing
• Expectation of public-service enthusiasm for
  government agenda
• Increased political spin in government
  communications

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Gomerys Analysis

• Three main factorscaused or contributed
• to the problems
• the unprecedented decision by the Prime
  Minister to direct the Sponsorship Program from
  the PMO, bypassing the departmental procedures
  and controls which the DM of PWGSC would normally
  have been expected to apply and enforce
• the failure of the DM of PWGSC to provide
  oversight and administrative safeguards against
  the misuse of public funds
• the deliberate lack of transparency on how the
  Program was initiated, financed and directed.

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Gomery Who is responsible?

• PM Chretien
• involved himself in direction of program
  (prerogative of PM)
• put PMO (Pelletier) in charge, contrary to
  Clerks (Bourgon) advice
• PM personally responsible for Pelletiers
  actions (political staff)
• Pelletier (Chief of Staff, PMO)
• not a public servant - no authority to direct
  simply PMs power!
• Minister Gagliano (GWPSC)
• partisan abuse of ministerial authority
  commission and omission
• personally responsible for actions of his
  political staff

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Gomery Who is responsible?

• Other ministers
• Minister Marleau (GWPSC) not held responsible
  not informed
• Finance Minister Martin and other Quebec
  ministers exonerated
• DM PWGS (Ran Quail)
• Abdicated his responsibility to manage
  department ( to control, direct and oversee his
  officials)
• Black hole in report
• Clerk and PCO mentioned, especially (Bilodeau,
  Deputy Clerk) in instructing DM and subordinates,
  but no judgement!

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Reshaping Public Management?

• Liberal Government executive centred changes
  taking place
• more executive management (ministers as chief
  executives) and more central agency controls and
  oversight
• Conservative government parliamentary centred
  proposals
• More central agency financial controls,
  transparency, and parliamentary and parliamentary
  agency oversight, audit and control
• House of Commons votes for UK Accounting Officer
  regime
• PAC recommends adoption of UK Accounting Officer
  regime, and House of Commons concurs (Majority
  opposition vs minority Liberal government
  November, 2005)

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Reshaping Public Management?

• Gomery 2 Focus Government Structure and
  Organization
• Constitutional conventions Ministerial
  Responsibility and Non-Partisan Public Service
• Executive Relationships ministers, political
  staff, public servants (Clerk, Central Agencies,
  DMs, and departments), Crown corporations
• Parliament and agencies oversight, review and
  audit for public accountability
• Transparency access to government information,
  whistleblower protection
• Gomery 2 will be technical, theoretical, and
  dense!!

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Ministerial Responsibility Sorting out
accountability answerability

• Minister has authority to direct manage
  department and thus is responsible and
  accountable to Parliament in general
• But PM staffs DMs PM can intervene TB sets
  rules PSC staffs
• And, DM has own authority for some matters of
  administration (from parliamentary statutes
  directly FAA and HRMA delegated authority from
  TB and PSC directly)
• Therefore, when (1) actions of departmental
  public servants, including DM, at issue, and (2)
  minister not involved, minister merely answers,
  in first instance reports on what happened
• Thereafter, Minister is personally accountable
  for her/his own response because now he/she is
  involved and/or in the know

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Ministerial Responsibility Ministers vis-à-vis
their Deputy Ministers

• Official Doctrine says Minister fully accountable
  in Parliament for actions of DMs, even when DM
  acting on own authority!
• Therefore, DM not deemed personally accountable
  to Parliamentary committees for exercise of
  her/his own separate authorities
• DM is said only to appear on behalf of
  minister
• DM only answers in support of ministers
  accountability
• DMs cannot be accountable to parliamentary
  committees, says doctrine, because
• Parliament is political institution DMs are
  non-partisan
• Parliament does not have authority to direct or
  discipline DMs

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Ministerial Responsibility in Practice Is
constitution merely what happens?

• Widespread misunderstanding of constitutional
  convention
• Assumption of moral obligation of ministers to
  commit political hari-kari (admit guilt and
  resign)
• Confusion over responsibility and accountability
  of former and incumbent ministers
• No power of House to require resignation - to
  fire/impeach minister (only PM can fire)
• Duty of Parliament to hold ministers to account
  accountability is a two-sided process
• Responsible Government doesnt trump
  ministerial responsibility
• Ministers name and/or blame departmental
  officials when convenient
• Deputy ministers held to account by
  parliamentary committees

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Ministerial Responsibility Clarifying the
doctrine what it should say?

• Ministers general management responsibility
  accountability does encompass DMs own separate
  authorities as follows
• Minister becomes responsible accountable for DM
  actions when Minister learns (or should have
  learned) of DMs failures to act properly in
  respect to these authorities at this point
  minister required to respond
• However, Minister cannot direct DM on these
  matters Minister does not have the authority
• But, Minister can should raise concerns with DM
  and, if necessary, with Clerk/PM, TB ministers,
  or PSC who have authority to act vis-à-vis the
  DM

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Ministerial Responsibility Gomerys position
and challenge

• Gomery presents accepts Official Doctrine in
  Gomery 1
• Nonetheless, Gomery (1) declines to hold Minister
  Marleau responsible despite doctrine, and (2) he
  holds DM PWGSC Ran Quail personally responsible
  and accountable
• Further, Gomery seems to be of two minds about
  the proposition that there is, and/or should be,
  a division of responsibilities for policy-making
  administration between ministers and
  non-partisan public-service bureaucrats
  respectively hopefully, hell sort it out in
  Gomery 2
• Gomery claims DM Quail responsible for
  administration when he holds him accountable

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Deputy Minister Accountability Should DMs
account publicly?

• Official Doctrine says no, although it accepts
  that
• DMs appear before parliamentary committees, esp.
  PAC, and answer for the performance of their
  department
• Often more than simply reporting or answering
  MPs sometimes demand a personal account
• DMs are, in fact, held to account by committees
  actions judged
• Committees cant discipline or direct, but
  judgement has consequence for reputation is a
  reward or sanction

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Clarifying Conventions what do we need?

• Need to distinguish between
• statutory authorities and responsibilities of
  ministers and DM respectively, and
• (2) Ministers assumed delegation of authority to
  DM as Ministers chief administrative officer
• Distinction between policy-making and
  administration or roles not adequate, or no
  longer adequate
• Need to reduce opportunities, and incentives, for
  Ministers to blame DMs (or other public servants)
  to escape personal responsibility
• Need to accept that DMs should provide a public
  account of their exercise of their own
  authorities responsibilities before
  parliamentary committees

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Do we need the UK Accounting Officer Regime?

• Canadian DMs already have necessary statutory
  and delegated authority to manage department
  independent of minister to say no to
  minister
• minister cannot direct or override DM in these
  matters
• different than in UK system where Accounting
  Officer (Permanent Secretary) authority is
  executive prerogative power that is delegated,
  not statutory
• DM cannot use ministerial letter of instruction
  to escape personal responsibility and
  accountability - DM must decide and be
  accountable
• minister can seek action from TB or PSC that
  overrides DM on TB and PSC delegations
• Canadian DMs already account before are held to
  account by PAC for personal performance in
  managing their department

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Strengthening Independence of the Non-Partisan
Public Service

• DMs should be formally brought into the
  non-partisan public service to protect the public
  service from politicization via politicization of
  DMs in Parliament and by Ministers
• Independent staffing is required condition by
  definition, appointments by partisan ministers
  risks partisan staffing
• Canadian convention is non-partisan, professional
  staffing of DM cadre through Clerk, assisted by
  COSO, who advises PM on staffing and where PM
  traditionally accepts recommendation
• But, New Public Governance ministers
  increasingly want a more politically responsive
  public service the traditional bargain has
  been broken no one arguing otherwise!

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Independent Staffing of DM Cadre

• Institutionalize the spirit of Canadian
  convention
• DM Commission (Clerk, COSO, and two external
  members)
• DMC recommends appointments to Cabinet
• Cabinet appoints or not
• if not, Cabinets veto disclosed publicly
• DMC makes another recommendation
• DMC separate from PSC given Cabinet veto as
  democratic check (no check on PSC powers to
  staff)
• DMC external members as check on bureaucratic
  favouritism

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Rein in Political Staff

• In constitutional doctrine, political staff
  merely staff to ministers with no line
  authority to issue orders or direction to
  departments public-service bureaucracy,
  including DM
• In practice, however, political staff
  increasingly aggressive in seeking to exercise
  their ministers authority blurring of
  boundaries, stepping over the line - New Public
  Governance
• Priority status for political staff in public
  service staffing serves no public interest
  invites backdoor partisan-politicization
  eliminate
• Political staff a permanent feature another
  reason for strengthening independence of
  non-partisan public service

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In Conclusion

• New Public Governance will not subside as
  pressure on government
• greater transparency
• 7/24 competitive media
• decline of deference to political authority
• increased expectations and standards
• fewer partisans and less tolerance of
  partisanship
• Canadian non-partisan public service should be
• independent authority for impartial conduct of
  government business
• transparent in its administrative operations
• accountable publicly before parliament committees