Michael ALLOUCHE

1
CIVIL UAV Safety Issues Airworthiness
Operational Certification aspects
The IAI-Malat background experience

• Presented by
• Michael ALLOUCHE
• Airworthiness Manager
• Israel Aircraft Industries, Malat Division

UAV-NET Stockholm, 23 October 2001
2
Thinking Peaceful Civilian UAVsIn A World
Enraged by Terror?!
An Old-New Philosophical Debate
Leibnitz We live in the BEST of all possible
worlds
Voltaire We live in the WORST of all possible
worlds
A Jewish Answer We live in a world that is the
WORST of all possible worlds, but in which there
is still HOPE (Rabbi
Adin Steinsaltz, Jerusalem)
3
PRESENTATION TOPICS

• Introducing the issues
• UAV Certification stalemate?
• Basic definitions terminologies
• Safety risks / Airworthiness vs Operational
• IAI-Malat Background Experience
• Airworthiness approvals
• Operational approvals
• Airworthiness safety lessons learned
• Overall safety improvement trend
• B-Hunter UAV Certification Process Highlights

4
PRESENTATION TOPICS (cont.)

• UAV Safety Airworthiness Issues
• UAV Leading Particulars
• Overall Safety Objective Rationale Elements
• Hazard Risk Assessment Criteria Elements
• Defining An Airworthiness Certification Basis
• UAV Operational Design Features
• Conclusions
• The Long Shorter Way to Civil UAV Certification

5
Introducing the IssuesThe UAV certification
stalemate?

• UAV industry waits for Certifying Authorities
  to regulate UAV Type Certification, as awaited by
  UAV operators who seek the granting of less
  restricting Flight Authorizations from Certifying
  Authorities who, before they invest resources in
  regulating, wait to see whether or not UAVs are
  really to be developed at a larger scale by UAV
  industry who waits for Certifying Authorities to
  regulate UAV Type Certification, as awaited by
  UAV operators who seek...

6
Introducing the IssuesBasic Definitions
Terminology

• CERTIFICATION Legal recognition by a
  certifying authority that a product complies with
  applicable requirements.
• National / international law
• Relevant certifying authority
• Clearly defined product
• Applicable administrative and technical
  requirements
• () In red TBD for Civilian UAVs?

7
Introducing the IssuesBasic Definitions
Terminology

• AIRWORTHINESS CERTIFICATION
• Type airworthiness certification
• Type design complies with applicable
  airworthiness requirements aimed at showing that
  it can be flown with an acceptable level of
  safety.
• Engineering process, safe and reliable
  design
• Individual airworthiness certification
  Individual aircraft built in accordance with Type
  Design
• Production quality control oriented
  process

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Introducing the IssuesBasic Definitions
Terminology

• OPERATIONAL CERTIFICATION
• Crew qualification
• Maintenance continued airworthiness
• Safe airspace integration airspace management
  issue
• Special flight permit / flight authorization
• Covers most essential airworthiness operational
  safety of flight aspects.
• Used in particular cases e.g. flight test
  clearance or special operational use.

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Introducing the IssuesSafety / Airworthiness
vs Operational
Persons on board
UAV Safety Risks
Persons Property On Ground
Air Traffic Collision

• AIRWORTHINESS
• Safe reliable design
• Manufacturer

• OPERATIONS
• Safe Airspace Integration
• Operator

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IAI-MALAT BACKGROUND EXPERIENCE
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IAI-MALAT BACKGROUND EXPERIENCE Current
"Airworthiness approvals"

• "Covered" by customer requirements
  qualification procedures
• System specification requirements military
  contractual procedures
• System qualification / First Article Test
  inspection process.
• e.g. US SR-Hunter, F-Hunter, Israeli Searcher,
  Heron
• Ranger "certification" (type A/type B) in
  Switzerland
• Belgian B-Hunter Airworthiness Certification

In each case, Approval authority Military Body
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IAI-MALAT BACKGROUND EXPERIENCECurrent UAV
Operational Approvals

• Military operations
• Full control by military air traffic authorities
• Special reserved airspace areas / allocated
  airways
• Coordination with civilian Air Traffic control
  authorities wherever required
• US SR-Hunter, France F-Hunter, Swiss Ranger,
  Israeli Searcher
• Israeli Heron
• Civil UAV (Firebird 2001) demonstration
• Approval procedure through FAA regional offices
  (through FAA waiver application form 7711-2)
• Granting of FAA Certificate of Flight
  Authorization (State of Montana, October 1996)
  within NAS and TFR area.

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IAI-MALAT BACKGROUND EXPERIENCEAirworthiness
safety lessons learned
UAV EVENTS STATISTICS (BASED ON 100,000 FLIGHT
HOURS OF IAI UAV FLEET)
REDUNDANCY
REDUNDANCY
ANTI-ICING SYSTEM
AUTOMATION
FULL REDUNDANCY FAIL SAFE APPROACH
FAR 33 CERTIFIED ENGINE DUAL ENGINE
CONFIGURATION
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()
()
() Based upon Heron AV
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IAI-MALAT BACKGROUND EXPERIENCEB-HUNTER UAV

• EAGLE Association, Consortium led by SONACA in
  teaming agreement with IAI-Malat and Thales,
  Belgium.
• Belgian MOD contract with specific clause related
  to Airworthiness Certification

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B-HUNTER Airworthiness Certification Main Design
Features

• B-Hunter characteristics
• Basic US Hunter AV
• Upgraded Avionics payload
• Advanced GCS
• Automatic Take-Off
• Landing System.

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B-Hunter Airworthiness Certification Highlights
Outlines of the process

• B-Hunter Certification basis
• Hazard Risk Assessment Criteria
• JAR VLA tailoring
• Specific airworthiness requirements
• B-Hunter verification process
• Engineering data
• System Safety Analyses
• Hardware software qualification
• Ground tests and Flight Tests, incl. failure
  handling demonstration
• B-Hunter Airworthiness Certification Dossier
• Manufacturers Type Certificate
• Flight Ops Manuals, incl. normal abnormal
  procedures, limitations
• Final Type Certificate of Airworthiness to be
  granted by BMoD at the conclusion of validation
  flights in Belgium.

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UAV AIRWORTHINESS SAFETY ISSUESUAV Leading
Particulars

• Catastrophic Event Definition Loss of UAV AND
  hazard on ground (or uncontrolled crash)
• Airworthiness operational interrelation
• Flight Termination capability
• Communications data-link
• Ground control station
• No pilot on board
• Piloting monitoring function (automation
  levels)
• Handling of failure conditions corrective
  actions
• Definition of emergency procedures
• Unforeseen scenarios far from home

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UAV AIRWORTHINESS SAFETY ISSUESOverall Safety
Objective Rationale Elements
May We Apply Similar Rationale for Civil UAVs ?
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UAV AIRWORTHINESS SAFETY ISSUESHazard Risk
Assessment Criteria Elements

• Civil UAV issues to be solved
• Define intermediate quantitative probability
  values
• consistent with UAV Overall Safety Objective
• Confirm Risk Index
• Severity Definitions to be adapted according to
  Civil
• Context UAV Applications

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UAV AIRWORTHINESS SAFETY ISSUESDefining an
Airworthiness Certification Basis

• UAV System as a Whole
• Categorization Issue
• Prime element
• Overall System Safety Objectives
• Hazard Risk Assessment Criteria
• Additional elements
• JAR 25/23/VLA like code (UAV Airframe)
• Well thought tailoring
• Towards new JAR UAV?
• Additional criteria for UAV specific features
• GCS
• Communication Data Link
• Flight Termination

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UAV OPERATIONAL SAFETY FEATURES

• IFF transponder capable of mode S communications
• Avoid" means for other (relying on ATC or/and
  TCAS of others)
• Switching logic to given transponder codes (e.g.
  SSR 7700 in case of total loss of communication)
• Voice relay VHF radio 2-way communications
• Via air vehicle using communication data link
  ("ATC talks to the air vehicle")
• Direct GCS-ATC communications in case of
  contingency
• Anti-collision strobe lights ("avoid" means for
  others)
• Forward vision camera and/or EO/IR sensor (See
  and Avoid" enhancement)
• Need to develop Technologies (cooperative e.g.
  ADS-B, VDL-4...versus non cooperative, e.g. Radar
  based) fully solving the See and avoid issue

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CONCLUSIVE THOUGHTSThe Long Shorter Way to Civil
UAV certification

• UAV industry has a key role to help breaking out
  of the UAV certification stalemate
• Pragmatic realistic way
• Short Term confidence building approach
• Long Term proven approach.
• Design technological parameters strongly
  related to Overall safety Objective Hazard Risk
  Assessment Criteria
• UAV certification regulation cope with every
  potential design choices by setting objectives
  (RBO1) rather than imposing specific solutions.
  
• 1Regulation By Objective