A Case Study in Army-Air Force Co-Operation

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A Case Study in Army-Air Force Co-Operation

• The Western Desert Air Force and the Battle for
  the Mareth Line, 19th 29th March 1943

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Introduction

• Perception of tactical air power
• Flexible and adaptable
• 1940 1942 a period of difficult gestation
• Often derided as the Royal Absent Force
• Hard fought lessons
• Coninghams principles
• Air superiority
• Concentration of force
• Effective planning
• Centralised control
• Flexibility
• Command relationships

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A Hawker Hurricane Mark IID of No 6 Squadron,
Royal Air Force, demonstrates the effect of its
firepower on an abandoned enemy tank in Tunisia
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Strategic Situation

• By January 1943 2 key problems were identified
• The speed with which the OKW and Commando Supremo
  could reinforce their positions in Tunisia
• The speed with which 8th Army and WDAF forces
  could be reinforced
• Affect of the Kasserine Pass battles Operation
  Sturmflut
• Reorganisation of air power assets in North
  Africa
• Formation of NATAF under Coningham
• Logistical issues for the 8th Army and WDAF
• Operation Capri
• Strength of the Mareth Line position

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Initial Planning

• Basic plan laid out by Montgomery
• Flanking operation by the NZ Corps under Freyberg
• To be supported by X Corps
• Frontal attack on the Mareth Line by XXX Corps
• Role of the air forces
• Broad strategic outline for future operation
  dictated by Coningham at Canrobert, 12 March
• No. 242 Group and US XII ASC to attack airfields
  maintain theatre wide air superiority
• WDAF to operate in support of 8th Army operations
• In support of the 8th Army attack against the
  Mareth Line operations would consist of
• Light bombers to conduct attacks on landing
  grounds Starting 15 March
• Fighters to maintain command of the air in the
  battlespace
• Fighters to operate in support of the ground
  forces
• Medium bombers to wear out German positions
• 5 fighter wings, 3 light bomber wings, 1
  reconnaissance wing and 2 medium bomber wings in
  support

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Operation PUGILIST

• Initial attack went in by 50th Infantry Division,
  20th/21st March
• BAI and air superiority mission took priority
• Limited reaction by Axis forces
• During 21st March BAI missions continued
• Failure of frontal attacks on the Mareth Line
• NZ Corps halted by 21st Panzer Division
• Successful use of CAS in support in NZ Corps on
  22nd March
• No. 6 Squadron in Hurricane IID tank-busters
• Claimed 36 tanks hit
• Prevention of further operations by bad weather
• German counter-attacks on 23 March against XXX
  Corps
• Forced to shift the weight of the attack

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Shifting Priorities

• Failure of XXX Corps frontal assault
• Decision to concentrate on NZ Corps left hook
• Intention to thrust towards the Gabes Gap via El
  Hamma
• Air effort was to support this new thrust
• 24th/25th March No. 6 Squadron was again in
  action around El Hamma
• Continuing attacks on airfields
• 20 tanks hit by Hurricane IIDs
• Maintenance of air superiority by actions of No.
  242 Group and XII ASC
• Army held up at El Hamma

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Operation SUPERCHARGE II

• Problem of geography
• A frontal assault would be costly
• Broadhurst suggested a possible solution
• An air blitz
• Use of air power of roving artillery on a fixed
  pattern
• This would allow movement by 1st Armoured
  Division
• Situation on other fronts
• Broadhursts appreciation
• NZ Corps Operation Orders driven by the air plan

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Air Support The Breakthrough at El Hamma

• Exploitation of allied air superiority
• BAI operation to proceed the air blitz
• Outline of the air blitz
• 1530 26th March 3 waves of light and medium
  bombers launched pattern bombing
• On lines laid by a pre-planned artillery
  programme
• Relay attacks launched immediately after its
  completion by fighter-bombers
• A strength of 2.5 squadrons was maintained over
  the battlespace
• Relays arrived at quarter hour intervals
• No. 6 Squadron Hurricane tank-busters attacked
  concentrations of tanks
• Air superiority maintained by a roving patrol of
  one Spitfire squadron
• Infantry advanced at 1600 at a rate of 100 feet
  a minute
• Positions marked by flares
• By 29th March 1st Armoured Division had breached
  the Gabes Gap

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Command, Control, Intelligence and Reconnaissance

• Role of 285 Wing
• Reconnaissance in support of army preparations
• Based on the Woodall system
• Lessons of No. 2 AASC in the Western Desert
• Final perfected use of the Woodall system
• FACs deployed with 8th Armoured Brigade
• Use of Flying FACs
• Intelligence driven interdiction campaign

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Comments on the Battle at El Hamma

• An interesting feature of the El Hamma battle
  was the readiness of the Eighth Army to modify
  their plans at short notice in order to fit in
  with what was considered to be the most effective
  method of employing the air forces. The air
  operations themselves had no specifically novel
  features. The conventional rules of war were
  applied, special attention being paid to
  surprise, concentrating the maximum force at the
  right place, and carefully co-ordinating the air
  plans with those of the land forces.
• AIR 23/6764 Operations of the Western Desert Air
  Force from the capture of Tripoli, 23rd Jan 1943,
  until the final surrender of Axis forces in North
  Africa, 13th May 1943 p. 21

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Conclusion A Blueprint for Success?

• A fusion of lessons
• The RAF was proactive rather than reactive to
  army needs
• Readiness of army commanders to listen to their
  air force counterparts
• Growth in inter-dependence between the army and
  air force
• Development of command relationships
• Notably Montgomery and Broadhurst
• Culmination of 3 years of hard fought lessons
• A notable feature of combined arms operations in
  Italy and North-West Europe
• Introduction of WINKLE and TIMOTHY operations
• Links to CABRANK
• Flexible and adaptable