Dewey and Lippmann: A Comparison, Ch. 2

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Dewey and Lippmann A Comparison, Ch. 2

• Dewey begins this chapter by further explaining
  how manners of association differ from one
  another. He does this in the interest of
  demonstrating the kinds of association suitable
  to form the public.
• He particularly discusses two types of
  association
• Those that are too intimate to need a state (pp.
  41-2). His example here is theocratic
  communities, small towns run by the local
  church.
• Those that are too separated to form enough
  association for a public (pp. 42-3).
• The state relies on associations that lie between
  these two extremes.

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Dewey and Lippmann A Comparison, Ch. 2
Deweys definitions of the public and the state
are important, he explains, because they account
for the variability of both. Peoples material
lives change (p. 44). (We stop focusing on
agriculture, start focusing on manufacturing, for
instance.) Their ideas about what the state
should do change (pp. 45-6). (We move from
idealist to progressive notions of the state, for
instance.) Dewey explains that his approach to
the state is superior to Lippmanns causal
explanation because Lippmanns explanation cannot
account for the relativity of states (p. 47).
According to Lippmann, the state will always do
the same thing because people will always be the
same way. According to Dewey, circumstances
change, and peoples ability to indirectly
influence one another change, so states change.
Dewey says, the only function of the state is
caring for and regulating the interests which
accrue as the result of complex indirect
expansion and radiation of conjoined behavior
(p. 47).
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Dewey and Lippmann A Comparison, Ch. 2
Dewey and Lippmann on the public/private
division Lippmann very clearly puts little in
the public sphere. All the public can and should
do or discuss is crisis management. Everything
else belongs in the private sphere. This is the
same in all cases and all eras because Lippmann
begins with a causal explanation. Deweys
consequential explanation, and his theory of a
variable state lead him to a much more fluid
understanding of what belongs in the public and
the private spheres. On pp. 48-52, he lists
various institutions/issues that may be public or
may be private depending on how their indirect
consequences materialize religion, marriage,
licensing. He ends with a potentially much
broader sense of what the public should
deliberate when consequences concern a large
number, a number so mediately involved that a
person cannot readily prefigure how they are to
be affected, that number is constituted a public
which intervenes (p. 53). The line between
public and private becomes blurry (p. 64).
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Dewey and Lippmann A Comparison, Ch. 2
Dewey and Lippmann on what makes a good
rule For Lippmann, the rule 1. Must be
clearly stated, 2. Must clearly state its
effects, 3. Must be open to amendment (pp.
126-8). Lippmann sez the rule does not represent
the public will, only a temporary agreement that
will return everything to order by settling
conflict. Dewey agrees with Lippmann on an
important point the rule does not represent a
general will (p. 54). But for Dewey, the rule
does much more than settle conflict. The rule
canalizes action (p. 54). The rule also
regulates the effects of our actions in ways that
we would find reasonable if we had the time to
consider all of the indirect consequences (p.
56). Dewey calls the law embodied reason, not
insofar as it is caused by a reasoning public but
insofar as it has the consequence of formulating
rational behavior (p. 57).
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Dewey and Lippmann A Comparison, Ch. 2
Deweys qualification The rule cannot deal with
the future or with innovation (pp. 58-9). Dewey
says that innovation is a private matter, but
regulation of old modes of behavior is a public
matter. This qualification prevents his theory
of the state and of the public from becoming
excessively hollow or all-encompassing.
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Dewey and Lippmann A Comparison, Ch. 2
Dewey, carefully claiming his pluralism In his
discussion of the relationship between the
public, the state, and the government (pp.
66-74), Dewey carefully sidesteps charges that he
is a collectivist. He affirms his commitment to
a pluralism like that which Lippmann
espouses. He says, for instance, that The state
does not represent any collective public will
(pp.67-8). Citizens must constantly criticize the
state to ensure that it will remain useful to
them (p. 69). There is no one society but
rather are many overlapping societies, so there
can be no collective will (pp. 70-1). The state
is regulatory--it protects individuals so they
can pursue their own freedoms without
interference (p. 72). There are plural social
groupings in any society (p. 73).