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Philosophy of Mind

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certain mental phenomena (states, events, etc.) are immaterial properties of ... Mental states are functional states of a complex system ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Philosophy of Mind


1
Philosophy of Mind
  • Dualism in addition to the physical/material
    body, there is an immaterial mind
  • Physicalism mind and body are both entirely
    physical

2
Dualism
  • Substance dualism
  • The mind is an immaterial substance, i.e., a
    thing that can (logically possibly) exist by
    itself
  • Property dualism
  • certain mental phenomena (states, events, etc.)
    are immaterial properties of some material thing
    (e.g., brain, body)

3
  • Brie Gertler

In Defense of Mind-Body Dualism
4
Disembodiment Argument
  • 1. I can conceive of experiencing this pain while
    disembodied
  • 2. What is conceivable is possible
  • 3. Its possible that this pain exists in
    immaterial being (1, 2)
  • 4. If this pain were a physical state or event,
    it couldnt exist in immaterial being
  • 5. So, this pain is not identical to any physical
    state (3, 4)
  • 6. So physicalism is false (5)

5
Disembodiment Argument
  • 1. I can conceive of experiencing this pain while
    disembodied
  • 2. What is conceivable is possible
  • 3. Its possible that this pain exists in
    immaterial being (1, 2)
  • 4. If this pain were a physical state or event,
    it couldnt exist in immaterial being
  • 5. So, this pain is not identical to any physical
    state (3, 4)
  • 6. So physicalism is false (5)

6
Disembodiment Argument
  • 1. I can conceive of experiencing this pain while
    disembodied
  • 2. What is conceivable is possible
  • 3. Its possible that this pain exists in
    immaterial being (1, 2)
  • 4. If this pain were a physical state or event,
    it couldnt exist in immaterial being
  • 5. So, this pain is not identical to any physical
    state (3, 4)
  • 6. So physicalism is false (5)

7
Disembodiment Argument
  • 1. I can conceive of experiencing this pain while
    disembodied
  • 2. What is conceivable is possible
  • 3. Its possible that this pain exists in
    immaterial being (1, 2)
  • 4. If this pain were a physical state or event,
    it couldnt exist in immaterial being
  • 5. So, this pain is not identical to any physical
    state (3, 4)
  • 6. So physicalism is false (5)

8
Disembodiment Argument
  • 1. I can conceive of experiencing this pain while
    disembodied
  • 2. What is conceivable is possible
  • 3. Its possible that this pain exists in
    immaterial being (1, 2)
  • 4. If this pain were a physical state or event,
    it couldnt exist in immaterial being
  • 5. So, this pain is not identical to any physical
    state (3, 4)
  • 6. So physicalism is false (5)

9
Disembodiment Argument
  • 1. I can conceive of experiencing this pain while
    disembodied
  • 2. What is conceivable is possible
  • 3. Its possible that this pain exists in
    immaterial being (1, 2)
  • 4. If this pain were a physical state or event,
    it couldnt exist in immaterial being
  • 5. So, this pain is not identical to any physical
    state (3, 4)
  • 6. So physicalism is false (5)

10
Who cares?
  • pain C-fiber firing water H2O
  • Pain is either necessarily physical or not
    physical at all
  • Analogously for other mental phenomena
  • Since mental events are not necessarily physical,
    they arent physical
  • So we are not entirely physical

11
Physicalism
  • Behaviorism
  • What we call mentality is really just proneness
    to behave in certain ways
  • x is in pain means x is disposed to cry out,
    wince, etc.
  • Functionalism
  • Mental states are functional states of a complex
    system
  • Pain is any state that plays a certain causal
    role e.g., is produced by kicks and shocks,
    leads to fear, aversion, pain behavior, etc.
  • Identity theory the mind is the brain
  • Pain is (but doesnt mean) C-fiber firing, or
    brain state 71325, or whatever we discover it to
    be
  • Like water is H2O or lightning is electrical
    discharge, a scientific discovery, not a fact
    about meaning

12
  • Peter Carruthers

The Mind is the Brain
13
Causal Argument
  • Some mental events cause physical events
  • Every (caused) physical event is wholly caused by
    some physical event
  • Therefore, some mental events are physical events
  • Plausibly, if theyre physical events, theyre
    brain events, and if some are, all are

14
Causal Argument
  • Some mental events cause physical events
  • Every (caused) physical event is wholly caused by
    some physical event
  • Therefore, some mental events are physical events
  • Plausibly, if theyre physical events, theyre
    brain events, and if some are, all are

15
Arguments for Premise 2
  • Conservation laws of physical sciences
  • Metaphysical principle of the causal closure of
    the physical
  • Neuroscientific induction

16
Objections to PhysicalismCertainty
  • Leibnizs Law if a is numerically identical with
    b, then a cannot have any properties that b lacks
  • I am absolutely certain of having certain
    conscious states
  • I am not absolutely certain of having certain
    brain states
  • Therefore, these conscious states are not
    identical with these brain states (by Leibnizs
    Law)

17
Response
  • Leibnizs Law does not hold in intentional
    contexts
  • intentional having to do with meaning
  • Jocasta is pretty implies Oedipuss mother is
    pretty
  • O said that Jocasta is pretty does not imply O
    said that Os mom is pretty
  • O thought that J was pretty does not imply O
    thought that Os mom was pretty
  • I can tell Im in pain does not imply I can
    tell Im in brain state 714390, even if pain is
    brain state 714390

18
Objections to PhysicalismColor, etc.
  1. An afterimage may be green (a taste sensation may
    be sweet, etc.)
  2. Brain events arent green (or sweet, etc.)
  3. Therefore, afterimages (etc.) are not brain events

19
Response
  • Note first how this applies to dualism as well
    the immaterial soul isnt green either.
  • The afterimage isnt green in the sense that
    grass is its an experience of green, not a
    green experience.

20
Objections to PhysicalismSpatial properties
  1. Brain events are spatially located
  2. Mental events are not spatially located
  3. Therefore, mental events are not brain events

21
Response
  • It is unusual to attribute precise locations to
    specific thoughts (e.g., two inches behind her
    left eye), but that doesnt make it senseless
  • The question is where the event is occurring in
    virtue of which Mary is thinking about her mother
  • And that event is occurring two inches behind her
    left eye
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