Shocks and Aftershocks: Lessons from Thailand and Indonesia

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Shocks and Aftershocks Lessons from Thailand and
Indonesia

• Lessons from the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami The
  First Annual Elisabeth and Henry Morss Jr.
  Colloquium
• Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution
• Woods Hole, Massachusetts USA
• Dr. Stephen J. Atwood, MD, F.A.A. P.
• Regional Advisor, Health and Nutrition
• UNICEF East Asia and Pacific Regoinal Office
• Bangkok, Thailand
• October 31 2006

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Purpose of this presentation

• To present the observations and lessons learned
  from tsunami impact and aftermath from two
  different sites -- Thailand and Indonesia.
• To present the socio-ecological impact of the
  subsequent 28 March 2005 aftershock on the island
  of Nias off the west coast of Sumatra
• To use the examples of earthquake / tsunami
  impact in these different settings to develop
  ideas for change in preparation for and
  mitigation of future disasters.

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• Background

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Background the earthquake

• On December 26, 2004 at 07.58 am (local time) an
  undersea earthquake occurred with an epicentre
  off the west coast of Sumatra, Indonesia. The
  magnitude of the earthquake has been measured as
  between 9.1 and 9.3 on the Richter scale.
• The second largest earthquake ever recorded on a
  seismograph.
• Reported to be the longest duration of faulting
  ever observed, lasting between 500 and 600
  seconds.

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Background the tsunami

• The earthquake, because of the large vertical
  displacement of the seabed, generated a series of
  tsunamis moving most strongly in an east-west
  direction that hit neighboring Aceh within 15
  minutes and the south west coast of Thailand
  approximately 2 hours later.

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Countries affected
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• Animation of the tsunami showing how the tsunami
  radiated from the entire length of the 1,200
  kilometer (750 mi) rupture. National oceanic
  and atmospheric administration, 30 December 2004

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The wave that hit Aceh

• Early estimates were of a 30-foot wave.
• Later Researchers found evidence of waves as
  high as 24 m (80 ft) when coming ashore along
  large stretches of the coastline, rising to 30 m
  (100 ft) in some areas travelling inland.
• The waves average velocity on shore was 45 feet
  / second.

Moore, Tsuji Seattle Post Intelligencer 07
February, 2005
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The wave that hit Thailand

• Photo David Rydevik, Stockholm, Sweden.
• Ao Nang, Thailand. 26 Dec 2004

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• Preconditions and
• Vulnerabilities

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Preconditions and Vulnerabilities

• Thailand The highly visible
• Economy in the Phuket area formerly based on
  rubber trees, tin mining, and fishing. But
  soaring land prices due to tourism have pushed
  other industries out.
• After opening of Phuket International Airport in
  1976, tourism has become the primary economic
  force. Managed by Thais but requiring
  (seasonally) large numbers of laborers from other
  parts of Thailand and from neighboring countries.
• A healthy infrastructure with health care
  (including emergency obstetric facilities),
  roads, water, and sanitation.

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Preconditions and Vulnerabilities

• Thailand and the invisible
• The need for inexpensive labour to serve the
  hospitality, agricultural, construction, and
  fishery industries.
• Easier access of migrants to Thai shores
  long-standing co-dependency.
• 73,000 migrant workers were reportedly registered
  for work in the tsunami-affected provinces
  beginning in July 2004 considered a significant
  underestimation since many were unregistered.

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Preconditions and Vulnerabilities

• Aceh Province, Indonesia Open
• Aceh Province was considered the entry point for
  Islam into Indonesia and the rest of Southeast
  Asia (c. 700- 800 CE).
• Aceh was never under the formal control of
  colonial Netherlands. Since Indonesian
  independence granted by the UN in 1949 was from
  the Dutch, the Acehnese felt betrayed by the UN
  resolution that included them in the new
  Indonesian Republic.

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Preconditions and Vulnerabilities

• Aceh Province, Indonesia Open
• A socio economic stronghold in the 1970s and
  1980s with abundant international aid,
  multinational experts and multinational
  investment. During that period, infrastructure
  was developed, and social services improved.
• Between 1990 2001, the once-rich province
  became one of the slowest growing with poverty
  levels rising from 1.8 (1989) to 30 (2001).
  (ref. ISEAS, May 2003)

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Preconditions and Vulnerabilities

• Aceh Province, Indonesia and closed.
• The separatist movement started in 1976 with the
  formation of Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) or Free
  Aceh Movement but did not have impact until 1990s
  
• Security crackdowns in 2001 and 2002 resulted in
  several thousand civilian deaths with human
  rights abuses on both sides government feared
  parallel with the independence of Timor Leste and
  the separatist movements in Papua.
• Many higher-educated and better off Acehnese
  began leaving the Province in 2000.

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Preconditions and Vulnerabilities

• Aceh Province, Indonesia and closed.
• Access for international humanitarian and human
  rights agencies were severely restricted by
  Indonesian government after 2003.
• A nutrition survey done in Aceh Province in Feb
  March 2005 found an unacceptably high level of
  undernutrition in children and women in both
  areas affected and unaffected by the Tsunami,
  which indicated a problem that existed before the
  tsunami.

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Preconditions and Vulnerabilities

• Geography and Terrain
• Indian Ocean Tsunami a part of the Alpide Belt of
  volcanic and seismic activity, the second most
  active in the world.
• However, no history of large tsunami in the
  Indian Ocean since Krakatoa erupted (1883).
  Hence, as distinct from the Pacific Ring of
  Fire (which includes northeastern Indonesia,
  Hawaii, and the West Coast of USA), no early
  warning system for tsunami in the Indian Ocean.
• With few exceptions, early warning signs (e.g.,
  recession of the sea) were curios rather than
  cautions. Children and tourists explored the
  vast areas of exposed beach.

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Sea recession - Thailand

• Maximum recession of tsunami waters at Kata Noi
  Beach, Phuket, Thailand, before the 3rd, and
  strongest, tsunami wave (sea visible in the right
  corner). (26 December 2004)

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Preconditions and Vulnerabilities

• Geography and Terrain
• The high-rise resorts of Phuket and the proximity
  of the mountainous interior offered more
  protection than the bungalow architecture and
  flatter geography of dwellings and resorts north
  of the city.
• The east-west orientation of the tsunami hit more
  than 800 km of coastal area on the west coast of
  Sumatra, obliterating the port and city of Calang
  (pop. 14,000) and the port and much of the city
  of Meulaboh (pop. 120,000).

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Preconditions and Vulnerabilities

• Timing
• First wave hit Aceh at approximately 0800 am
  local time and the southwest coast of Thailand
  approximately two hours later on a Sunday.
• Schools were closed and children were at home or
  playing on the beach. (In Thailand, many schools
  were on higher ground farther from the ocean.)
• In Thailand, much of the fishing fleet was on
  shore in Aceh, fishermen were at sea, leaving
  behind women and children.
• Markets were closed.
• It was the height of the tourist season in
  Thailand (Phuket alone has an estimated 35,000
  visitors a day over 4 million tourists arrived
  in Phuket in 2002.)

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Preconditions and Vulnerabilities

• Summary
• Thailand Growing economy since the 1980s with
  improving social services and a burgeoning
  tourist industry however, not yet addressing its
  migrant problem.
• Aceh A society that was once thriving but on
  the decline since 1990 due to conflict,
  isolation, and centralized economic
  mismanagement deteriorating social services,
  flight of the educated classes.

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• The Aftermath and its consequences

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Ban Nam Khen, Thailand Photo
S.J. Atwood 01 Jan 2005
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Ban Nam Khen, Thailand, Photo S.J. Atwood,
01 Jan 2005
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Ban Nam Khen, Thailand,
Photo S.J. Atwood,
01 Jan 2005
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Ban Nam Khen, Thailand,
Photo S.J. Atwood, 01
Jan 2005
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Village near the coast of Sumatra , January 2,
2005. Photo P. McDaniel, US Navy.
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Photo SOURCE Amir, Aceh Besar
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Photo UNICEF, Banda Aceh
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Photo UNICEF, Banda Aceh, 02 Feb 2005
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Photo Joerg Meier, Aceh Besar
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PhotoMichael Elmquist, OCHA, Aceh Besar
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Photo UNICEF, Banda Aceh
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Photo Joerg Meier, Aceh Besar
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Photo UNICEF, Aceh
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Photo S.J. Atwood, Banda Aceh
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Casualties
Country wheredeaths occurred Deaths Deaths Injured Missing Displaced
Country wheredeaths occurred Confirmed Estimated Injured Missing Displaced
Indonesia 130,736 167,736 -- 37,063 500,000
Sri Lanka 35,322 35,322 21,411 -- 516,510
India 12,405 18,045 -- 5,640 647,599
Thailand 5,395 8,212 8,457 2,817 7,000
Myanmar 61 400-600 45 200 3,200
TOTAL (plus all countries) 184,168 230,210 125,100 45,752 1.69 mill
UN Office of the Special Envoy for Tsunami
Recovery Joint One-Year Report, December, 2005
UN Office for the Special Envoy for Tsunami
Recovery Joint One Year Report, December 20052
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The Aftermath

• Thailands Social Costs
• lt50 schools hit by the tsunami, and only 12 of
  them seriously damaged. (UNICEF, 14 Jan 2005)
• Schools re-opened on schedule, 1st week of
  January, 2005. Attendance 50. (UNICEF, 14 Jan
  2005)
• Very limited damage to Health Sector facilities
  4 health clinics in coastal villages and islands
  were severly damaged or destroyed. (Asian
  Disaster Preparedness Centre, 2005 CDC, MMWR, 28
  Jan 2005)

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The Aftermath

• Thailands Social Costs
• An estimated 2,500 Burmese workers went missing,
  although there appears to have been no concerted
  effort to track missing migrant workers by the
  Thai authorities so this number is an
  underestimate.
• Many children of migrant workers were denied
  access to primary health care services. (SJA,
  personal observations, Jan 2005).

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The Aftermath

• Thailands Social Costs
• The Thai Ministry of Public Health (MOPH)
  responded with rapid mobilization of local and
  nonlocal clinicians, public health practitioners,
  and medical supplies assessment of health-care
  needs identification of the dead, injured, and
  missing and active surveillance of diesease.
• None of the 10 hospitals had been damaged by the
  tsunami all had activated previously rehearsed,
  written mass casualty plans. (CDC, MMWR, 28 Jan
  2005)
• As of January 19, 2005 a total of 7,423 survivors
  had sought psychiatric help (MOPH, unpublished
  data, 2005).

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and its Consequences

• In most cases, Thailands well-orchestrated
  response along with unprecedented public
  donations and relatively easy access contributed
  to rapid relief and recovery for the Thai
  survivors.
• However, coordination of relief organizations and
  management of unregulated donations represented a
  major challenge (e.g., food went rotting, no
  monitoring of quality)
• The sudden visibility of unexpectedly high
  numbers of migrant workers and their families who
  fell outside of the Thai recovery process drew
  international attention to a long-simmering
  problem that Thailand has been compelled to deal
  with.

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The Aftermath

• Acehs Social Costs
• 500,000 Internally Displaced Persons in camps or
  relatives homes.
• 592 Hospitals, health centres destroyed or
  damaged
• 2240 Primary, secondary schools destroyed
  ordamaged
• 10,124 Water sources destroyed or damaged
• US 5.8 billion tstimated total financial need
  for long term recovery
• 5266 Doctors, Health Workers, Teachers and
  Government workers were among those dead.

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and its Consequences

• The restricted access to Aceh led to an almost
  2-day delay in reaching affected areas for
  assessment and relief (which explains why the
  first reports noted only 200 2000 dead).
• Eventually, however, the Tsunami and the
  overwhelming humanitarian response opened up
  access to areas previously inaccessible.

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and its Consequences

• The deaths of doctors, health workers, teachers
  and government workers have contributed to a
  significant loss of leadership and skill in the
  province.
• As the Province opened up, it became obvious that
  these workers because they were Government
  employees -- were also the target of the
  separatist militants in the North and Northeast
  contributing to a wide-spread loss of human
  resources. Many were killed or displaced.

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and its Consequences

• The uneven loss of womens lives (as high as 41
  in some areas) has changed the entire social
  structure of Aceh.
• The Acehnese, because of the prevalent belief
  that the tsunami was a punishment for their lack
  of faith, instituted Shariah Law, a consequence
  of which is the formation of a para-legal
  organization of Shariah Police that operates
  outside of the legal system and is occasionally
  in conflict with the outside relief
  organizations.

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and its Consequences.

• The Government and GAM agreed on a cease-fire and
  ultimately a peace accord in August 2005 ending
  29 years of conflict. Negotiations re-opened
  after the tsunami.
• Ironically, the 2004 tsunami may have rescued
  Aceh from a dangerous downward economic and
  development curve. Massive and unprecedented
  relief has brought jobs, the potential for
  economic recovery, and peace to this formerly
  war-torn and backward district.

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• The Special Vulnerability of Children

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Children in Aceh and Thailand

• Unable to run as fast not as strong ability to
  swim possibly a factor.
• An added burden to at least one parent both
  were more likely to die.
• More susceptible to disease after the emergency
  low immunization rates of migrant children in
  Thailand and of most children in Aceh tetanus a
  problem in Thailand.
• All vulnerabilities enhanced by undernutrition
  in Aceh 43 girls/ 45 boys underweight 9.2
  girls / 10.4 boys severely undernourished
  UNICEF Aceh Nutrition Survey, Feb-Mar 2005
• Experience shows that there are those waiting to
  exploit separated childrens increased
  vulnerability.

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The Special Vulnerability of Children in Aceh and
Phuket

• Protection from physical harm 1/3 of victims
  were children ( 50,000 dead)
• Protection from exploitation and gender-based
  violence (unknown no reported cases of
  traficking, but no denominator in Aceh or Phuket
  sporadic cases of sexual abuse)
• Protection from Recruitment into armed groups
  (note Acehnese children had been witness to or
  participants in armed conflict for at least 10
  years.)

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The Special Vulnerability of Children in Aceh and
Phuket

• Protection from Psychosocial distress (unknown,
  but between 5-10 of survivors of traumatic
  events have persistent Post-traumatic Distress
  Syndrome requiring psychiatric counselling.)
• Protection from abuse related to forced
  displacement (up to 500,000 families displaced
  forced to live in camps or in host families)
• Protection from family separation (up to 2800
  children were separated from families or
  orphaned more women then men killed)

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Photo UNICEF, Aceh, 16 May 2005
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• The Aftershock Nias earthquake

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Background Nias Earthquake

• On March 28, at 1109 pm, a magnitude 8.7
  earthquake hit the west coast of Sumatra half way
  between the islands of Nias and Simileu.
• Considered an aftershock of the December 2004
  earthquake, as it was on the same fault.
• Approximately 1300 deaths, mainly on Nias.
• 85 of all structures in the northern capital
  Gunungsitoli were destroyed.
• Nias already a marginalized and poor society
  because of geographic and social remoteness.

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Nias Earthquake social and economic toll

• Researchers found the earthquake was associated
  with uplift of up to three meters over a
  400-kilometer stretch of the Sunda megathrust
  (Scripps Institution of Oceanography, Science,
  March 2006)
• The uplift on Hinako Islands and Sirombu port on
  the west coast of Nias led to profound social and
  environmental changes killing of coral reefs,
  loss of ports and jettys, change in fishing
  habits, decrease in water table with subsequent
  exhaustion of wells and water sources.
• With a crumbling economy, poor water supply,
  persistent fear, many have left the islands.

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Uplift on Nias Island
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The Port at Hinako - before
Photo Channa Seneratne, LEAP
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The Port at Hinako -- after
Photo S.J. Atwood, Feb, 2006
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The Port at Hinako -- after
Photo S.J. Atwood, Feb, 2006
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The Port at Hinako -- after
Photo S.J. Atwood, Feb, 2006
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• Analysis and Summary

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Five Major Take-home Points
Examples The undernutrition found in women and children in Aceh after the tsunami enhanced their susceptibility to infectious diseases surveys showed that the problem pre-dated the disaster. The marginalised community in Nias has taken the longest to recover since the aftershock in March. Migrant workers in Thailand, denied access to public services before the tsunami, were the hardest hit by the crisis. Unimmunised children most vulnerable. The poorer members of society are those now left in barracks and tents in Aceh.

• Point 1
• Disasters lead to an exaggeration of previous
  inequities, enhancing the vulnerability of the
  most-vulnerable, i.e., children and women.
• Therefore, development programmes must be an
  integral part of disaster preparedness and
  mitigation.

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Five Major Take-home Points

• Examples
• It was impossible to assess early needs in Aceh
  as the number of families, demographic data,
  infrastructure was not known. As a result,
  supplies were either over- or under-estimated
  location of populations were difficult to
  identify, and percentage affected was impossible
  to estimate as the denominator was not known.
• Ironically, the same was true of Thailand because
  of the invisible migrant population. Estimates
  of dead and missing, lost children and separated
  families were hindered if not impossible to make.

• Point 2
• Immediate response to an emergency is (almost)
  independent of place or situation e.g., food,
  water, shelter, child protection are needed in
  almost all cases.
• Immediate assessment and planning, however,
  require knowledge of baseline data demographic,
  economic, social including health, nutrition,
  education, and infrastructure including water and
  sanitation.

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Five Major Take-home Points

• Examples
• Socio-economic differences began to appear in
  Aceh after the first months of relief. The
  entrepreneurial class had already opened up
  businesses, inventories were restocked, loans
  were secured where needed.
• For the poor teetering on the brink before the
  tsunami all was lost they required more
  assistance in identifying and accessing services
  and employment. They can be lost from the
  beginning, however, as beneficiaries are
  identified in the early days and remain the same.

• Point 3
• At the onset of a disaster, most families are
  equally needy, but not all are equally
  vulnerable.
• In planning a medium and long-term response it
  is important to identify those who are most
  vulnerable.

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Five Major Take-home Points

• Examples
• During the July 2006 earthquake (7.7) and smaller
  tsunami in central java, 500 people perished.
  Many of them walked out to see what was causing
  the receding waters.
• The story of Tilly Smith in Phuket.
• Disaster planning in the Indian Ocean had been
  mainly for earthquake and volcano, not for
  tsunami since it had happened so rarely.
• Thailand put into practice a well-rehearsed
  crisis management plan.

• Point 4
• Lessons learned are not really learned until they
  are put into action. Education and messages
  must be strengthened by rehearsal and evaluated
  for effect.
• People planning for disasters are usually
  planning according to the last disaster. There
  needs to be more imaginative thinking about the
  unexpected and unpredictable.

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Five Major Take-home Points

• Examples
• The massive influx of foreign experts into Aceh
  who were uneducated in the culture or history of
  the province led to tensions and conflict and
  delayed progress.
• In Thailand, the response was led by Thais some
  of them local, using expertise from other
  international and national agencies.
• The same paradigm of community ownership has been
  used for successful development projects the
  world over. We should apply them to disaster
  preparedness, response and mitigatoin.

• Point 5
• There is a need for a new paradigm for the
  involvement of communities in their own response
  to disasters.
• A model is needed where local people, respected
  and empowered as survivors and not diminished as
  victims, regroup and reconstruct their own
  lives using available resources.

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Survivors
Photo S.J.Atwood, IDP Camp, Nias Island, Dec 2005
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not victims
Photo S.J.Atwood, IDP Camp, Nias Island, Dec 2005
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