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Traveling agents: Political change and bureaucratic turnover in India

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Construct transfer dummy for each officer in each year; count multiple transfers ... MeanTransferkt = ak bt cPolChangekt ekt ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Traveling agents: Political change and bureaucratic turnover in India


1
Traveling agents Political change and
bureaucratic turnover in India
  • Lakshmi Iyer (Harvard Business School)
  • Anandi Mani (Warwick University)
  • IPES Conference
  • November 2007

2
Motivation
  • Relationship between elected politicians and
    appointed bureaucrats large theoretical
    literature on normative and positive aspects, but
    relatively little empirical work, especially in a
    developing country context.
  • Political interference in the bureaucracy is a
    major public policy concern in India Public
    Services Bill under consideration to further
    insulate bureaucrats from politicians.
  • We use data from the Indian Administrative
    Service (top level of Indian bureaucracy).
    Politicians have very limited ability to hire and
    fire bureaucrats, so main margin of influence is
    changing which position the bureaucrat is
    assigned to. We thus look at the relationship
    between political events and whether a bureaucrat
    moves to a different post (Transfer).

3
The Indian Administrative Service
  • Successor to the Indian Civil Service (ICS) of
    colonial period. Top layer of Indian bureaucracy.
  • All-India service i.e. officers appointed by
    the central government, but assigned to specific
    states gt potentially have multiple principals.
  • Career bureaucrats, who occupy a range of
    positions district administration, state and
    central secretariats, state-owned enterprises.
  • Recruited through examinations or promotion from
    State Civil Services (SCS).
  • Constitutionally protected from dismissal or
    (formal) demotion by state governments, but are
    frequently transferred to different posts. We
    investigate whether political events change the
    frequency and pattern of bureaucrat transfers.

4
Bureaucrat transfer data
  • Complete career histories of all IAS officers in
    October 2005 (Ministry of Personnel website)
    officer characteristics and job details.
  • Focus on 4149 officers in 19 major states 12
    female, 74 direct recruits, 32 of direct
    recruits serve in their home state. Time period
    1980-2004.
  • Average time in any post is 16 months. Note that
    this has been a historical feature of the IAS.
  • Construct transfer dummy for each officer in each
    year count multiple transfers as one. Mean of
    transfer dummy 0.49
  • Transfer frequency varies across states and over
    time, but there is no secular trend in transfer
    frequency.

5
Political change and bureaucratic transfers
6
Regression specification
  • State-level Regressions for mean transfers in
    state k and year t with state and year fixed
    effects
  • MeanTransferkt ak bt cPolChangekt ekt
  • District-level Regressions for transfer dummy in
    district d of state k and year t with district
    and year fixed effects, and interactions with
    district characteristics
  • Transferdkt ad bt cPolChangekt
    dPolChangekt Xdt edkt
  • All standard errors are clustered at the state
    level.
  • Political events in Indian parliamentary system
    elections are scheduled every 5 years, but the
    Chief Minister of a state changes every 3 years
    on average (non-election related changes are
    usually due to within-party political infighting
    or due to coalition changes).

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10
Conclusions
  • Bureaucrat turnover is significantly increased by
    politician changes. A change in the identity of
    the state Chief Minister (CM) results in an 8
    increase in transfers.
  • This politician impact does not depend on the
    circumstances of attaining office or on the
    legislative strength of the CMs party.
  • Bureaucrats and local politicians seem to be
    substitutes the CM transfers more bureaucrats
    in areas where he does not have political control
    ? a model with multiple agents might be better
    suited for this relationship.
  • We do not find significant negative impacts of
    such politicized bureaucrat transfers on broad
    district level indicators of policy
    implementation and development outcomes (progress
    of immunization programs, completion of road
    projects, poverty reduction).
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