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Distance and Information Asymmetries in Lending Decisions

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Title: Distance and Information Asymmetries in Lending Decisions


1
Distance and Information Asymmetries in Lending
Decisions
  • by
  • Sumit Agarwal and Robert Hauswald
  • ( sons)
  • Discussant
  • Hans Degryse
  • CentER Tilburg University, TILEC, K.U. Leuven
    and CESIfo
  • TILEC-AFM Chair on Financial Market Regulation
  • Conference on the Changing Geography of
    Banking, Ancona, September 2006

2
General Issue
  • Does distance still matter?
  • Petersen and Rajan (JF2002) US
  • No, as distance between lender and borrower has
    quadrupled from 1970s to 90s
  • Yes, as loan rate decreases in distance
  • Degryse and Ongena (JF2005) Belgium
  • Yes, distance between lender and borrowers did
    not increase substantially over from 1975-97
  • Yes, as loan rate hinges on distance to lender
    and distance to competitor
  • This paper US
  • Loan pricing when controlling for score, no
  • Loan volume and switching yes

3
General Issue evidence
4
General Issue why should distance matter?
  • What does distance capture?
  • Petersen and Rajan (JF2002) US
  • No, as distance between lender and borrower has
    quadrupled from 1970s to 90s
  • Yes as loan rate decreases in distance
  • Degryse and Ongena (JF2005) Belgium
  • Yes distance between lender and borrowers did
    not decrease dramatically
  • Yes, as loan rate hinges on distance to lender
    and distance to competitor

5
This papers findings
  • Loan rate determinants
  • decreases in borrower-lender distance (DL) and
    increases in borrower-competitor distance (DC)
  • Distance loses statistical significance when
    introducing the internal score of lender
  • Interaction between score, and DL and DC shows
    that higher scored firms that are closer pay
    higher rates, hinting at asymmetric information
    being the driver
  • Nice treatment of potential selection issues
  • Decision to offer credit
  • Decrease in DL and increase in DC
  • Increase in score distance remains significant

6
This papers findings
  • Switchers away from Bank
  • Increase in DL and decrease in DC
  • Interaction of score, and DC and DL suggest that
    higher scored firms are more likely to switch
    when DC is large, suggesting asymmetric
    information
  • delinquency further away borrowers are more
    delinquent

7
CommentsSetting more inclined towards asymmetric
information?
  • transportation costs vs. asymmetric
    information
  • Degryse and Ongena (JF2005) Belgian sample 44
    borrowed from closest branch
  • US borrowers do not turn to the closest branch
    but prefer to borrow from further away

8
CommentsSetting more inclined towards asymmetric
information?
  • US versus Belgium absolute differences in
    distance
  • US versus Belgium huge relative differences in
    DL versus DC
  • gt how would results be in a restricted sample
    with similar absolute and/or relative
    differences

9
Comments asymmetric information?
  • Inclusion of score in loan pricing model
  • Removes statistical significance of distance as
    standard errors increase
  • Magnitude of coefficients and economic
    significance, however, often remains
  • Main Bank and Duration of Relationship (Months on
    Books)
  • Relatively short duration median of 30 months
  • both have a negative coefficient in loan rate
    regression gt asymmetric information would
    suggest a positive coefficient

10
Comments Is it asymmetric information?
  • Suppose branch managers know that the bank
    applies the following pricing model
  • Loan rate f (Score)
  • gt Branch managers reflect local market power in
    score gt borrowers where the branch manager
    asserts to enjoy a lot of market power get low
    score
  • (see Ioannidou and Ongena (2006) competing bank
    credit scores get adjusted to allow loan officers
    to give borrowers lower rate to attract
    borrowers)
  • gt distance and competitive setting gets
    reflected into score
  • On p. 8-9 the authors mention our bank estimates
    that, on average, 20 to 30 of our banks scores
    consists of soft information
  • Suggestion
  • orthogonalize score to investigate the separate
    impact of distance and
  • check in how far internal score differs from
    external score

11
Comments Technology and potential selection
  • Loans are from January 2002-April 2003, a recent
    period when new technologies may already be in
    place
  • Is the bank only granting loans via its branches,
    or are also loans through other channels like
  • Internet
  • Online banking
  • Other stores/shops, available
  • gt i.e. do you cover all the loan applications
    and approvals of the bank?
  • gt if not, potential selection issues
  • Similar issues and question for rival banks?

12
Minor Comments
  • Do competing branches include own banks
    branches?
  • Switching away from bank versus switching
    towards bank
  • Should months on books and main bank and some
    other variables still play a role when internal
    score is good proxy of private information?

13
Summary
  • Interesting topic? Yes!
  • Interesting paper? Yes!
  • Do I recommend that you read it? Yes!
  • Am I convinced? May be Not Yet
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