When things become undecidably complex

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When things become undecidably complex
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• Within linear, one-dimensional thinking.

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That is to say
1. A is A  Law of Identity
2. A must be either A or not A  Law of Contradiction
3. A cannot be both A and not A  Law of Excluded Middle
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Thus any and all problems should have an answer,
clearly and distinctly and fixed for all time.
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• But what if we have n-dimensional thinking along
  n-lines?

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In other words, its a matter of
Timespace semiosis
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0-Dimension
Timespace semiosis is processual, from
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1-Dimension
To
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2-Dimensions
To
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3-Dimensions
To
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4-dimensions
To
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From I (a point 0-D nothingness, emptiness)
to Other (a line 1-D linearity, bivalence)
to I ? Other (a plane 2-D possibly 3-valued)
to Community (a cube 3-D many-valued) to
Cosmos (a hypercube 4D potentially ?-valued)
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A variation on the theme
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Of, if you wish, a 4-D Tessaract
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Or a cube exploded Into a hypercube
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Or, a 4-dimensional Klein-bottle
within 3-dimensional space
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Now
The equation becomes
A is what it is (becoming) A is (now) not what it
is not A IS both what it is becoming and it is
not what it is becoming A is neither what it is
becoming nor is it not what it is becoming, for
it is some- thing else becoming
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• In other words, there is no absolute priority,
  and everything is possible, given fluctuating
  times and places and conditions.

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• Or, consider a sort of Gödels proof, from a
  concrete, practical point of view

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• Gödel first thought that his theorems established
  the superiority of mind over machine.

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• Later, he came to a less decisive, conditional
  view if machine can equal mind, the fact that
  it does cannot be proved.

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• This view parallels the logical form of Gödels
  second theorem if a formal system of a certain
  kind is consistent, the fact that it is cannot be
  proved within the system.

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• Gödels more famous first theorem says that if a
  formal system (or a certain kind) is consistent,
  a specific sentence of the system cannot be
  proved within it.

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• Extrapolating from the above, in everyday
  situations, if our knowing becomes inconsistent
  (flawed, unacceptable), then we go on to choose
  between all the possibilities that may present
  themselves, and we proceed to articulate the
  consequences of our choice at some particular
  time and place within some particular context.

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• But then we cant know if this choice will prove
  consistent at/in any and all times, places, and
  contexts, for if it is indeed consistent,
  nevertheless, there is no knowing whether at some
  other time, place, and context it will not reveal
  an inconsistency.

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• Thus whatever choices we make from the range of
  all possibilities will be incomplete, for there
  is no way to know that they will not be subject
  to some inconsistency or another at some
  particular time and place and within some
  particular context.

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• Stated otherwise

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• What good is rigorous formalization that can
  prove a sentence which says that it is not
  provable (first theorem)?
• And,
• What good is such formalization that can prove
  its consistency when it would follow that it is
  not consistent (second theorem)?

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• Or, in everyday life situations

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• What good is knowing, if it can know a sentence
  within itself revealing that it is not knowable
  (much like Gödels first theorem)?
• What good is knowing that claims to know its own
  consistency when it follows that that knowing is
  inconsistent (much like Gödels second theorem)?

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• Knowing is either inconsistent or incomplete, or
  in the worst of all possible worlds, both.

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• That is to say We never know entirely what we
  mean by what we say or write, or the implications
  of our interpretation regarding what somebody
  else says or writes. Nonetheless, we will
  undoubtedly continue on, in learned ignorance,
  blissfully saying and writing and listening and
  reading.

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For, concrete everyday living knows of no carved
in stone linearity it thrives on
far-from-equilibrium conditions, which allow it
always to be in the process of becoming something
other than what it was becoming
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Indeed, I predict a time when threre will be
mathematican investigations of calculi containing
contradictions, and people will actually be proud
of having emancipated themselves from
consistency (Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical
Remarks, Blackwell, 1964, p. 332).