Universals, Properties, Kinds

1
Universals, Properties, Kinds

• The distinction between universals and
  particulars.
• Start with a basic observation the world
  consists of lots of genuinely distinct
  individuals, i.e., particulars.
• But, as we saw in the last class, there is a
  Fregean notion that, for a to be an individual, a
  must fall under a concept a is F.
• What is F? A concept for a property, a quality,
  a universal. I.e. something that can be
  multiply instantiated in the world.

2

• Particulars exist at unique spatiotemporal
  locations.
• Universals do not. (Either they are multiply
  instantiated or they exist in some other realm
  Platos heaven.)
• Two views Realism vs. Nominalism
• Particulars are reducible to universals. (Each
  particular is merely a bundle of universals.
  E.g. a is FGH means that there exists somewhere
  this amalgam of properties F, G, and H.)
• Universals are reducible to particulars. (Each
  universal or property is merely a name that
  suggests some commonality between individuals.)

3

• Class Nominalism Properties are classes of
  particulars. So, F-ness is simply the name for
  the class of all things that are F.
• (This is advocated by Lewis in The Plurality of
  Worlds. And the classes can include individuals
  in different possible worlds.)
• Resemblance nominalism Start with a paradigm
  for some property, F. All things that resemble
  this paradigm are members of the class of F
  things.
• Note that classes are not universals because
  classes are not multiply instantiatable.

4
Trope Theory

• Each particular thing possesses its own property
  of F-ness, which is itself a particular. In
  other words, this chair is blue. But its
  blueness is unique it is not merely one instance
  of many instances of blueness. The particular,
  individual blueness of this chair is a trope.
• Blue is used of many different particulars,
  presumably because there is some resemblance.

5
Armstrong, Universals as Attributes

• 1 Uninstantiated Universals
• One key question Should we, or should we not,
  accept a Principle of Instantiation for
  universals?
• Three possible views
• Universalia ante res (universals before
  things) Platonic, transcendent universals that
  can exist without being instantiated in the
  world. Armstrong this is unacceptable to
  naturalists.
• Universalia in rebus (universals in things)
  rejects uninstantiated universals. Armstrongs
  view.
• Universalia post res (universals after things)
  nominalism.

6

• 2 Disjunctive, Negative, and Conjunctive
  Universals
• Disjunctive properties (i.e. universals) are not
  to be allowed.
• N.b. There is some very close link between
  universals and causality.
• Negative properties (universals) are also not to
  be allowed.
• But conjunctive properties are OK.

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3 Predicates and Universals

• There is no automatic passage from predicates
  (linguistic entities) to universals. (202a)
• Universals are not going to be simply equivalent
  to the predicates that we use in our language.
  Rather, universals are discoverable by natural
  science. In other words, Armstrong advocates a
  posteriori realism.

8
4 States of Affairs

• State of affairs are primitive.
• Truthmaker principle For every contingent truth
  at least (and perhaps for all truths contingent
  or necessary) there must be something the in the
  world that makes it true.
• In other words, there is something in the world
  in virtue of which a proposition is true.

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5 A World of States of Affairs?

• We should think of the world as a world of
  states of affairs, with particulars and
  universals only having existence within states of
  affairs. (205b)
• In other words, particulars and universals can
  only be said to exist insofar as they constitute
  facts. No a, no F, except as part of the state
  of affairs lta is Fgt.
• A particular that existed outside states of
  affairs would not be clothed in any properties or
  relations. It may be called a bare particular.
  Armstrong rejects such bare particulars.

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6 The Thin and the Thick Particular

• The antinomy of bare particulars
• When we say a is F what is the is? It is
  not the is of identity (a a). It is the is
  of instantiation of a fundamental tie between
  particular and property. a and F are different
  kinds of things. But, then, that would seem to
  mean that a really is a bare particular, that it
  can exist without F and that F can exist without
  being instantiated.
• Thin particular a abstracted from its
  properties.
• Thick particular the state of affairs which
  enfolds thin particulars and properties (as
  being F).

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7 Universals as Ways

• My contention is that once properties and
  relations are thought of not as things, but as
  ways, it is profoundly unnatural to think of
  these ways as floating free from things. (207a)

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8 Multiple Location

• To talk of locating universals in space-time
  then emerges as a crude way of speaking.
  Space-time is not a box into which universals are
  put. Universals are constituents of states of
  affairs. Space-time is a conjunction of states
  of affairs. In that sense universals are in
  space-time. But they are in it as helping to
  constitute it. I think that this is a reasonable
  understanding of universalia in rebus, and I hope
  that it meets Platos objection. (208ab)