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Strategy-Proof%20Classification

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Title: Strategy-Proof%20Classification


1
Strategy-Proof Classification
  • Reshef Meir
  • School of Computer Science and Engineering,
    Hebrew University

A joint work with Ariel. D. Procaccia and
Jeffrey S. Rosenschein
2
Strategy-Proof Classification
  • An Example of Strategic Labels in Classification
  • Motivation
  • Our Model
  • Previous work (positive results)
  • An impossibility theorem
  • More results (if there is time)

(12 minutes)
3
Motivation
Model
Results
Introduction
Strategic labeling an example
ERM
5 errors
4
Motivation
Model
Results
Introduction
5
Motivation
Model
Results
Introduction
If I will only change the labels
24 6 errors
6
Classification
Motivation
Results
Introduction
Model
  • The Supervised Classification problem
  • Input a set of labeled data points
    (xi,yi)i1..m
  • output a classifier c from some predefined
    concept class C ( functions of the form f
    X?-, )
  • We usually want c to classify correctly not just
    the sample, but to generalize well, i.e .to
    minimize
  • R(c)
  • the expected number of errors w.r.t. the
    distribution D

E(x,y)D c(x)?y
7
Classification (cont.)
Motivation
Results
Introduction
Model
  • A common approach is to return the ERM, i.e. the
    concept in C that is the best w.r.t. the given
    samples (has the lowest number of errors)
  • Generalizes well under some assumptions on the
    concept class C
  • With multiple experts, we cant trust our ERM!

8
Where do we find experts with incentives?
Introduction
Model
Results
Motivation
  • Example 1 A firm learning purchase patterns
  • Information gathered from local retailers
  • The resulting policy affects them
  • the best policy, is the policy that fits my
    pattern

9
Introduction
Model
Results
Motivation
Example 2 Internet polls / expert systems
Users
Reported Dataset
Classification Algorithm
Classifier
10
Related work
Introduction
Motivation
Model
Results
  • A study of SP mechanisms in Regression learning
  • O. Dekel, F. Fischer and A. D. Procaccia,
    Incentive Compatible Regression Learning, SODA
    2008
  • No SP mechanisms for Clustering
  • J. Perote-Peña and J. Perote. The impossibility
    of strategy-proof clustering, Economics Bulletin,
    2003

11
A problem instance is defined by
Introduction
Motivation
Results
Model
  • Set of agents I 1,...,n
  • A partial dataset for each agent i ? I,
  • Xi xi1,...,xi,m(i) ? X
  • For each xik?Xi agent i has a label yik??,?
  • Each pair sik?xik,yik? is an example
  • All examples of a single agent compose the
    labeled dataset Si si1,...,si,m(i)
  • The joint dataset S ?S1 , S2 ,, Sn? is our
    input
  • mS
  • We denote the dataset with the reported labels by
    S

12
Input Example
Introduction
Motivation
Results
Model
X1 ? Xm1
X2 ? Xm2
X3 ? Xm3
Y1 ? -,m1
Y2 ? -,m2
Y3 ? -,m3
S ?S1, S2,, Sn? ?(X1,Y1),, (Xn,Yn)?
13
Incentives and Mechanisms
Introduction
Motivation
Results
Model
  • A Mechanism M receives a labeled dataset S and
    outputs c ? C
  • Private risk of i Ri(c,S) k c(xik) ? yik
    / mi
  • Global risk R(c,S) i,k c(xik) ? yik / m
  • We allow non-deterministic mechanisms
  • The outcome is a random variable
  • Measure the expected risk

14
ERM
Introduction
Motivation
Results
Model
  • We compare the outcome of M to the ERM
  • c ERM(S) argmin(R(c),S)
  • r R(c,S)

c ? C
Can our mechanism simply compute and return the
ERM?
15
Requirements
Introduction
Motivation
Results
Model
  • Good approximation
  • ?S R(M(S),S) ßr
  • Strategy-Proofness (SP)
  • ?i,S,Si Ri(M(S-i , Si),S) Ri(M(S),S)
  • ERM(S) is 1-approximating but not SP
  • ERM(S1) is SP but gives bad approximation

Are there any mechanisms that guarantee both SP
and good approximation?
16
Restricted settings
Introduction
Motivation
Model
Results
  • A very small concept class C 2
  • There is a deterministic SP mechanism that
    obtains a 3-approximation ratio
  • This bound is tight
  • Randomization can improve the bound to 2

R. Meir, A. D. Procaccia and J. S. Rosenschein,
Incentive Compatible Classification under
Constant Hypotheses A Tale of Two Functions,
AAAI 2008
17
Restricted settings (cont.)
Introduction
Motivation
Model
Results
  • Agents with similar interests
  • There is a randomized SP 3-approximation
    mechanism (works for any class C)

R. Meir, A. D. Procaccia and J. S. Rosenschein,
Incentive Compatible Classification with Shared
Inputs, IJCAI 2009.
18
But not everything shines ?
Introduction
Motivation
Model
Results
  • Without restrictions on the input, we cannot
    guarantee a constant approximation ratio
  • Our main result
  • Theorem There is a concept class C, for which
    there are no deterministic SP mechanisms with
    o(m)-approximation ratio

19
Deterministic lower bound
Introduction
Motivation
Model
Results
  • Proof idea
  • First construct a classification problem that is
    equivalent to a voting problem with 3 candidates
  • Then use the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem to
    prove that there must be a dictator
  • Finally, the dictators opinion might be very far
    from the optimal classification

20
Proof (1)
Introduction
Motivation
Model
Results
  • Construction
  • We have Xa,b, and 3 classifiers as follows
  • The dataset contains two types of agents, with
    samples distributed unevenly over a and b

We do not set the labels. Instead, we denote by Y
all the possible labelings of an agents dataset.
21
Proof (2)
Introduction
Motivation
Model
Results
  • Let P be the set of all 6 orders over C
  • A voting rule is a function of the form f Pn ? C
  • But our mechanism is a function M Yn ? C !
  • (its input are labels and not orders)
  • Lemma 1 there is a valid mapping g Pn ? Yn,
    s.t. (Mg) is a voting rule

22
Proof (3)
Introduction
Motivation
Model
Results
  • Lemma 2 If M is SP, and guarantees any bounded
    approximation ratio, then fMg is dictatorial
  • Proof (f is onto) any profile that c classifies
    perfectly must induce the selection of c
  • (f is SP) suppose there is a manipulation
  • By mapping this profile to labels with g, we find
    a manipulation of M, in contradiction to its SP
  • From the G-S theorem, f must be dictatorial

23
Proof (4)
Introduction
Motivation
Model
Results
  • Finally, f (and thus M) can only be dictatorial.
  • We assume w.l.o.g. that the dictator is agent 1
    of type Ia. We now label the data points as
    follows
  • The optimal classifier is cab, which makes 2
    errors
  • The dictator selects ca, which makes m/2 errors

24
Real concept classes
Introduction
Motivation
Model
Results
  • We managed to show that there are no good
    (deterministic) SP mechanisms, but only for a
    synthetically constructed class.
  • We are interested in more common classes, that
    are really used in machine learning. For example
  • Linear Classifiers
  • Boolean Conjunctions

25
Linear classifiers
Introduction
Motivation
Model
Results
a
b
ca
cb
cab
26
A lower bound for randomized SP mechanisms
Introduction
Motivation
Model
Results
  • A lottery over dictatorships is still bad
  • ?(k) instead of ?(m), where k is the size of the
    largest dataset controlled by an agent ( m kn
    )
  • However, it is not clear how to eliminate other
    mechanisms
  • G-S works only for deterministic mechanisms
  • Another theorem by Gibbard 79 can help
  • But only under additional assumptions

27
Upper bounds
Introduction
Motivation
Model
Results
  • So, our lower bounds do not leave much hope for
    good SP mechanisms
  • We would still like to know if they are tight
  • A deterministic SP O(m)-approximation is easy
  • break ties iteratively according to dictators
  • What about randomized SP O(k) mechanisms?

28
The iterative random dictator (IRD)
Introduction
Motivation
Model
Results
  • (example with linear classifiers on R1)

v
v
29
The iterative random dictator (IRD)
Introduction
Motivation
Model
Results
  • (example with linear classifiers on R1)

v
v
Iteration 1 2 errors
30
The iterative random dictator (IRD)
Introduction
Motivation
Model
Results
  • (example with linear classifiers on R1)

v
v
Iteration 1 2 errors
Iteration 2 5 errors
Iteration 3 0 errors
31
The iterative random dictator (IRD)
Introduction
Motivation
Model
Results
  • (example with linear classifiers on R1)

v
v
Iteration 1 2 errors
Iteration 2 5 errors
Iteration 3 0 errors
Iteration 4 0 errors
32
The iterative random dictator (IRD)
Introduction
Motivation
Model
Results
  • (example with linear classifiers on R1)

v
v
Iteration 1 2 errors
Theorem The IRD is O(k2) approximating
for Linear Classifiers in R1
Iteration 2 5 errors
Iteration 3 0 errors
Iteration 4 0 errors
Iteration 5 1 error
33
Future work
Introduction
Motivation
Model
Results
  • Other concept classes
  • Other loss functions
  • Alternative assumptions on structure of data
  • Other models of strategic behavior

34
Thank you...
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