Title: REDUCTION OF
1REDUCTION OF CO2 EMISSIONS IN THE EU
By Dr. Jean-Chandelle CEMBUREAU Chief Executive
2- European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS)
- Linking Directive
- Impact on Electricity Prices
3European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS)
4NAPs TABLE
5STATE OF PLAY NAPs - GENERAL TRENDS
- 15 NAPs out of 25 OUT
- Allocation method
- General trend grandfathering
- PS Historical average
- Reference year 1998 2002
- Growth updated grandfathering
- Process CO2 yes in /- half of MS
- Waste CO2 no in general
- Early action no in general
6STATE OF PLAY NAPs - GENERAL TRENDS
- New entrants reserve in almost all MS
- Plant closures allowances cancelled after year
of closure - Consultation period
- Number of installations covered gt 12 000
- Gap between 2001 Burden Sharing
- Reduction imposed in NAP
- Industry level versus cement
7SOME SPECIFICS EX POST ALLOCATION
Ex-post allocation in relation to biomass in the
NAP of Luxembourg "Auberdem erhalten im
Einzelfall - nach Prüfung - emissionsarme
Technologien (z.B. Zufeuerung von Biomasse)
ex-post eine Sonderausstattung aus der Reserve,
wenn sie vorübergehend aus bestimmten Gründen
ihren Biomasseeinsatz zurückfahren bsw.
einstellen müssen"
8SOME SPECIFICS BENCHMARKING
In Denmark, allowances are allocated to new
entrants on the basis of the following
- 5843 tonne CO2/year ltgt capacity 1 tonne grey
cement/hour - 8291 tonne CO2/year/ton ltgt capacity 1 tonne
white cement/hour
9Linking Directive
10LINKING DIRECTIVE
- Purpose to convert credits from projects (CERs
and later ERUs) into allowances (EUAs)
- Status political agreement between EUR
Parliament (EP) and Council vote in EP on 21
April
11LINKING DIRECTIVE
MAIN FEATURES
- Baseline and Credit (Ex post) v. CAP and TRADE
in E-ETS (Exante) - Conversion allowed regardless of Kyoto coming
into force or not - One to one conversion
- Cap on installations optional to M-S (to be
defined) - Possibility for Domestic Projects after 2006
review - Sinks excluded but possibility for credits from
biofuels projects and some sinks may be included
in 2nd phase.
12Impact on Electricity Prices
13THE IMPACT OF CO2 TRADING ON POWER PRICES
Supported by Ford Europe, IFIEC and Solvay
Yes to Emissions Trading No to Windfall Profits!
The Power Intensive Industries Alliance
14BACKGROUND
- Several studies have looked at the indirect
impact of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme on
power prices - Estimated price increases from 15 to 50!
- Not based on real costs from the CO2 trading and
leading to windfall profits for utilities - Possible because of the existing pricing
mechanism (based on marginal costs) and the lack
of competition between utilities
15Price of electricity 25/ MWh 0.7 tonne CO2
/MWh for marginal production With Emission
costs of 10/ tonne 7/ MWh cost increase for
coal condense production but 90 of allowances
are free of charge and 20 of the electricity is
fossil fuel based ? 0.14
POWER MARKET NORDIC AREA (simplified)
production cost
/ MWh
Current Market Price
TWh
Oil / coal
Hydro power
CHP Industry
Nuclear power
CHP District
Gas
Wind power
16Price of electricity 30/ MWh 0.7 tonne CO2
/MWh for marginal production With Emission
costs of 10/ tonne 7/ MWh cost increase for
coal condense production but 90 of allowances
are free of charge and 60 of the electricity is
fossil fuel based ? 0.42
POWER MARKET GERMANY (simplified)
production cost
/ MWh
Current Market Price
TWh
Hydro
Nuclear power
Different coal
Gas
oil
others
Wind power
17ACCEPT TRUE CO2 COSTS BUT NOT WINDFALL PROFITS
6.75 /MWh
With CO2 allowances 10 / tonne of CO2
An average European calculation (Nordic area
0.14 Germany 0.42)
0.25 /MWh
True CO2 Costs
Cost of Windfall Profit
18IMPACT PER TONNE OF CEMENT
Our own emissions and electricity prices
0.7 t CO2 / tonne cement 105 kWh / tonne cement
Accepted true electricity costs of 0.25 /
MWh (Average Nordic Area 0.14 - Germany
0.42) 90 allowance free of charge CO2 priced
at 10 / tonne.
Windfall profits
Real costs
/ tonne of cement
Cement production own emission costs after 90
free allocation
Accepted true costs for electricity from actual
mix of market power
Total costs per tonne of cement
Real costs cost of windfall profits with full
marginal costs charged
19CONCLUSIONS
- Windfall profit estimated at 2.70 bio in
Nordic area, 3.20 bio in Germany! - Cost for the alliance 2,4 billion per year
- Accept 0.25/MWh - Cannot accept 7.00/MWh
- Recommendation
- Unbundling of the environmental market from the
power market ensuring transparency, producers
cost coverage and cost-based environmental
increases
20SOLUTION UNBUNDLING
To separate the emissions trading market and the
electricity market so that unfair electricity
price increases can be avoided with a solution
which
- is fair both to electricity producers and
consumers - increases transparency
- separates emissions market and electricity market
- enables monitoring the impact of the ETS on
electricity prices - contributes to EU Climate Change objective
AND
21SOLUTION UNBUNDLING
- can be accommodated under existing EU laws
- the Electricity Market Directive (2003/54/EC)
- the Emission Trading Directive (2003/87/EC)
22UNBUNDLED AND TRANSPARENT PRICING OF POWER
National Schemes
National or regional power exchanges EEX,
NordPool, etc.
EU Emissions Trading
Taxes
Natural regulatedmonopoly
Renewable energy fee
The power price is a result of two separate
products, one monopoly service and taxes.
CO2 Emissions Trading
Environmental markets
Power Free market
23CONSUMER PRICE DEVELOPMENT WITH SEPARATION
Total costs 36 /MWh
Windfall 7 ET Real Cost 0.1 Production
25 Transmission 4
Power producer
TSO
No Separation
Separation
Production Cost
ET Real Cost
Transmission Cost
Windfall Profit
24ENVIRONMENTAL INCENTIVE
End users secure Needed allowances
Allowances needed for production
Bought in Market
Received from NAPs
Sold in market
Needed
Needed
Power Producers Keep benefit of surplus
allowances
CO
CO
2
2
Allowances
Allowances
Needed CO2 Allowances
Needed CO2 Allowances
16
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12.03.04
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NT
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25FUTURE ACTIONS
2 pathways to be followed to reach a solution
26www.cembureau.be