Title: Internet Economics
1Internet Economics
- John Chuang
- School of Information Management Systems
- UC Berkeley
- chuang_at_sims.berkeley.edu
2The Big Picture
Market Structure Mechanisms
Supply
Demand
Price(s)
Producer Surplus Consumer Surplus Social Surplus
Welfare (surplus)
3Why Study Internet Economics?
- Internet has interesting economic properties
- Resource allocation
- Rule-based vs. pricing-based
- Market structures
- Interconnections
- Horizontal mergers and vertical integration
- Bandwidth markets
- Policymaking
- Sustainable competition
- Universal access
4Outline
- Economic characteristics of the Net
- Resource allocation and pricing
- Interconnection and industrial organization
5Economic characteristics of the Net
- Public vs. private good
- Economies of scale
- Economies of scope
- Network externalities
6Public vs. Private Goods
- Private good
- depletable and excludable
- e.g., toothpaste, automobile
- Public good
- non-depletable and non-excludable
- e.g., national defense, clean air, lighthouses
- What about roadways, information, and the
Internet?
7Public vs. Private Goods
- Roadways
- non-depletable (until congestion) and
non-excludable - Information
- Encapsulated depletable and excludable
- Non-encapsulated non-depletable, but is it
excludable? - Internet
- non-depletable (until congestion), but is it
excludable?
8Economies of scale
- Average cost declines as output level increases
- Internet exhibits strong economies of scale
- High fixed cost
- e.g., trenching cost, up-front capital investment
- Low/zero marginal cost
- of sending an additional packet
9Traditional Goods Services
- Q is optimal firm output
- Can support N firms if market size (QTOT) gt NQ
AC
Q
Q
QTOT
10Infrastructure Goods Services
- High FC, low MC ? declining AC curve (economies
of scale) - Therefore it is socially optimal to have the
entire market served by a single firm (natural
monopoly)
AC
Q
QTOT
11- A monopolist
- is a price-setter, not a price-taker
- maximizes producer surplus (profit), not consumer
surplus - Alternatives public utility or regulated
monopoly - e.g., ATT historically treated as regulated
natural monopoly - rate regulation
- structural regulation
12Competition
- In a perfect competition
- all firms are price-takers
- P MC in the long run
- inefficient firms with high MC will exit market
- long term profits 0
- consumer and total surplus maximized
13Technological Change
- Natural monopoly may not last forever
- Technological change may result in new cost
curve same market may now be optimally served by
multiple firms - e.g., long distance telephony and the breakup of
ATT in 1984
Q
QTOT
14Economies of Scope
- Significant joint costs of production for
multiple goods/services - Examples
- GM plants produce sedans, SUVs, and minivans,
etc. - Amazon.com sells books, music, and lawn-mowers,
etc. - Internet supports multiple traffic types
previously carried over different networks
(telephony, radio, CATV, )
15Service Differentiation
email
Best Effort
voice
16Service Differentiation
email
Best Effort
voice
17Why QoS?
18Why QoS? Economists View
- Network congestion ? negative network externality
- Differing willingness-to-pay (WTP) ? quality
differentiation allows price discrimination - Economies of scope cost savings (e.g.,
statistical multiplexing)
19Network Externalities
- Externality value (including costs and benefits)
of a good/service not fully reflected in its
price - e.g., the price of an automobile does not include
the economic impact of its potential to pollute - Network externality value of the network is a
function of the network size
20Positive Network Externalities
- Value of network increases with network size
- e.g., telephones, fax machines, email clients
- Metcalfes Law the value of a network is
proportional to the square of the number of users
(N2) - Reeds Law the value of network grows with the
number of possible sub-groups that can be formed
(2N)
21Negative Network Externalities
- Value of network decreases with network size
- e.g., due to increased likelihood of network
congestion - During network congestion, each data packet
incurs a social cost to other packets (e.g.,
delay, packet-drop)
22Summary
- The Internet as a public good (?)
- High fixed cost, low marginal cost (strong
economies of scale) - Significant joint costs (strong economies of
scope) - Positive/negative network externalities
(demand-side economies/diseconomies of scale)
23Outline
- Economic characteristics of the Net
- Resource allocation and pricing
- Interconnection and industrial organization
24Resource Allocation Goals (Objective Functions)
- Technical efficiency
- Performance (latency, throughput) vs. cost
- Survivability (availability, redundancy) vs. cost
- Economic efficiency
- Social surplus
- Pareto efficiency
- Other objectives
- Profit (producer surplus)
- Penetration/usage s.t. cost recovery (e.g.,
universal service) - Equity, stability, predictability, etc.
25Rule-Based Resource Allocation
- Example TCP Congestion Control
- All hosts reduce transmission rate when there is
congestion - Some TCP-unfriendly implementations ignore
congestion signal
0.5Mb/s
1Mb/s
0.5Mb/s
0.5Mb/s
26The Role of Prices
- Allocate resources to maximize economic
efficiency - Serve as feedback signals
- Help users make efficient consumption choices
- Help provider make optimal capacity expansions
27Pricing Network Services
- Criticism of flat-rate pricing
- Tragedy-of-the-Commons
- Usage-based pricing
- Metering costs
- Users prefer predictable bills
- Marginal cost pricing
- MC0 most of the time
- Congestion-based pricing
- Packets bid for service
- Too costly to implement
- Back to flat-rate?
28QoS and Pricing
- QoS Pricing
- Multi-class network requires differential pricing
scheme - Otherwise all users select best service class
- How about use differential pricing to implement
QoS itself? - Paris Metro Pricing
29Desirable Properties of Pricing Schemes
- Service providers perspective
- Encourage efficient resource usage (incentive
compatibility) - Low cost (implementation, metering, accounting
and billing) - Competitive prices
- Cost recovery
- Users perspective
- Fairness
- Predictability (reproducibility)
- Stability
- Transparency (comprehensibility)
- Controllability
(Delgrossi and Ferrari 1999)
30Outline
- Economic characteristics of the Net
- Resource allocation and pricing
- Interconnection and industrial organization
31Internet Service Providers
Customer Premises
Internet backbones
Telephone Network
Point of Presence
Backbone Provider 1
Router
INTERNET
Tandem Switch
Dial-Up ISP
Local Exchange Carrier (LEC)
Backbone Provider 2
Exchange Point
DNS
Router
Router
Local Egress Switch
Local Ingress Switch
Remote ISP
Server
Packet Network
Content Provider
Local Loop
Router
Analog Modem
xDSL Modem
Firewall
Headend
Cable Network
Cable Modem
Corporate LAN
Customer Premise
Source M. Sirbu
32Industrial Organization
- Horizontal merger
- Vertical integration/disintegration
- Determinants
- Technological efficiencies
- Transactional efficiencies
- Market imperfections
33Vertically Related Markets
- Upstream/downstream relationship
- Examples
- Detroit steel v. automobile
- Software OS v. applications
- Telephony local v. long distance
- Internet physical transport v. access v.
content/services
34Vertical Integration
- Good
- economies of scope savings
- internalize transaction costs
- reduce prices increase total welfare
- Bad
- if one component is monopolistic
- foreclose competition in other component
35Vertical Integration Telephony
- Telephony was vertically-integrated industry
- ATT (Ma Bell) offered end-to-end solution
- Divestiture in 1984
- Local service (the seven baby bells)
- Long distance service (ATT)
- Customer premise equipment (CPE)
- Removes hidden subsidies between local service
(monopoly) and long distance (competitive)
36Vertical Integration Internet
- Different vertical components of Internet
Lehr98 - Local access transport (LAT) PacBell, TCI (ATT)
- Retail Internet access provision (ISP) AOL,
_at_Home - Wide area transport (WAT) ATT, MCI-WorldCom,
Sprint, Qwest, Level3 - Backbone Internet service provision (BSP) UUNET,
ATT, BBN - Note ATT vertically integrated across all four
components
37Downstream Goods/Services
- Internet data centers
- Content distribution networks
- Application service providers
- Certificate authorities
- Billing and payment services
- Content providers
38Unbundling the Local Loop
- RBOCs (e.g., Pacific Bell) own the local loop
infrastructure and offers local phone/DSL service - Telecom Act of 1996 requires RBOCs to unbundle
services from local loop access - Motivation allow competitive local exchange
carriers (CLECs, e.g., Covad, Northpoint) to
compete against the incumbents - Difficult to implement/enforce not sustainable
39Unbundling the Cable Plant
- TCI owns/operates cable infrastructure (LAT)
- _at_Home offers broadband Internet access over cable
(ISP) - TCI and _at_Home are now one integrated entity ATT
Broadband - Enters AOL
- wants to offer retail ISP service over ATTs
cable infrastructure, in competition with _at_Home
service - demands unbundling and open access to cable plant
- Who wins?
40Horizontal Merger
- Proposition Economies of scale
- Example Internet Backbone
- MCI-WorldCom (1998)
- WorldCom-Sprint (2000 abandoned)
- Objection concentration leads to market power
- Larger network has less incentive to
interconnect, or to maintain a high quality
interconnection - Larger network has negotiation power over smaller
networks
41Fiber System Route Miles
Source Kende 2000
42Horizontal Merger
- Example 2 Local loop
- Seven Baby Bells Merging
- SBC PacBell Ameritech
- Nynex BellAtlantic
- Bell South
- US West
- 1996 Telecom Act unbundling and open access
- competition in local exchange (e.g., Covad,
Northpoint and other CLECs ) - Facilities-based competition
- e.g., wireless, cable, satellite,
43Network Interconnection
- Network externalities motivate network operators
to interconnect - Different types of interconnection
- Peering
- Multilateral
- Bilateral (or private)
- Transit
- Issue of settlement
- Peer settlement-free sender-keep-all (SKA)
44Peering
Source Kende 2000
45Multilateral Peering
Source Kende 2000
46Bilateral/Private Peering
Source Kende 2000
47Transit
Source Kende 2000
48Hot Potato Routing
Source Kende 2000
49Free Riding
Source Kende 2000
50UUNET Peering Policy
- Need to meet following requirements to peer with
UUNET (January 2001) - Interconnection Requirements
- Geographic scope (gt 50 of UUNET scope)
- Traffic exchange ratio (not exceed 1.51)
- Backbone capacity (gt 622Mbps)
- Traffic volume (gt 150Mbps per direction)
- Operational Requirements
- 24x7 NOC, fully redundant network, implement
shortest-exit routing,
51Interconnection Issues
- Peer or transit?
- Size (market share) important
- Why multilateral peering fails?
- Tragedy-of-the-Commons
- What about advanced services?
- Inter-domain multicast, inter-domain QoS, content
peering,
52Markets
- Bandwidth Markets
- Bandwidth is perishable
- Bandwidth as tradable commodity
- Contract terms
- What Diameter of pipe (Mbps)
- Where city A to city B
- When/how long
- Other quality metrics (drop rates, latency, )
53Bandwidth Exchanges
- Two basic functions
- Facilitate financial transaction
- Facilitate physical delivery of traded BW
- Three types of exchanges
- Sole seller of bandwidth (e.g., Enron, Williams)
- Neutral facilitator of member trading (e.g.,
Band-X, RateXchange) - Member-managed exchange (e.g., Bandwidth
Financial Corporation, Commerex)
Source Mindel and Sirbu 2001
54Example NY-London DS3, US/month, 1-year contract
Source RateXchange
55Commoditization Trend Lines
Commodity Timing
Crude Oil OTC Futures Market Derivatives Late 1970s 1983 1985
Natural Gas OTC Between Pipelines Intermediaries Futures Market Derivatives Early 1970s Mid 1980s 1990 1991
Electricity OTC Between Utilities Intermediaries Futures Market Derivatives Late 1960s Early 1990s Mid 1990s Mid 1990s
Source RateXchange
Â
56Commoditization Trend Lines
Commodity Timing
Telecom OTC Between Utilities Intermediaries Futures Market Derivatives Late 1980s Mid 2000 TBD TBD
Source RateXchange
Â
57Other Markets?
- Distributed processing (P2P)
- SETI_at_Home, entropia, Popular Power
- Distributed storage/caching
- Distributed object services