Title: Strong Authentication
1Strong Authentication
- Project Update for NPTF
- 4/21/2008
2Agenda
- Review Project
- Background and Goals
- Methodology
- Implementation Requirements
- Review the Options
- Recommendations
- Challenges and Risks
- Resources and Schedule for Development
3Background
- Key Concerns with Authentication
- Increase in password theft
- Increased likelihood of password cracking
- Mobile computing
- Increased demand for credentials
- Levels of assurance
- Positioning Penn for the future
4Project Goal
- Publish a specific set of recommendations for
improvements to PennKey and for strengthening
Penn web authentication to protect University
assets and individuals private data.
5Methodology
- Divide Into Five Related Sub Projects
- Establish Central Authentication Log
- Strengthen PennKey Passwords
- Update Web Authentication Infrastructure
- Supplement Re-usable Passwords
- Enable Multiple Levels of Assurance
6RequirementsEstablish Central Authentication Log
- Centrally collect information about login
attempts - Service Name
- Access Time
- Originating IP Address
- Success or Failure
- Phase 1 Identify participants and collect the
data - Phase 2 Create and deploy tools to query the
data - Phase 3 Integrate fraud monitoring software
7RequirementsStrengthen PennKey Passwords
- Increase the minimum complexity required for Penn
Key passwords - Establish communications plan to inform
- End users
- Application owners
- Local support providers
- System administrators
8RequirementsUpdate Web Authentication
Infrastructure
- Provide a replacement for websec that
- Addresses current security vulnerabilities
- Supports web-based Kerberos authentication
- Supports multiple authentication factors
- Supports Kerberized single sign-on
- Supports integration with Shibboleth
9RequirementsSupplement Re-usable Passwords
- Develop a process that
- Identifies which applications must require a
second authentication factor - Defines the procedures an application which
provides sensitive data must follow - Recommend a two-factor solution that
- Integrates with the websec replacement
- Can be deployed on a per application basis
- Can be replaced without recreating accounts
10RequirementsEnable Multiple Levels of Assurance
- Position the University to support multiple
levels of assurance for both authentication and
I.D. proofing - Outline a policy that application developers can
use to identify the level of assurance required
for that application - Specify the technical security requirements for
each level of assurance
11Options and RecommendationsEstablish Central
Authentication Logging
- Options
- Real time data upload
- Periodic batch upload
- Recommendation
- Support both real time and periodic uploads of
log data - Real time will be preferred but not required
- Option
- Require all Level of Assurance 3 applications to
contribute to the logs, regardless of their
participation in central authentication? - Recommendation
- Systems using common user identifiers such as
Penn ID or Penn Name should be enabled but not
required to contribute
12Options and RecommendationsEstablish Central
Authentication Logging
- Option
- In addition to authentication data, should
application usage data (i.e. SSN access) be
logged in this repository as well? - Recommendation
- This possibility should be enabled but not
required. Application participation should be
based on a project by project cost-benefit
analysis.
13Options and Recommendations Strengthen PennKey
Passwords
- Options
- Increase the complexity of passwords, but allow
them to remain shorter. - Transition from a password model to a passphrase
model. - Considerations
- Passwords do not expire or lock, so they must be
able to withstand a long period of brute force
guessing - Password complexity increases exponentially with
length, but only cubically with alphabet - A 15 character password with only lowercase
letters will take 23 years to break - A 10 character password with 1 upper, 1 number,
and 1 special character will take only 81 days to
break. - Difficult to remember passwords will be written
down (and stolen) or forgotten - jnrUf5_at_pM versus theredandtheblue
14Options and Recommendations Strengthen PennKey
Passwords
- Recommendation
- Promote a minimum password length of 15
characters, with pass phrases encouraged - The phrase may contain dictionary words, but not
ascending/repeating sequences (i.e. aaa or
123) - No other onerous complexity restrictions on
phrases of this length, so they are easy to
remember without being written down - Users desiring a shorter 10 character password
can add numbers, upper case letters, and special
characters to achieve a higher complexity. - Challenges / Risks
- Communication and coordination with support
providers will be essential - It is burdensome to ask users to learn new
password rules and change their passwords, so it
cannot be done frequently - Some automated systems, such as those creating
Guest PennKeys will have to be modified to
generate legal passwords
15Options and Recommendations Strengthen PennKey
Passwords
- Options
- Expire existing PennKey passwords when the
complexity rules change - Grandfather all existing PennKey passwords until
the user chooses to change them - Have a phased rollout period to encourage the
community to change passwords over time
16Options and Recommendations Strengthen PennKey
Passwords
- Recommendation
- Have a phased rollout period to encourage the
community to change passwords over time as part
of the Cosign authentication process - For users who have not changed their password the
success screen should contain links to either
update their password or continue to their
destination. - After 4 months, the success screen would be
replaced with the password change screen for
these users. A link would be provided to skip
this step and continue to their destination. - After an additional 4 months, the link to skip
the password change step would be removed. - Users changing their password should get real
time validation of their choice (i.e. Microsoft
Live, Google) - Passwords that arent changed should not expire
automatically at any point - Challenges / Risks
- Users who do not use web applications would not
be prompted to change their passwords - All PennKey holders would have to make this
change, including alumni
17Options and Recommendations Update Web
Authentication Infrastructure
- Options
- Stanford WebAuth
- Self Service Provisioning
- Logout via timeout only
- Shibboleth Interoperability as an Identity
Provider - Only supports Apache, no IIS support
- No native support for multiple factors
- Single Sign On with Shared Secret
- Cosign (University of Michigan)
- Provisioning by ISC
- Global logout supported
- Shibboleth Interoperability must be developed
- Supports IIS and Apache
- Native Multifactor Support
- Single Sign On with Shared Secret
18Options and Recommendations Update Web
Authentication Infrastructure
- Recommendation
- Replace Websec with Cosign
- Provides very modular multi-factor support
- Supports both IIS and Apache web servers
- Supports a global logout
- Has an integration library for java web
applications - Integrate Cosign with Shibboleth
- Migration costs
- Service certificates require a self-provisioning
interface - Depending on the technology, 1-3 hours migration
time per application - Custom login pages no longer supported
- SSL Costs for web servers not currently
supporting SSL traffic
19Options and Recommendations Supplement Re-usable
Passwords
- Options
- Hardware tokens
- Software tokens
- Virtual two factor
- Biometrics
- Recommendation
- Use Hardware tokens as Penns second
authentication factor - Software tokens can be compromised if the
desktop/device they are running on are
compromised - Virtual two factor does not protect against
replay attacks and commonly involve secrets
easily stolen - Biometric solutions are very expensive to deploy,
and cannot easily be replaced if compromised - Tokens should be easy to use and carry with no
input required from users - Vendor solutions should integrate with Active
Directory
20Options and Recommendations Supplement
Re-usable Passwords Two Factor Architecture
Options
- Integrate with Kerberos, always use both factors
- Pros
- Strengthen PennKey
- No user confusion
- Cons
- Onerous usability demands for users
- All applications behave at the same level of
assurance, regardless of sensitivity - Notes
- May also work with Active Directory where PennKey
is used - Moderate cost to roll out and maintain, but lower
cost for modifying existing infrastructure
21Options and Recommendations Supplement
Re-usable Passwords Two Factor Architecture
Options
- Integrate with Kerberos, users are given two
credentials (one with and one without 2-factor
enabled) - Pros
- Strengthen PennKey
- Variable levels of assurance based on data
sensitivity - Cons
- User confusion on when to use which credential
- Significant technical issues for authorization
and single sign-on - Notes
- Does not work with Active Directory
- May require additional KDCs
22Options and Recommendations Supplement
Re-usable Passwords Two Factor Architecture
Options
- Decouple from Kerberos, enable on a
per-application basis - Pros
- Variable levels of assurance based on data
sensitivity - Works directly with Cosign
- Cons
- Doesnt strengthen PennKey
- Requires additional infrastructure to be bought
- Less secure, since credentials can be attacked
separately - Notes
- Works with Active Directory
- Applications not using Cosign or not supported
natively by the vendor would require rework to
use - Could be used with systems not using PennKey
23Options and Recommendations Supplement
Re-usable Passwords Two Factor Architecture
Options
- Recommendations
- Deploy a decoupled solution today
- Easiest for end-users to adopt
- Easiest to pilot by application without impact on
other applications - Makes Penn a more a hardened, unattractive target
- Re-evaluate with an eye towards an integrated
solution in 4-5 years. - MIT Kerberos may evolve to make LOA-based
two-factor possible - Users may be better positioned to accept
two-factor for everyday use - It may be necessary as phishing and password
cracking becomes more sophisticated
24Options and Recommendations Enable Multiple
Levels of Assurance
- Options
- Employ a 3 level of assurance hierarchy
- Employ a 4 level of assurance hierarchy
- Recommendation
- Employ a 3 level of assurance hierarchy
- Level 1 - Little or no confidence in the asserted
identity's validity - Level 2 - Some confidence in the asserted
identitys validity - Level 3 - Highest confidence in the asserted
identitys validity - Required level will be based on risk assessment
matrix of the likelihood and possible extent of
harm to - University reputation
- University financial loss or liability
- Universitys academic, research, or
administrative functions - Individual user
- Personal safety
25Options and Recommendations Enable Multiple
Levels of Assurance
- Options
- Contract to a 3rd party to perform remote ID
proofing using credit report data - Identify a secret known only by both Penn and
PennKey holders to use for remote ID proofing - Continue to use the slow U.S. Mail system
employed today - Recommendation
- 3rd party remote ID proofing services should not
be employed - Sensitivity of the data considered is
unacceptable to the desired audience - The scope of this issue seems to fall under the
purview of Bill Branans Streamlining PennKey
initiative
26Design and Development
- Strong Authentication Really Five Projects
- Establish Central Authentication Log
- ISC Networking and Telecommunications
- Strengthen PennKey Passwords
- ISC Administrative Information Technologies
Communications - Update Web Authentication Infrastructure
- ISC Networking and Telecommunications
- Implement Two Factor
- ISC Networking and Telecommunications
- PennKey Authentication Policies
- ISC Administrative Information Technologies
Communications
27Organization
28Design and DevelopmentEstablish Central
Authentication Log
- Establish Central Authentication Log
- ISC Networking and Telecommunications
- Begin Phase 1 in June 2008
- Estimated Completion Dates
- Phase 1 February 2009
- Phase 2 June 2009
- Phase 3 October 2009
- Receive log information from all non-Cosign
applications by February 2010 - RADIUS Clients
- Jabber
- Kite
- Library Web Proxy
29Design and DevelopmentStrengthen PennKey
Passwords
- Strengthen PennKey Passwords
- ISC Administrative Information Technology
Communications - Begin September 2008
- Dependencies
- Cosign conversion
- Develop transition and password change web
application - Estimated Timeframe and Completion Date
- Begin the password transition period January 2009
- Password change no longer optional by September
2009
30Design and DevelopmentUpdate Web Authentication
Infrastructure
- Implement Cosign
- ISC Networking and Telecommunications
- Begin May 2008
- Dependencies
- Penn Name to Penn Id conversion service (Central
Authorization project) - Estimated Timeframe and Completion Date
- ISC Pilot by August 2008
- Rollout and transition existing Websec
applications to Cosign by September 2009 - Password change tool to be available by January
2009
31Design and DevelopmentSupplement Reusable
Passwords
- Implement Two Factor
- ISC Networking and Telecommunications
- Begin July 2008
- Estimated Timeframe and Completion Date
- Identify Two Factor Token Vendor by May 2009
- Launch a small scale pilot by August 2009
- Broader pilot and ongoing rollouts to Level of
Assurance 3 applications ongoing
32Design and DevelopmentEnable Multiple Levels of
Assurance
- PennKey Authentication Policies
- ISC Administrative Information Technology Data
Administration - Begin May 2008
- Part of the Streamlining PennKey Initiative
- Estimated Timeframe and Completion Date
- Have policies available for public comment period
by August 2008
33Design and DevelopmentPreliminary High Level
Timeline
Identify Vendor / Trial Testing Identify Vendor / Trial Testing Identify Vendor / Trial Testing Identify Vendor / Trial Testing Identify Vendor / Trial Testing Identify Vendor / Trial Testing Contract Contract Contract Contract Integration Integration ISC Pilot Broader Pilot Broader Pilot Support Ongoing Rollouts Support Ongoing Rollouts
Development Development Development ISC Pilot Rollout and Transition for all websec applications Rollout and Transition for all websec applications Rollout and Transition for all websec applications Rollout and Transition for all websec applications Rollout and Transition for all websec applications Rollout and Transition for all websec applications Rollout and Transition for all websec applications Rollout and Transition for all websec applications Rollout and Transition for all websec applications Rollout and Transition for all websec applications Rollout and Transition for all websec applications Rollout and Transition for all websec applications
Develop Infrastructure Develop Infrastructure Develop Infrastructure Develop Infrastructure Get Data / Develop Query Tool Get Data / Develop Query Tool Get Data / Develop Query Tool Get Data / Develop Query Tool Fraud Detection Fraud Detection Fraud Detection Fraud Detection
Development Development Development Development User Password Change Grace Period User Password Change Grace Period User Password Change Grace Period User Password Change Grace Period User Password Change Grace Period User Password Change Grace Period User Password Change Grace Period User Password Change Grace Period
First Draft of Policies First Draft of Policies First Draft of Policies Public Comment and Review Public Comment and Review Public Comment and Review Public Comment and Review Public Comment and Review Public Comment and Review Public Comment and Review Public Comment and Review Public Comment and Review Public Comment and Review Public Comment and Review Public Comment and Review
06/08 07/08 08/08 09/08 10/08 11/08 12/08 01/09 02/09 03/09 04/09 05/09 06/09 07/09 08/09 09/09 10/09 11/09 12/09
Implement 2-factor Implement 2-factor Implement 2-factor Implement 2-factor Implement 2-factor
Implement Cosign Implement Cosign Implement Cosign Implement Cosign Implement Cosign
Central Authentication Logging Central Authentication Logging Central Authentication Logging Central Authentication Logging Central Authentication Logging
Strengthen Passwords Strengthen Passwords Strengthen Passwords Strengthen Passwords Strengthen Passwords
PennKey Authentication Policies PennKey Authentication Policies PennKey Authentication Policies PennKey Authentication Policies PennKey Authentication Policies
34Strong Authentication