EAP-TTLS draft-funk-eap-ttls-v0-01.txt - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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EAP-TTLS draft-funk-eap-ttls-v0-01.txt

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EAP-TTLS. draft-funk-eap-ttls-v0-01.txt. Given by Steve Hanna for Paul Funk. emu wg, IETF 69 ... Documented in Internet-Drafts since 2001. Widely implemented ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: EAP-TTLS draft-funk-eap-ttls-v0-01.txt


1
EAP-TTLSdraft-funk-eap-ttls-v0-01.txt
  • Given by Steve Hanna for Paul Funk
  • emu wg, IETF 69

2
Overview of EAP-TTLS
  • TLS-based tunneled EAP method
  • Phase 1 like EAP-TLS
  • Phase 2 AVP exchange
  • Supports
  • Tunneled authentication via many methods
  • Multiple forms of authentication
  • Endpoint integrity checks
  • Other extensions
  • Documented in Internet-Drafts since 2001
  • Widely implemented and deployed (eduroam, etc.)
  • Cited by SDOs like WiMAX
  • Plan to submit for RFC status

3
EAP-TTLS AVPs
  • Diameter AVP format
  • 32-bit type, 24-bit length
  • Easy to tunnel existing EAP methods
  • Not just password-based methods
  • Easy to tunnel non-EAP authentication
  • Easy to integrate with RADIUS servers
  • Can translate AVPs into RADIUS packets

4
Proposed New EAP-TTLS AVPs
  • Option AVPs
  • Client indicates acceptable options
  • Server indicates which option will be used
  • MSKCalculation
  • Options Outer, Inner, Mixed
  • KeyConfirmation (intermediate and final)
  • Options Enabled, Disabled
  • SecureCompletion
  • Options Disabled, Enabled
  • TTLS-Success, TTLS-Failure
  • Sent by Client and Server at end

5
Evaluation Against Requirements
  • Transport of encrypted password for support of
    legacy password databases OK
  • 2. Mutual authentication (specifically
    authentication of the server) OK
  • 3. Resistance to offline dictionary attacks,
    man-in-the-middle attacks OK
  • 4. Compliance with RFC 3748, RFC 4017 and EAP
    keying (including EMSK and MSK generation) OK
  • 5. Peer identity confidentiality OK

6
Evaluation Against Requirements
  • 6. Crypto agility and ciphersuite negotiation OK
    w TLS 1.2 new AVPs
  • 7. Session resumption OK
  • 8. Fragmentation and reassembly OK
  • 9. Cryptographic binding OK w new AVPs
  • 10. Password/PIN change OK when authentication
    method supports

7
Evaluation Against Requirements
  • 11. Transport Channel binding data OK w new TBD
    AVPs
  • 12. Protected result indication OK w new AVPs
  • 13. Support for certificate validation protocols
    OK w TLS CertStatus extn
  • 14. Extension mechanism OK

8
Summary
  • EAP-TTLS
  • Well-established EAP method
  • Specified in Internet-Drafts since 2001
  • Widely implemented
  • Referred to by other standards bodies
  • No known substantial IPR problems
  • With forthcoming extensions, meets all Design
    Team requirements (required and desired)
  • Offers many other features
  • Tunneled authentication via many methods
  • Multiple forms of authentication
  • Endpoint integrity checks (for NEA)
  • Why start over?
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