TRANSFORMATION

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TRANSFORMATION TECHNOLOGY A CANADIAN MARITIME
SECURITY PERSPECTIVE
A Conference hosted by the Centre for Foreign
Policy Studies ltwww.cfps.dal.cagt Dalhousie
University, 15-17 June 2006   THE 1,000-SHIP
NAVY INITIATIVE FOR INTERNATIONAL NAVAL
COOPERATION LESSONS LEARNED FROM US-CANADA
NAVAL COOPERATION Dr. Stanley Weeks Senior
Scientist, Science Applications International
Corporation
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THE 1,000-SHIP NAVY INITIATIVE FOR
INTERNATIONAL NAVAL COOPERATION Lessons Learned
from US-Canada Naval Cooperation

• 2006 Maritime Security Conference, CFPS,
  Dalhousie University, Halifax, N.S.
• 15-17 June 2006
• Dr Stanley B. Weeks
• Science Applications International Corporation
  (SAIC)
• McLean, Virginia, USA

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AGENDA

• Origins of the 1,000-Ship Navy Initiative
• Ten Principles of the Initiative
• A Possible Framework for Implementation
• Lessons Learned from US-Canada Naval Cooperation
• Conclusion

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ORIGINS OF THE 1,000-SHIP NAVY INITIATIVE

• September 2005 Presidents National Strategy
  for Maritime Security
• Vision of coordinated effort to safeguard US
  global maritime interests
• Security of the maritime domain is a global
  issue. The United States cannot safeguard the
  maritime domain on its own. We must forge
  cooperative partnerships and alliances with other
  nations and with private stakeholders around the
  world.

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ORIGINS OF THE 1,000-SHIP NAVY INITIATIVE
(Cont.)

• New CNO Admiral Mullen
• True commitment to international maritime
  cooperation from prior experience in
  NATO/Mediterranean
• Admiral Mullen speech to September 2005
  International Seapower Symposium
• Theme Establishing a Global Network of
  Maritime Nations for a free and secure maritime
  domain
• New vision must include increased
  interoperability and closer maritime cooperation
  between the navies and coast guards of the world
• Our level of cooperation and coordination must
  intensify
• No nation today can go it alone, especially in
  the maritime domain.

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THE 1,000-SHIP NAVY GLOBAL MARITIME NETWORK

• Article in Nov 2005 USNI Proceedings by N5/N5SP
  VADM Morgan/RADM Martoglio
• Identified emerging security environment of
  increased globalization and interdependence,
  making policing and protecting the maritime
  commons a high priority for all nations
• Highlighted trend toward more international
  cooperation in economic and security issues
• Most nations challenged by multi-faceted
  transnational threats including maritime piracy,
  organized crime, smuggling, drug trafficking,
  illegal immigration, weapons (including WMD)
  proliferation, and terrorism
• Thus need to harness the powers of the
  international communitys maritime organizations
  to confront these multi-national transnational
  threats

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THE 1,000-SHIP NAVY GLOBAL MARITIME NETWORK
(Cont.)

• Imperatives for Maritime Security
• Increasingly an international problem that
  requires an international solution
• No single nation has the sovereignty, capacity,
  and control requires close cooperation between
  like-minded nations
• That level of cooperation can also pay dividends
  in other circumstances (e.g., Tsunami relief)
• Building the 1,000-ship Navy
• Policing the maritime commons requiresa
  combination of national, international, and
  private industry cooperation to provide the
  platforms, people, and protocols necessary to
  secure the seas against the transnational
  threat.
• Effectively, requires voluntary development of a
  network to increase sensors to monitor security
  in maritime domain and to increase the number of
  responders
• Emerging regional maritime security networks are
  a model
• No one size fits allEvery nation can
  contribute in some way to security in the
  maritime domain
• Navies are the first and predominant
  contributors to the 1,000-ship Navy, Enabling
  the peace
• International shipping industry important to
  vastly increase sensors in maritime domain

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THE 1,000-SHIP NAVY GLOBAL MARITIME NETWORK
(Cont.) Employing the 1,000-ship Navy

• Overall Goalincrease security of maritime domain
  for safe use of maritime commons by all nations
• Increase maritime domain awareness
• Posture assets to rapidly respond to
  crises/emergencies
• More capable nations can export
• Maritime security through international
  operations (e.g., CTF 150, NATO Active Endeavor)
• Security Assistance
• But overcoming resistance based on sovereignty
  concerns is often a delicate issue, influence of
  allies, peers, neighboring nations important
• US and USN do not have capability or desire to
  be the sole exporter of security or security
  assistance in the maritime domain
• USN is in unique position to facilitate voluntary
  enlistment of nations as members of global
  partnership
• But requires strong/sustained support from other
  maritime nations

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TEN PRINCIPLES OF THE GLOBAL MARITIME NETWORK
(CNO ADM Mullen Speech, London, Dec 2005)

• (1) National sovereignty comes first and foremost
  and is always respected
• (2) Nations, navies, and maritime forces
  participate where they have common interests
  (e.g., common transnational maritime threats)
• (3) Focus of the global network is security in
  the maritime domain
• (4) Foundation of the global network is
  individual nations capabilities (capacity to
  contribute)
• (5) International navies will be cornerstones in
  global network, but network also includes coast
  guards, maritime forces, port operators,
  commercial shippers, and local law enforcement
  all working together

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TEN PRINCIPLES OF THE GLOBAL MARITIME NETWORK
(CNO ADM Mullen Speech, London, Dec 2005)

• (6) Every nation, regardless of size or capacity,
  can do something to contribute to maritime
  security. Those nations or navies that can
  assist others should do so.
• (7) Nations or navies that need assistance should
  ask for it
• (8) Regional nations must develop regional
  maritime networks
• (9) To be effective, a global network must widely
  share information (to the greatest extent
  possible, unclassified)
• (10) Timing A long-term effort, but must start
  now by strengthening
• Individual nations capacity to provide for their
  own maritime security
• The operational side of regional organizations
• The relationships between regional organizations
  to build the global network

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The 1,000-SHIP NAVY CONCEPT

• A broader vision of seapower (Comprehensive
  Security)
• Inclusive
• Flexible
• Idealistic (No nation can do everything, but all
  nations can do something.)

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IMPLEMENTING THE INITIATIVE

• Navy Strategic Plan tasks Navy Strategy staff
  (N5SP) with drafting a Global Maritime Security
  Cooperation Strategy
• (MY VIEW) N5SP staff must provide focal point for
  coordinating and implementing 1,000-ship Navy
  initiative, including
• Be clearinghouse/coordinator/integrator at global
  level for regional USN Component Commanders
  theater maritime cooperation plans
• Provide strategic templates for assistance (e.g.,
  Navy Transformation Plans) for emerging coastal
  maritime forces
• Coordinate Security Assistance Programs with USN
  International Programs Office
• Coordinate Training assets with US Coast Guard
  International Programs office
• Coordinate Maintenance Assistance planning with
  US Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA)

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POSSIBLE FRAMEWORKS FOR IMPLEMENTATION

• Categorize efforts
• Blue Water navies (Global Partners)
• Green Water navies (Regional Partners)
• Coastal navies (Sub-Regional Partners)
• Establish a Building Block approach to assess
  and leverage existing regional maritime
  cooperation initiatives into the broader global
  network context
• Identify how US Navy can best engage and lead
  integration of interagency and private maritime
  sector partners
• Identify technology availability and requirements
  for the various categories of navies to
  participate in the network

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CANADIAN NAVY COMMENTS ON THE 1,000-SHIP
NAVYVADM Robertson, USNI Proceedings, March 2006)

• General concept fits well with world views of
  the Canadian government
• Canadian Navy experience/leadership with USN and
  coalitions
• Canadian success at coalition command due to
  interoperability and our national predisposition
  to multilateral cooperation
• Challenges
• C2 arrangements will need to limit security
  restrictions
• Must manage competition between coalitions of the
  willing and formal alliance structures
• Must avoid public impression that high end of
  conflict can be left to only a few nations (need
  combat-capable multi-purpose force)

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LESSONS FROM US-CANADA NAVAL COOPERATION (I)

• Value of what we share Language, values,
  geography, history
• Value of longstanding maritime cooperation
• Value of routine peacetime training and exercises
  together
• Value of wartime Alliance operationsWWII. Korea,
  Cold War, 1991 Gulf War, Operation Apollo
  2001-2003

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LESSONS FROM US-CANADA NAVAL COOPERATION (II)

• Institutional Defense Planning linkages (from
  1940 Permanent Joint Board on Defense to 1946
  Military Cooperation Committee to 1958 NORAD to
  the Bi-national Planning Group and expanded NORAD
  maritime role of today
• Interoperability
• A national defense goal for Canada
• Interoperability routinely exercised and refined
  in bilateral and NATO context

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LESSONS FROM US-CANADA NAVAL COOPERATION (III)

• Canadas very special relationship with the USN
  and interoperability led to
• Key international maritime command roles in 1991
  and 2002-2004
• Full integration of Canadian ships in deployed
  Carrier Strike Groups (and, soon, Expeditionary
  Strike Groups)
• But...Dont look back, they may be gaining on
  you
• Other nations now imitating Canada in formerly
  unique Canadian international command roles and
  even Carrier Strike Group ship integration
• Suggests importance of Canada keeping a
  modernized and unreduced maritime force (in
  platforms and capabilities)

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THE IMPORTANCE OF TRUST AND RELIABILITY

• It is not so much our friends help that helps
  us, as the confidence of their help.
  Epicurus
• The long-held Canadian desire to be within the
  American defence perimeter but not the American
  policy perimeter is historic and traditional.
  Itshapes the political culture of our foreign
  and defence relations Hugh Segal