Title: GAME THEORY IN TOPOLOGY CONTROL
1GAME THEORY IN TOPOLOGY CONTROL
- Robert P. Gilles
- 11/18/05
2Presentation Overview
- Ad-Hoc Networks
- Motivation
- Problem Statement
- Game Theoretic Framework
- Topology Control Game
- Potential Game
- Convergence
- Results
3Elements of an ad-hoc network
Heterogeneous nodes- different functionality and
capability Wireless medium
4Transmission pattern
- nodes can only transmit to other nodes within
link coverage
5Variable transmission range
nodes can adjust their transmission power to
conserve energy
self organizing network nodes route amongst
themselves
6Abstraction
construction of symmetric communication graph
7Motivation
- Issues
- Energy and Capacity
- Limiting resources in Ad-hoc networks.
- Improper topology
- Too sparse (high end-to-end delay, less robust to
node failure) - Too dense (limited spatial reuse, reduced
capacity)
8Motivation
- Problem
- Connectivity
- a basic requirement
- How should the nodes select an appropriate
transmit power? - Underlying graph is connected
- Total energy consumption is minimized
Solution ? TOPOLOGY CONTROL
9Before Topology Control
10After Topology Control
Topology Control- Choosing a subset of links and
nodes
11Notations and Assumptions
- Network abstracted as undirected graph H(V,E)
- Let power required to support edge (i,j)
- Individual transmission power p(i)
- Connected graph with pi,max(with redundancies)
- Symmetric channel
- Multi-hop path between source and destination
p(i)
12Problem Statement
- The (design) problem of choosing per node
(optimal) transmission ranges (variables) that
preserves network connectivity (constraints). -
- Formally
- Power assignment such that
determines . Sub-graph G(V,E)
must be efficient and preserve connectivity of
H induced by
13Existing TC Algorithms
- nodes forced to cooperate to achieve global
objective - altruism may not hold when nodes competing for
resources - algorithm design must account for selfish node
behavior !
14Non Cooperative Game Framework
- Each node independent, selfish
- Considers power level of other nodes when
assigning transmission power somewhat fair
(power level assignment) - Best response to current state topology
(overhead), but works even with local information
(localized) - Once a node determines its transmission power
(utility maximizer), it will cooperate and
forward. -
Topology update Cycle Payoff better
connectivity,..
Actions (Power level)
Individual payoff
Neighborhood
Topology (Set of links)
15Framework
- Let
- Utility of node i
- Benefit of node i, , from being a
part of topology g - Cost to node i its transmission power pi
- Transmit power level vector
induces a topology given by - Let be the maximum-power- connected-graph
- Goal Generate that is energy
efficient and preserves the connectivity of gmax
16Energy Efficiency
- A network gp is locally energy efficient if no
node can reduce its transmission power without
disconnecting the network
A network gp is globally energy efficient if sum
of every nodes transmission power is minimum
17Topology Control Game I
- Consider where
- and . f is the number of nodes
that can be reached (multi-hop). Assume, - This game is an OPG with
18Corollary
- For the BR algorithm converges
to NE that is locally energy efficient and
preserves connectivity. - Proof (Connectivity) Suppose not.
- Contradiction.
-
- Thus topology always connected at every stage.
So . Power minimization problem,
implies, locally energy efficient.
19Corollary
- For the steady state topology is
also globally energy efficient. - Proof We have . Potential maximizer
. But by previous corollary
. Therefore, - .Thus g(p) is globally efficient.
-
20Topology Control Game II
- Consider where
- This game is an EPG with EPF given by
- Utilities exhibit 0-1 around a power level
threshold. So BR algorithm converges to a power
profile just to the right of this threshold -
21Simulation results (I)
22Simulation results
23Simulation results
24Simulation results