Title: LEARNING AND ADAPTING: COUNTERINSURGENCY IN AFGHANISTAN
1LEARNING AND ADAPTING COUNTERINSURGENCY IN
AFGHANISTAN
- Dr Daniel Marston
- SDSC ANU
2- I'm generally reluctant to talk about myself
when I'm making a presentation in fact, I have
been known in the past to plunge straight into my
topic without telling anyone my name. However,
I've been advised that for this group, I need to
provide a bit of background information. Since
I'm not that comfortable with the idea, I've
decided to let someone else do the job, and
provide you with a summary of my involvement with
the Iraq campaign written by a senior British
officer.
3Opening Thoughts
- I am not an expertone is not learning if one
calls himself an expert - Learning and adapting are key in all aspects of
warfare, not just COIN - Met and worked with Australian officers and NCOs
since 2004 - Do not formally speak for the US or UK armies,
however, I am involved with many of the
discussions - Will discuss learning curve in MND SE first and
then Afghan
4- The British campaign in MND (SE) was not a
glowing success, as some within Whitehall and
PJHQ may try to claim. The fact that it will end
on a positive note, as of the summer of 2009, has
more to do with bottom-up reform within units and
formations in theatre, and less to do with
planners in Whitehall and PJHQ. The war has been
changing in Iraq since the beginning of 2007, and
many within MND (SE) recognised early on that
different approaches might be needed. Some
British commanders expressed concern that the
withdrawal strategy from Basra to the COB would
cause major splits with MNF-I. The decisions
taken in Whitehall in 2006 and 2007 promoting
Provincial Iraqi Control and handover, as well as
withdrawal to the COB, were not linked to the
eventual success of the CotK they could not have
been, since the COTK was not part of this
strategy. In some significant ways, they were two
different campaigns.
5- The British Armys campaign in Iraq, its overall
impact, and whether it has been a success or
failure, are currently topics of intense
discussion in the UK press, military and
government communities. Recently, the Chief of
Defence Staff referred to Britain as having
become too complacent and smug about its
experiences in Northern Ireland and Bosnia and
their application to operations in Iraq. Many
within the Army do not dispute this, but I think
the opposite viewpoint is also worth stating
that there were an equal number, if not more
officers, NCOs and soldiers who were not smug,
and who actively sought to know more about how to
reform and adapt for the counter-insurgency
(COIN) campaign in Iraq
6Learning and adapting in MND SE
- What was the mission?
- Arrogance
- Hands off approach with ISF
- Many mistakes by US and UK that forced
decisionschanged in 2007 - Envy for success of al Anbar and the north
- Distrust of British position
- Recognition to learn from mistakes and humility
to learn from othersbottom up reform and did not
wait for mother army to fix things - Frustration by many
- Things finally changed for the betterCharge of
the Knights and MiTTs - Honour was restored
- Major tactical, operational and strategic
assessment taking place about what happened in
Iraq and the need to avoid similar pitfalls in
Afghanistan - Reform was disjointed and needed to be better
unified and this is now being worked out - Many know there is a need for long and deep
reform and no band-aid applications for the
fight in Afghanistan
7Training issues identified in Iraq
- Once a unit is warned off for operations, it
should be taken off any other taskings and left
to use the limited time training and preparing
for operations. - Prior to deployment, opportunities must be made
to conduct training for COIN rather than
traditional warfighting. - Lack of knowledge of the incoming troops in
regard to TTPs and theatre specific issues. - Have a team commander per multiple deploy
earlier to embed with outgoing BG/COY to deepen
the understanding of TTPs and theatre specific
issues.
8Education problems and solutions
- Education in COIN had been shown to be wanting
from the lieutenants to the senior officers
level - Lack of knowledge regarding previous successful
and unsuccessful COIN campaigns across all ranks - Less than 15 of officers and NCOs had read the
doctrine or understand what COIN was about - Reform began bottom up RMASETS was against it as
were some senior officers - This is now changing as many within the Army
recognized the need to finally educate as well as
train - It needs to be a building block piece from NCO,
RMAS, Captains MOD, Staff College, RCDS - Things are finally shifting
- Formal COIN Cadreswith input from academe, US
and Coalition partners - COIN and Stability Centre finally set up
- Support of CTC A in Afghanistanwill like to
discuss the recent comments regarding CTC-A from
CDF in the discussion period
9Feedback from Captains COIN course
- I thoroughly enjoyed the course (MOD C). . . . I
feel far better armed . . . to go forward and act
pragmatically with the benefit of others
hindsight for the mistakes of the past. I am more
than slightly concerned that I have gone this far
through my career without being armed with this
knowledge of this sort! - Thank you again for the COIN module. Fascinating
and professionally useful, I only wish that I had
been taught that before Op TELIC 5! - COIN module was excellentshould this be
pre-deployment education rather than Captains
education? This should be for all officers. - Personally I feel that British doctrinal
knowledge of COIN is actually a bit of a myth so
to be taught it in the classroom prior to
deploying to Afghanistan is extremely useful.
10Feedback from Cos for study nights in theatre
- Thank you for your support and time you have
given . . . and for an excellent insight into
COIN. . . . This was valuable for the unit and
helped us focus the minds of the officers and
men. - You gave a fascinating insight into the
recurring themes of British operations over the
past fifty years and what you had to say has made
us aware that we need to implement those lessons
learnt by our predecessors. As a result of your
talk the officers are now burying their heads
into the doctrine and readings that you
recommended so highly.
11Issues with some commanders
- I think you have got to recognise that if you
took the attacks on the Coalition out of the
equation, what you are left with is actually a
very low level of residual violence within Iraqi
society compared to anywhere else across Iraq. .
. .This is not a war zone. This is nothing like
you are seeing on the streets of Baghdad and here
you have got to ask the question what is the most
appropriate force or capability to deal with this
problem and I would argue that a foreign army is
particularly ill suited to resolving those kinds
of societal problems.
12- Many of us feel that, notwithstanding limited
political and popular support for the Iraq
campaign, too much military advice from theatre
was watered down on the basis of perceptions of
what the market would bear. In contrast with the
US our people in Basra struggled to get their
views over, as reflected in our lukewarm response
to the SSR challenge right up to Charge of the
Knights (CotK). Personally I point the finger at
PJHQ who, in my view, filter straight up advice
on our requirements. The whole construct lacks
the dynamism and necessary tension that you see
in the US relationships.
13Major issues with lack of continuity
- Your points relating to rotation of commands
through the 6 month tour structure is at the root
of most of our problems from Basra and also now
in Afghanistan. Not only does it work against our
accumulation of knowledge and understanding of
the situation, but it also ultimately undermines
our reputation in the face of our US allies who
think it's a joke that we scuttle back home after
only 6 months in theatre. The extension to 9
months for Staff officers is an improvement but
still doesn't compare to the American system.
Collation of intelligence was dire when I was out
there. It was clear that intelligence from the
previous BG's in Maysaan had either been thrown
away or never collected in the first place. We
started on a blank canvas. My patrol reports were
always praised for their level of detail, but
there was never any follow-up, never any pursuit
of some significant leads I uncovered when in
lengthy dialogue with the local Sheikhs. I think
this was inherent throughout the chain of
command.
144th Mech Brigade how it changed
- Meeting with Brigadier Julian Free
- General Mohans (COIN) plan for the retaking of
BASRA is a key development14 DIV must win this
fight and the British must support it in all
aspects - British assets in terms of 4 Brigade and future
TELICs need to support this effort in many
mannersthis will provide a focus of effort for
the British officers and soldiers as well as
playing a role in the future pacification of
BASRA and BASRA province - British officers, NCOs and soldiers can be
embedded across many lines of operation within 14
DIVfrom staff officers, ISTAR etc to platoon to
coy embedded roles - This future plan will need to be briefed to MNC-I
and MNF-I so they clearly see a plan developing
for this important area of IRAQ with major
British supportwhich will be well received by
many sceptics in BAGHDAD. - Urban ops center to train a coy for two weeks
- Briefed across the BDE that mission is now MiTT
throughout - Joint operations carried out along the Shatt
- MNF-I staff what about PJHQ?
15Post CoTK
- 3 of the 4 battlegroups were MiTTs
- Working alongside the USMC/USA MiTTs
- Campaign plan embedded within MNF-I
- Marsh Arab Levy
- Constant need to adapttalks and working with 14
DIV as well as 7 Brigadedifficult at times - FP less of an issue
- 13 in IA vehicles
- At BN level
- Last British GOC Thank you for all that you did
for us. Your advice proved prophetic - but I
can't discuss over this means. Keep in touch and
I'll tell you why. Let's get together in the
Autumn.
16New thinking on Afghanistan
- COIN is a strategy not a tacticCT is not the
message anylonger - Population centric approach is needed (has
occurred at tactical and maybe operational levels
at time) lack of forces - It is not the simplistic hearts and minds as
there will be some killing and dying in the
coming years - Reconciliation is important and not new and very
complicated - COIN through education and training reform has
impacted the key military allies US/UK/Can (not
so much with AuZaccording to many within the
Army) - More forces, both Coalition and Afghan (ANA,
local aux.) neededalso operating jointly - Advisory mission (civ/mil) has been a work in
progress and still needs more workmajor shifts
are about to occur - There are major questions in regards to the
selection of the OMLT or ETT concept within the
US and UK militaries and different thinking - AATTV concepts of recruiting across Army needs to
be discussed
17McChrystal to LA Times
- Do you think there has been too much focus on
counter-terrorism? I think there hasn't been
enough focus on counterinsurgency. I am certainly
not in a position to criticize counter-terrorism.
But at this point in the war, in Afghanistan, it
is most important to focus on almost classic
counterinsurgency.I don't want people to think
it is inflexible it should be uniquely adapted
to the conditions in each part of the country.
18McChrystal La Times
- Another priority you have outlined is the Afghan
security forces. You want to expand their numbers
faster. It sounds like the main way to do that is
to expand the partnerships between Afghans and
alliance forces. Is there a way to improve there? - After analysis, we've determined we could
increase the rate of their growth and their
target numbers. The results of our analysis are
not approved up the chain of command yet. But all
of our analysis tells us that is something we
need to recommend, so that is my intent.Whether
we grow the Afghan security forces larger or not,
partnering closer is to our benefit and we can do
it better than we have in the past.We need a
combination of mentoring and partnering.
Mentoring is people who stay with a unit all the
time and teach and evolve as units. Partnering is
where you operate together. Our thought is to
bring the concepts much closer together. So a
unit is partner, is partnering in a much tighter
relationship. Then two things happen. The
coalition force gets much better performance on
the ground because Afghans are great soldiers and
they have huge cultural acuity that a coalition
soldier is not going to have. And the other part
is as we operate we think we can give them best
practices
19GEN McC 8 imperatives for success 13 06 2009
- Protect and partner with the people
- Conduct a comprehensive campaign
- Understand the Environment
- Ensure values underpin our effort
- Listen closelyspeak clearly
- Act as one team
- Constantly adapt
- Act with courage and resolve
20Practitioner
- At the time beginning of 2003 the US military
had not published COIN doctrine since Vietnam,
and units had relatively little training in COIN
before their arrival in country. There was much
learning by doing and even disagreement as to
whether the fight in Afghanistan was a COIN fight
at all. In fact unit commanders were forbidden to
from using the word COIN in describing their
missionsthey were executing a CT mission in
keeping with US strategic guidance and an
operational focus on the enemy.COIN narrative
in Australia?
212007 Gen Barno
- Continual turnover of US senior leaders has made
continuity of effort a recurrent challenge in
this very complex fight Since mid-2005, the
comprehensive US led counterinsurgency
strategyhas been significantly altered by
subsequent military and civilian leaders who held
differing views. With the advent of NATO military
leadership, there is today no single
comprehensive strategy to guide the US, NATO, or
international effort. Unity of purpose both
interagency and international has suffered
unity of command is more fragmented.
22Practitioner UK IV Examples of reform mindset
- Additionally as in previous counter-insurgency
campaigns, WARFIGHTING is an element of COIN. . .
. Many of the lessons learned from the BGs
resulting experiences are not new. Common themes
from previous UK COIN campaigns and conflicts
were all evident in operations conducted in
HELMAND Province. The key lesson is that we
ignore previous experience of such campaigns, and
those of our allies, at our peril.
23Practitioner UK VII(coalition ability)
- TASK FORCE FURY were highly experienced, having
been in Afghanistan at that point for 12 months
and they were a very capable force. It was
illuminating to see their approach to COIN and
the extent that it had become a part of them.
They were equipped for it, had the training and
doctrine behind them, really understood it. . .
You sensed in them the extent the US Armed Forces
have transformed since it looked over the Iraqi
precipice and did something about it. What, to my
mind, is all the more remarkable is how they have
undergone that transformation, the momentum that
has been generated and the commitment and
attention to detail that has left no stone
unturned in seeking out better solutions.
24Practitioner USMC
- The Marines and sailors leveraged Pashtunwali
to our advantage when able. We sought to
establish relationships, which incurs obligations
of reciprocation for deeds and respect. This
pulled some Afghan tribes and villagers to us.
Understanding and use of Pashtunwali assisted in
our understanding of the environment, maintaining
the neutral to the positive outlook of our
operations and presence, and countered Taliban
information ops and resurgence. . . In general,
people fight based upon the norms of their
cultural, historical, economic and political
influences that exist in their environment.
Connect the critical cultural thinking and
understanding in our training and education
program. Do not make the assumption that it is
too complicated for the junior Marines. They
understand these concepts and will care about
this if the leadership cares .
25Where does Australia go from here
- The Rudd government needs to decide if the
narrative for Afghanistan needs to
changealliance debate, in your national
interests, CT not COIN what is COIN - The narratives are changing in the northern
hemisphere - Population focused COIN is the way forward in the
East/South - Provincial boundaries are breaking down in the
South - Advisory mission is a work in progress and major
changes are being discussed - AATTV? Serve throughout the South? Selected from
across Army? - The Australian Army prides itself in COIN
training and tactical excellence, however, the
US/UK militaries have now recognised the
importance of education for all commanders and
OGDs to implement a COIN strategy that is
properly resourced and focusedmajor issues in
Australia with OGDs - Education is key and there needs to be a building
block systemWeston Creek is doing COIN education
for Lt Colonels and Majors, is it linked with the
Lts and Captains and the NCO courses? Do the
other courses need to be expanded in terms of
content? - Assessment of what happened in Iraq is being
done, however, will it be as open and critical as
other armies assessments? Advisory mission
heavily questioned2 BNs from 10 Div in surge - There is talk of reform within the Australian
Army, however, how linked is it and does it go
long and deep? Many within the Army are
questioning this
26Keys to past success in COIN
- Comprehension of existing doctrine
- Adaptation to local situations and learning from
mistakeshumility to learn from others - Risk-taking organizations
- Harmony of effort
- Small-unit approach
- Corporate memory within theatre HQs
- Appropriate training
- Reconciliation amongst their enemies
- Ongoing education in COIN
- Population security
- Understand local perspectivesnon-western metrics
- Raise, mentor and fight alongside indigenous
forces (army/paramilitary police/local
auxiliaries) - Regular and aux indigenous forces needed
27Thinking within the US/UK
- We have seen that it is only by a close
combination of civil and military measures that
insurgency can be fought, so it is logical to
expect soldiers whose business it is to know how
to fight, to know also how to use civil measures
in this way. Not only should the army officers
know about the subject, they must also be
prepared to pass on their knowledge to
politicians, civil servants, economists, members
of the local government and policemen where
necessary. The educational function of the army
at these critical moments is most important.
Amongst senior officers in particular, ignorance
or excessive diffidence in passing along such
knowledge on can be disastrous.
Kitson, Bunch of Five