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LEARNING AND ADAPTING: COUNTERINSURGENCY IN AFGHANISTAN

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Title: LEARNING AND ADAPTING: COUNTERINSURGENCY IN AFGHANISTAN


1
LEARNING AND ADAPTING COUNTERINSURGENCY IN
AFGHANISTAN
  • Dr Daniel Marston
  • SDSC ANU

2
  • I'm generally reluctant to talk about myself
    when I'm making a presentation in fact, I have
    been known in the past to plunge straight into my
    topic without telling anyone my name. However,
    I've been advised that for this group, I need to
    provide a bit of background information. Since
    I'm not that comfortable with the idea, I've
    decided to let someone else do the job, and
    provide you with a summary of my involvement with
    the Iraq campaign written by a senior British
    officer.

3
Opening Thoughts
  • I am not an expertone is not learning if one
    calls himself an expert
  • Learning and adapting are key in all aspects of
    warfare, not just COIN
  • Met and worked with Australian officers and NCOs
    since 2004
  • Do not formally speak for the US or UK armies,
    however, I am involved with many of the
    discussions
  • Will discuss learning curve in MND SE first and
    then Afghan

4
  • The British campaign in MND (SE) was not a
    glowing success, as some within Whitehall and
    PJHQ may try to claim. The fact that it will end
    on a positive note, as of the summer of 2009, has
    more to do with bottom-up reform within units and
    formations in theatre, and less to do with
    planners in Whitehall and PJHQ. The war has been
    changing in Iraq since the beginning of 2007, and
    many within MND (SE) recognised early on that
    different approaches might be needed. Some
    British commanders expressed concern that the
    withdrawal strategy from Basra to the COB would
    cause major splits with MNF-I. The decisions
    taken in Whitehall in 2006 and 2007 promoting
    Provincial Iraqi Control and handover, as well as
    withdrawal to the COB, were not linked to the
    eventual success of the CotK they could not have
    been, since the COTK was not part of this
    strategy. In some significant ways, they were two
    different campaigns.

5
  • The British Armys campaign in Iraq, its overall
    impact, and whether it has been a success or
    failure, are currently topics of intense
    discussion in the UK press, military and
    government communities. Recently, the Chief of
    Defence Staff referred to Britain as having
    become too complacent and smug about its
    experiences in Northern Ireland and Bosnia and
    their application to operations in Iraq. Many
    within the Army do not dispute this, but I think
    the opposite viewpoint is also worth stating
    that there were an equal number, if not more
    officers, NCOs and soldiers who were not smug,
    and who actively sought to know more about how to
    reform and adapt for the counter-insurgency
    (COIN) campaign in Iraq

6
Learning and adapting in MND SE
  • What was the mission?
  • Arrogance
  • Hands off approach with ISF
  • Many mistakes by US and UK that forced
    decisionschanged in 2007
  • Envy for success of al Anbar and the north
  • Distrust of British position
  • Recognition to learn from mistakes and humility
    to learn from othersbottom up reform and did not
    wait for mother army to fix things
  • Frustration by many
  • Things finally changed for the betterCharge of
    the Knights and MiTTs
  • Honour was restored
  • Major tactical, operational and strategic
    assessment taking place about what happened in
    Iraq and the need to avoid similar pitfalls in
    Afghanistan
  • Reform was disjointed and needed to be better
    unified and this is now being worked out
  • Many know there is a need for long and deep
    reform and no band-aid applications for the
    fight in Afghanistan

7
Training issues identified in Iraq
  • Once a unit is warned off for operations, it
    should be taken off any other taskings and left
    to use the limited time training and preparing
    for operations.
  • Prior to deployment, opportunities must be made
    to conduct training for COIN rather than
    traditional warfighting.
  • Lack of knowledge of the incoming troops in
    regard to TTPs and theatre specific issues.
  • Have a team commander per multiple deploy
    earlier to embed with outgoing BG/COY to deepen
    the understanding of TTPs and theatre specific
    issues.

8
Education problems and solutions
  • Education in COIN had been shown to be wanting
    from the lieutenants to the senior officers
    level
  • Lack of knowledge regarding previous successful
    and unsuccessful COIN campaigns across all ranks
  • Less than 15 of officers and NCOs had read the
    doctrine or understand what COIN was about
  • Reform began bottom up RMASETS was against it as
    were some senior officers
  • This is now changing as many within the Army
    recognized the need to finally educate as well as
    train
  • It needs to be a building block piece from NCO,
    RMAS, Captains MOD, Staff College, RCDS
  • Things are finally shifting
  • Formal COIN Cadreswith input from academe, US
    and Coalition partners
  • COIN and Stability Centre finally set up
  • Support of CTC A in Afghanistanwill like to
    discuss the recent comments regarding CTC-A from
    CDF in the discussion period

9
Feedback from Captains COIN course
  • I thoroughly enjoyed the course (MOD C). . . . I
    feel far better armed . . . to go forward and act
    pragmatically with the benefit of others
    hindsight for the mistakes of the past. I am more
    than slightly concerned that I have gone this far
    through my career without being armed with this
    knowledge of this sort!
  • Thank you again for the COIN module. Fascinating
    and professionally useful, I only wish that I had
    been taught that before Op TELIC 5!
  • COIN module was excellentshould this be
    pre-deployment education rather than Captains
    education? This should be for all officers.
  • Personally I feel that British doctrinal
    knowledge of COIN is actually a bit of a myth so
    to be taught it in the classroom prior to
    deploying to Afghanistan is extremely useful.

10
Feedback from Cos for study nights in theatre
  • Thank you for your support and time you have
    given . . . and for an excellent insight into
    COIN. . . . This was valuable for the unit and
    helped us focus the minds of the officers and
    men.
  • You gave a fascinating insight into the
    recurring themes of British operations over the
    past fifty years and what you had to say has made
    us aware that we need to implement those lessons
    learnt by our predecessors. As a result of your
    talk the officers are now burying their heads
    into the doctrine and readings that you
    recommended so highly.

11
Issues with some commanders
  • I think you have got to recognise that if you
    took the attacks on the Coalition out of the
    equation, what you are left with is actually a
    very low level of residual violence within Iraqi
    society compared to anywhere else across Iraq. .
    . .This is not a war zone. This is nothing like
    you are seeing on the streets of Baghdad and here
    you have got to ask the question what is the most
    appropriate force or capability to deal with this
    problem and I would argue that a foreign army is
    particularly ill suited to resolving those kinds
    of societal problems.


12
  • Many of us feel that, notwithstanding limited
    political and popular support for the Iraq
    campaign, too much military advice from theatre
    was watered down on the basis of perceptions of
    what the market would bear. In contrast with the
    US our people in Basra struggled to get their
    views over, as reflected in our lukewarm response
    to the SSR challenge right up to Charge of the
    Knights (CotK). Personally I point the finger at
    PJHQ who, in my view, filter straight up advice
    on our requirements. The whole construct lacks
    the dynamism and necessary tension that you see
    in the US relationships.

13
Major issues with lack of continuity
  • Your points relating to rotation of commands
    through the 6 month tour structure is at the root
    of most of our problems from Basra and also now
    in Afghanistan. Not only does it work against our
    accumulation of knowledge and understanding of
    the situation, but it also ultimately undermines
    our reputation in the face of our US allies who
    think it's a joke that we scuttle back home after
    only 6 months in theatre. The extension to 9
    months for Staff officers is an improvement but
    still doesn't compare to the American system.
    Collation of intelligence was dire when I was out
    there. It was clear that intelligence from the
    previous BG's in Maysaan had either been thrown
    away or never collected in the first place. We
    started on a blank canvas. My patrol reports were
    always praised for their level of detail, but
    there was never any follow-up, never any pursuit
    of some significant leads I uncovered when in
    lengthy dialogue with the local Sheikhs. I think
    this was inherent throughout the chain of
    command.

14
4th Mech Brigade how it changed
  • Meeting with Brigadier Julian Free
  • General Mohans (COIN) plan for the retaking of
    BASRA is a key development14 DIV must win this
    fight and the British must support it in all
    aspects
  • British assets in terms of 4 Brigade and future
    TELICs need to support this effort in many
    mannersthis will provide a focus of effort for
    the British officers and soldiers as well as
    playing a role in the future pacification of
    BASRA and BASRA province
  • British officers, NCOs and soldiers can be
    embedded across many lines of operation within 14
    DIVfrom staff officers, ISTAR etc to platoon to
    coy embedded roles
  • This future plan will need to be briefed to MNC-I
    and MNF-I so they clearly see a plan developing
    for this important area of IRAQ with major
    British supportwhich will be well received by
    many sceptics in BAGHDAD.
  • Urban ops center to train a coy for two weeks
  • Briefed across the BDE that mission is now MiTT
    throughout
  • Joint operations carried out along the Shatt
  • MNF-I staff what about PJHQ?

15
Post CoTK
  • 3 of the 4 battlegroups were MiTTs
  • Working alongside the USMC/USA MiTTs
  • Campaign plan embedded within MNF-I
  • Marsh Arab Levy
  • Constant need to adapttalks and working with 14
    DIV as well as 7 Brigadedifficult at times
  • FP less of an issue
  • 13 in IA vehicles
  • At BN level
  • Last British GOC Thank you for all that you did
    for us.  Your advice proved prophetic - but I
    can't discuss over this means.  Keep in touch and
    I'll tell you why. Let's get together in the
    Autumn.

16
New thinking on Afghanistan
  • COIN is a strategy not a tacticCT is not the
    message anylonger
  • Population centric approach is needed (has
    occurred at tactical and maybe operational levels
    at time) lack of forces
  • It is not the simplistic hearts and minds as
    there will be some killing and dying in the
    coming years
  • Reconciliation is important and not new and very
    complicated
  • COIN through education and training reform has
    impacted the key military allies US/UK/Can (not
    so much with AuZaccording to many within the
    Army)
  • More forces, both Coalition and Afghan (ANA,
    local aux.) neededalso operating jointly
  • Advisory mission (civ/mil) has been a work in
    progress and still needs more workmajor shifts
    are about to occur
  • There are major questions in regards to the
    selection of the OMLT or ETT concept within the
    US and UK militaries and different thinking
  • AATTV concepts of recruiting across Army needs to
    be discussed

17
McChrystal to LA Times
  • Do you think there has been too much focus on
    counter-terrorism? I think there hasn't been
    enough focus on counterinsurgency. I am certainly
    not in a position to criticize counter-terrorism.
    But at this point in the war, in Afghanistan, it
    is most important to focus on almost classic
    counterinsurgency.I don't want people to think
    it is inflexible it should be uniquely adapted
    to the conditions in each part of the country.

18
McChrystal La Times
  • Another priority you have outlined is the Afghan
    security forces. You want to expand their numbers
    faster. It sounds like the main way to do that is
    to expand the partnerships between Afghans and
    alliance forces. Is there a way to improve there?
  • After analysis, we've determined we could
    increase the rate of their growth and their
    target numbers. The results of our analysis are
    not approved up the chain of command yet. But all
    of our analysis tells us that is something we
    need to recommend, so that is my intent.Whether
    we grow the Afghan security forces larger or not,
    partnering closer is to our benefit and we can do
    it better than we have in the past.We need a
    combination of mentoring and partnering.
    Mentoring is people who stay with a unit all the
    time and teach and evolve as units. Partnering is
    where you operate together. Our thought is to
    bring the concepts much closer together. So a
    unit is partner, is partnering in a much tighter
    relationship. Then two things happen. The
    coalition force gets much better performance on
    the ground because Afghans are great soldiers and
    they have huge cultural acuity that a coalition
    soldier is not going to have. And the other part
    is as we operate we think we can give them best
    practices

19
GEN McC 8 imperatives for success 13 06 2009
  • Protect and partner with the people
  • Conduct a comprehensive campaign
  • Understand the Environment
  • Ensure values underpin our effort
  • Listen closelyspeak clearly
  • Act as one team
  • Constantly adapt
  • Act with courage and resolve

20
Practitioner
  • At the time beginning of 2003 the US military
    had not published COIN doctrine since Vietnam,
    and units had relatively little training in COIN
    before their arrival in country. There was much
    learning by doing and even disagreement as to
    whether the fight in Afghanistan was a COIN fight
    at all. In fact unit commanders were forbidden to
    from using the word COIN in describing their
    missionsthey were executing a CT mission in
    keeping with US strategic guidance and an
    operational focus on the enemy.COIN narrative
    in Australia?

21
2007 Gen Barno
  • Continual turnover of US senior leaders has made
    continuity of effort a recurrent challenge in
    this very complex fight Since mid-2005, the
    comprehensive US led counterinsurgency
    strategyhas been significantly altered by
    subsequent military and civilian leaders who held
    differing views. With the advent of NATO military
    leadership, there is today no single
    comprehensive strategy to guide the US, NATO, or
    international effort. Unity of purpose both
    interagency and international has suffered
    unity of command is more fragmented.

22
Practitioner UK IV Examples of reform mindset
  • Additionally as in previous counter-insurgency
    campaigns, WARFIGHTING is an element of COIN. . .
    . Many of the lessons learned from the BGs
    resulting experiences are not new. Common themes
    from previous UK COIN campaigns and conflicts
    were all evident in operations conducted in
    HELMAND Province. The key lesson is that we
    ignore previous experience of such campaigns, and
    those of our allies, at our peril.

23
Practitioner UK VII(coalition ability)
  • TASK FORCE FURY were highly experienced, having
    been in Afghanistan at that point for 12 months
    and they were a very capable force. It was
    illuminating to see their approach to COIN and
    the extent that it had become a part of them.
    They were equipped for it, had the training and
    doctrine behind them, really understood it. . .
    You sensed in them the extent the US Armed Forces
    have transformed since it looked over the Iraqi
    precipice and did something about it. What, to my
    mind, is all the more remarkable is how they have
    undergone that transformation, the momentum that
    has been generated and the commitment and
    attention to detail that has left no stone
    unturned in seeking out better solutions.

24
Practitioner USMC
  • The Marines and sailors leveraged Pashtunwali
    to our advantage when able. We sought to
    establish relationships, which incurs obligations
    of reciprocation for deeds and respect. This
    pulled some Afghan tribes and villagers to us.
    Understanding and use of Pashtunwali assisted in
    our understanding of the environment, maintaining
    the neutral to the positive outlook of our
    operations and presence, and countered Taliban
    information ops and resurgence. . . In general,
    people fight based upon the norms of their
    cultural, historical, economic and political
    influences that exist in their environment.
    Connect the critical cultural thinking and
    understanding in our training and education
    program. Do not make the assumption that it is
    too complicated for the junior Marines. They
    understand these concepts and will care about
    this if the leadership cares .

25
Where does Australia go from here
  • The Rudd government needs to decide if the
    narrative for Afghanistan needs to
    changealliance debate, in your national
    interests, CT not COIN what is COIN
  • The narratives are changing in the northern
    hemisphere
  • Population focused COIN is the way forward in the
    East/South
  • Provincial boundaries are breaking down in the
    South
  • Advisory mission is a work in progress and major
    changes are being discussed
  • AATTV? Serve throughout the South? Selected from
    across Army?
  • The Australian Army prides itself in COIN
    training and tactical excellence, however, the
    US/UK militaries have now recognised the
    importance of education for all commanders and
    OGDs to implement a COIN strategy that is
    properly resourced and focusedmajor issues in
    Australia with OGDs
  • Education is key and there needs to be a building
    block systemWeston Creek is doing COIN education
    for Lt Colonels and Majors, is it linked with the
    Lts and Captains and the NCO courses? Do the
    other courses need to be expanded in terms of
    content?
  • Assessment of what happened in Iraq is being
    done, however, will it be as open and critical as
    other armies assessments? Advisory mission
    heavily questioned2 BNs from 10 Div in surge
  • There is talk of reform within the Australian
    Army, however, how linked is it and does it go
    long and deep? Many within the Army are
    questioning this

26
Keys to past success in COIN
  • Comprehension of existing doctrine
  • Adaptation to local situations and learning from
    mistakeshumility to learn from others
  • Risk-taking organizations
  • Harmony of effort
  • Small-unit approach
  • Corporate memory within theatre HQs
  • Appropriate training
  • Reconciliation amongst their enemies
  • Ongoing education in COIN
  • Population security
  • Understand local perspectivesnon-western metrics
  • Raise, mentor and fight alongside indigenous
    forces (army/paramilitary police/local
    auxiliaries)
  • Regular and aux indigenous forces needed

27
Thinking within the US/UK
  • We have seen that it is only by a close
    combination of civil and military measures that
    insurgency can be fought, so it is logical to
    expect soldiers whose business it is to know how
    to fight, to know also how to use civil measures
    in this way. Not only should the army officers
    know about the subject, they must also be
    prepared to pass on their knowledge to
    politicians, civil servants, economists, members
    of the local government and policemen where
    necessary. The educational function of the army
    at these critical moments is most important.
    Amongst senior officers in particular, ignorance
    or excessive diffidence in passing along such
    knowledge on can be disastrous.

Kitson, Bunch of Five
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