Getting to Yes

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Getting to Yes
Understanding Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot
public perceptions, concerning a possible
Solution to the Cyprus Problem.
Presented by Alexandros Lordos and Muharrem Faiz
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• In last Aprils referendums, the large gap
  between official negotiating positions and public
  perceptions, was made evident.
• Even though the primary Greek Cypriot negotiator
  over the previous years, Glafkos Clerides, was in
  favour of the Plan, 76 of Greek Cypriots voted
  No.
• Similarly, even though the main Turkish Cypriot
  negotiator, Rauf Denktash, was against the Plan,
  65 of Turkish Cypriots voted Yes.
• One lesson from last Aprils referendums, is
  therefore that public perceptions and preferences
  should be carefully examined from now on, since
  after all it is the wider public and not the
  negotiators who will be the final arbitrators
  of any Solution.

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• For the purposes of this presentation, two recent
  public opinion surveys will be utilised one of
  the Greek Cypriots and the other of the Turkish
  Cypriots.
• The first Survey was conducted in September 2004,
  with a sample of 1000 Greek Cypriots who were
  interviewed over the telephone.
• The second survey was conducted in January 2005,
  with a sample of 700 Turkish Cypriots who were
  interviewed face-to-face.
• The surveys were not conducted in parallel with
  identical questionnaires. Rather, the Turkish
  Cypriot survey was designed in such a way as to
  build on the findings of the Greek Cypriot
  survey.

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Sampling procedure Multi-stage stratified random
sampling
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Underlying Attitudes
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Greek Cypriot dominant narratives currently
favour co-existence with the Turkish Cypriots.
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The Turkish Cypriot community is currently
polarized on the issue of co-existence with Greek
Cypriots.
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Both communities currently tend to mistrust the
intentions of the other.
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Greek Cypriots have strong reservations about the
role of Turkey and of the Mainland Turks in the
whole Cyprus affair.
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Turkish Cypriots, in contrast, tend to believe
that they need Turkeys protection in order to be
safe from Greek Cypriot aggression.
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Majorities of both communities strongly oppose
the use of violence.
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Motivations
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Turkish Cypriot motivations

• To become members of the European Union.
• To escape economic isolation.
• To become the masters of their own house.
• To overcome the risk of another war.
• To be re-united with the Greek Cypriots.
  (secondary motive)
• To be able to return to ancestral homes that are
  now in the south. (secondary motive)

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Greek Cypriot motivations

• To escape the military stranglehold of Turkey.
• To re-establish the integrity and sovereignty of
  the Republic.
• To put an end to the Turkification of the
  northern half of Cyprus.
• To be able to return to ancestral homes that are
  now in the north.
• To be re-united with the Turkish Cypriots.
  (secondary motive)
• To attract foreign investment by resolving the
  political irregularity on the island. (secondary
  motive)

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Majorities of both communities are willing to
accept a Federal Solution.
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Security
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The two communities are sharply opposed on the
issue of troop withdrawal.
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The two communities are also opposed on the issue
of demilitarization.
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The creation of an integrated Security Force may
be a mutually acceptable compromise.
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Greek Cypriots demand the removal of intervention
rights.
The Turkish Cypriots would accept a moderation of
intervention rights.
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Replacing the Treaty of Guarantee with a European
Security agreement, would be acceptable to the
Turkish Cypriots.
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Governance
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The Turkish Cypriots have shaped the issue of
governance in the negotiations, by insisting on
privileges to protect them from majority rule.
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Greek Cypriots are willing to tolerate the
constitutional concessions which the Turkish
Cypriots demand.
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The Greek Cypriots are also willing to tolerate
the derogations which the Turkish Cypriots demand
in order to preserve bizonality and political
equality.
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The Turkish Cypriots are willing to tolerate
only Europeans as the three non-Cypriot judges
on the Supreme Court.
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The Turkish Cypriots are also willing to tolerate
a reduction in the number of issues for which
Senate Special Majority is required.
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The Turkish Cypriots would strongly support
direct election of the Presidential Council
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The Turkish Cypriots would also strongly support
provisions to encourage the development of
bi-communal Political Parties
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Property
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Greek Cypriots consider individual Property
Rights to be more important than further
territorial concessions.
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The Turkish Cypriots are willing to accept a
greater respect for Property Rights, and they
would enthusiastically support non-entitled
refugees to have the right to a new home in the
same village
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The Turkish Cypriots are also eager to put aside
timetable restrictions to the application of
residence rights.
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Citizens from Turkey
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More than half of the Turkish Citizens arrived in
the 1970s
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The Greek Cypriots strongly insist that more
Turkish Citizens should depart from the island.
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Greek Cypriot concerns about the Settlers.

• That many more would stay under the UN Plan, not
  just 45,000.
• That the Settlers would be entitled to stay in
  Greek Cypriot properties.
• That by allowing Settlers to stay, it will be
  like rewarding Turkey for her violation of
  International Law.
• That the Settlers would be an alien body to the
  culture of Cyprus, and would refuse to integrate.
• That through the vote of the Settlers, the
  influence of Turkey would remain strong in
  Cypriot politics.

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Turkish Cypriots and Turkish Citizens do not vary
much in their attitudes towards the Greek
Cypriots.
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However, the voting patterns of Turkish Citizens
are sharply different to the voting patterns of
the Turkish Cypriots.
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Turkish Cypriots would strongly oppose a
reduction in the list of 45.000 who may remain
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However, the Turkish Cypriots do in fact insist
that those who are not entitled to stay should
indeed leave the island.
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Both communities tend to agree on the necessity
to limit future immigration from Turkey.
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The Economy
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Both communities tend to agree that Federal
oversight of the Economy is important.
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Greek Cypriots would like to see a more rapid
application of free market economics.
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The Turkish Cypriots would be willing to tolerate
such a reduction of economic restrictions,
especially if Greek Cypriot investments are made
through bi-communal business ventures.
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Equitable distribution of costs is a demand of
both communities.
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Both communities would like to see Turkey more
involved in the financing of the new state of
affairs.
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Education
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The Greek Cypriots insist that the Federal State
should be given more authority over educational
matters.
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The Turkish Cypriots would be willing to accept
the creation of a Federal Ministry of
Education, to oversee integrated schooling and
cross-state schooling.
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The Turkish Cypriots would strongly appreciate a
European Development program for the instruction
of other languages.
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Legal Status
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Greek Cypriots strongly insist on the legal
continuity of the Republic of Cyprus.
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The Turkish Cypriots would be willing to consider
legal continuity, so long as a formula could be
found so that they wouldnt be forced to also
recognize the unilateral Greek Cypriot
administration
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Implementation Guarantees
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Both communities insist that strong and
enforceable guarantees be offered for the
implementation of the solution.
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Greek Cypriot Implementation concerns

• That territorial adjustment will indeed happen as
  agreed.
• That Turkish troops will indeed withdraw as
  agreed.
• That current occupants will indeed vacate
  properties when the Property Board orders them to
  do so.
• That the Turkish Cypriots will not be able to
  secede from the Republic.

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Turkish Cypriot Implementation concerns

• That the terms of the agreement (more
  particularly Bizonality and Political Equality)
  will not later be overruled through the
  application of European Law.
• That National Guard weapons kept in Greek Cypriot
  homes will indeed be relinquished as agreed.
• That alternative accommodation will indeed be
  found for those who would have to relocate.
• That the Greek Cypriots will not be able to
  dominate the Republic.

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Shared Implementation concerns

• That Settlers will indeed depart the island as
  planned.
• That properties will indeed be compensated for as
  agreed.
• That international donors will indeed support the
  settlement as promised.

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Getting to Yes An overview of Greek Cypriot
and Turkish Cypriot requirements.
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Conclusions (I)

• Getting to a double Yes in a future referendum
  involves satisfying those segments of each
  community whose demands do not clash with the
  fundamental requirements of the other side.
• From the Greek Cypriot point of view, getting to
  Yes involves satisfying those Greek Cypriots
  whose main concern is Security, as well as those
  Greek Cypriots whose main concern is Return of
  Refugees.
• Those Greek Cypriots who would like to bury the
  UN Plan, because it is not based on simple
  majority rule, cannot be satisfied without
  alienating the majority of the Turkish Cypriots.

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Conclusions (II)

• From the Turkish Cypriot point of view, renewing
  the Yes will involve satisfying those who would
  like to see a closer integration of the two
  communities, as well as those whose main concern
  is the raising of their standard of living
  through European Integration.
• Those Turkish Cypriots who would like to see a
  Pure Turkish State, cannot be satisfied without
  alienating the majority of the Greek Cypriots.
• The issue on which it will be most difficult to
  reach a mutually satisfactory compromise is
  Security and here, it will be imperative for
  all concerned to be willing to consider creative
  solutions.

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Conclusions (III)

• If Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot demands
  as described above are satisfied, then we can
  reasonably expect a double Yes at a future
  referendum, with approximate majorities of 65-70
  on each side. Given the underlying public
  perceptions of Greek Cypriots and Turkish
  Cypriots, this is the maximum level of support
  that any proposal for a Federal Solution could
  currently achieve.