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Kay and Doherty The Current Law

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Title: Kay and Doherty The Current Law


1
Kay and DohertyThe Current Law
  • Wayne Beglan

2
Sequence of cases
  • Qazi (HL)
  • Connors (ECtHR)
  • Kay (HL x7)
  • McCann (ECtHR)
  • Doherty (HL)
  • Dixon (15 Jan 09, HC)
  • Doran (3 March 09, CA)
  • McGlynn (1 April 09, CA)
  • Defence Estates (5 May 09, HC)
  • Taylor (23 June 09, CA)
  • Pinnock (31 July 09, CA)

3
Summary
  • Gateway (a) seriously arguable point of
    incompatibility
  • Gateway (b) seriously arguable extended
    irrationality
  • highly exceptional Bingham minority in Kay

4
Kay
  • 2006 UKHL 10 2006 2 AC 465 2006 2 WLR
    570 2006 4 All ER 194
  • That the right of a public authority landlord to
    enforce a claim for possession under domestic law
    would, in most cases, automatically supply the
    justification required by article 8(2) for an
    interference with the occupier's right to respect
    for his home

5
Kay
  • that the public authority was not required to
    plead or prove justification
  • courts were to assume that domestic law struck
    the proper balance of the competing interests and
    was compatible with article 8

6
Kay
  • that a challenge to the making of an order could
    be raised in the possession proceedings in the
    county court,
  • so far as its jurisdictional limits permitted,
  • if the defendant could, exceptionally, show a
    seriously arguable case that the relevant
    domestic law was incompatible with the Convention

7
Kay
  • but that (Lord Bingham of Cornhill, Lord Nicholls
    of Birkenhead and Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe
    dissenting)
  • where the requirements of the law had been
    satisfied and the right to recover possession was
    unqualified no challenge based only on a
    defendant's individual circumstances was
    permissible

8
Kay
  • post, paras 28 -30 ,34 -36 , 39 ,50 , 53 -55 ,58
    -59 , 86 ,108 -111 , 172 ,174 -175 ,180 -183 ,
    185 ,188 , 192 , 198 ,200 , 203 , 212

9
110
  • if the requirements of the law have been
    established and
  • the right to recover possession is unqualified,
  • the only situations in which it would be open to
    the court to refrain from proceeding to summary
    judgment and making the possession order are
    these

10
Gateway (a)
  • (a) if a seriously arguable point is raised that
    the law which enables the court to make the
    possession order is incompatible with article 8,
    the county court in the exercise of its
    jurisdiction under the Human Rights Act 1998
    should deal with the argument in one or other of
    two ways
  • (i) by giving effect to the law, so far as it is
    possible for it do so under section 3, in a way
    that is compatible with article 8, or
  • (ii) by adjourning the proceedings to enable the
    compatibility issue to be dealt with in the High
    Court

11
Gateway (b)
  • (b) if the defendant wishes to challenge the
    decision of a public authority to recover
    possession as an improper exercise of its powers
    at common law on the ground that it was a
    decision that no reasonable person would consider
    justifiable, he should be permitted to do this
    provided again that the point is seriously
    arguable

12
Gateway (b)
  • Seriously arguable
  • Only applies to summary hearing
  • Test at full hearing simply whether D is right to
    allege decision was one that no reasonable person
    would consider justifiable

13
Doherty
  • 2009 1 AC 367 2008 3 WLR 636.
  • In Doherty the House held that it would not
    overrule the majority in Kay they provided
    clarification
  • Accordingly Kay remains the binding authority on
    the point, with such further explanation given in
    Doherty as it consistent with the majority view
    in Kay

14
Doherty Lord Hope 55
  • I think that in this situation it would be unduly
    formalistic to confine the review strictly to
    traditional Wednesbury Grounds. The
    considerations that can be brought into account
    in this case are wider. 55
  • Begs the question how much wider?

15
55
  • An examination of the question whether the
    respondent's decision was reasonable, having
    regard to the aim which it was pursuing and to
    the length of time that the appellant and his
    family have resided on the site, would be
    appropriate.
  • But the requisite scrutiny would not involve the
    judge substituting his own judgment for that of
    the local authority
  • Length of time plainly capable of being a
    personal circumstance

16
55
  • In my opinion the test of reasonableness should
    be, as I said in para 110 of Kay, whether the
    decision to recover possession was one which no
    reasonable person would consider justifiable.
  • Italicised in Pinnock

17
Doherty Lord Scott
  • para. 61 rejection of attempt to undermine Kay
  • para. 66 para. 110 of Kay set out
  • para. 79 rejection of attempt to incorporate
    security of tenure by the back door
  • para. 85 requirement on judge is to review the
    lawfulness of the authoritys decision decision
    outside the range of reasonable responses may be
    quashed as erroneous in public law

18
Doherty Lord Rodger
  • agreed with Lords Hope and Walker

19
Doherty Lord Walker
  • para. 115 In common (as I understand it) with
    the rest of your Lordships I do not think,
    despite the decision in McCann, that it would be
    right for this Appellate Committee to depart from
    the decision recently arrived at in Kay by an
    Appellate Committee of seven members
  • para. 117 the breach identified by the ECtHR in
    McCann was procedural
  • para. 123 it is clear on a challenge under
    gateway (b) that the judge will in effect be
    hearing an application for judicial review on
    traditional judicial review grounds.

20
Doherty Lord Mance
  • para. 134 recalling Dyson LJ recognising that a
    shift from conventional JR to a proportionality
    test could was a step that could only be taken by
    the House
  • para. 135 noting proportionality not introduced
    by this case
  • para. 140 under gateway (b) the only challenge
    is conventional judicial review

21
Dixon
  • 2009 EWHC 27 Admin 2009 NPC 21 2009 LLTR
    (CA refused PtA)
  • Challenge to the Monk rule in case of joint
    tenancy
  • Joint tenancy terminated by Ts NTQ. D was found
    to have (in part class A) drug habit
  • And gateway (b) challenge covered by earlier JR
    in Dixon No 1

22
Dixon 2
  • Common law rule survived many housing
    re-enactments over more than 100 years - see Monk
  • Other cases demonstrate the strength of the
    striking the balance point

23
Doran v Liverpool CC
  • 2009 EWCA Civ 146
  • Irish traveller on local authority pitch
  • Counsels approach to gateway (b)
  • LHA - new form of judicial review of uncertain
    dimensions, wider than judicial review as
    ordinarily understood but at the same time not
    extending to a full application of the
    Convention.
  • SoS submitted that the effect of the
    clarification and modification in Doherty was far
    more limited. It was a modest development in the
    elucidation of domestic public law principles.
  • Appellant - took an intermediate position,
    submitting that the effect was less dramatic than
    was suggested by Mr Bartley Jones but more
    significant than was suggested by Mr Stilitz.

24
Doran
  • Counsel were united in the view that the decision
    had created a new battleground area
  • Much argument about the scope of the modification
    of gateway
  • A bleak prospect 46

25
Doran
  • Helpful approach to what is a reasonable
    decision 56
  • And no duty to conduct judicial investigation as
    to where the truth lies 56
  • That point reinforced in both Taylor and Defence
    Estates

26
Doran
  • Toulson LJ thought twofold effect of Doherty
  • All factors can potentially be relevant
    (including personal) for example
  • Money spent on pitch / property
  • Time taken to get pitch / property
  • History / family support and connections
  • Health problems (educational problems) old age
  • Absence of alternative accommodation
  • Prospect of improvement in (e.g. behaviour)

27
Doran
  • Second effect of Doherty
  • Question whether the councils decision was one
    which no reasonable person would have made is to
    be decided by applying public law principles as
    they have been developed at common law, and not
    through the lens of the Convention
  • Promising but read on!

28
Doran
  • Lord Hope stated at para 55 that the requisite
    scrutiny would not involve the judge substituting
    his own judgment for that of the local authority.
  • It cannot therefore have been envisaged that the
    court would make a judgment of the reasonableness
    of the councils decision otherwise than on the
    facts as they reasonably appeared, or should have
    appeared, to the council at the time of making
    its decision. 60
  • As to when decisions might now be made see
    Taylor

29
Doran
  • See postscript at 65-69 for helpful guidance on
    traveller cases involving phase 2 MHA 1983

30
Doran
  • Court rejected argument that court can consider
    case retrospectively 57, 58

31
McGlynn v Welwyn HC
  • 2009 EWCA Civ 285
  • Non-secure tenancy (para 4 case)
  • NTQ served as a result of ASB (magnet case)

32
McGlynn
  • If we do not receive any further complaints of
    anti-social behaviour that can be linked to Mr
    McGlynn or his property we will consider granting
    him a further non-secure tenancy with an option
    to him being re-housed in a smaller property as
    requested. However, if the complaints continue,
    we will have no option but to continue with the
    legal action required to repossess 20 Kingscroft
    (Emphasis supplied)

33
McGlynn
  • Correct approach is Kay, Doherty 32
  • WS from authority did not give details of
    continuing complaints who made them, what they
    were, their impact etc.
  • Court applied seriously arguable test appears
    to be on basis DJ made summary order 31

34
Defence Estates
  • 2009 EWHC 1049 (Admin)
  • No security of tenure para 11 sch1 HA 1988
  • D was wife of resigned army officer provided
    with accommodation for 18 years after resignation

35
Defence Estates
  • S.49A(1) positive discrimination provision
  • But to suggest that section 49A enables someone
    who otherwise would fail to have any defence to a
    possession order nonetheless to remain is to take
    that much too far. 23

36
Defence Estates
  • Conclusions in paras 57, 58
  • No domestic law right to remain
  • Need of army for accommodation outweighed
    individual Art 8 rights
  • Unclear whether being treated as a summary
    hearing or not

37
Taylor
  • 2009 EWCA Civ 613
  • Trespassers case former right to occupy
    pursuant to AST granted by HAssoc who took from
    LHA (Luton) who took from another LHA (Bedford
    C) similar to Kay
  • The main issue - whether arguable that the
    circumstances were such as to impose on the
    council an obligation to consider the personal
    circumstances of the appellants?
  • Second issue - whether, in judging the lawfulness
    of the councils decision, the test is the strict
    Wednesbury rationality test or something wider?

38
Taylor
  • Waller LJ emphasised that private landowner would
    face no difficulty
  • Only additional point is A8 defence because C was
    a public body with decisions susceptible to JR
    18
  • Concept of further decisions discussed 39-42

39
Taylor
  • Kay type situations may make it unreasonable
    not to allow a period of time to bring the
    possession order sought into effect but that is
    something which the court oversees and which the
    law allows for 44
  • Even if one made the assumption that the public
    authority was aware of the personal circumstances
    of the occupiers, their obligation to take
    account of them could never make it unreasonable
    to take proceedings for possession. Provided they
    could establish their absolute right to
    possession, personal circumstances could only be
    relevant to the extent to which a court was
    prepared to postpone execution, which a public
    authority would be entitled to leave to the court
    45.

40
Pinnock demoted tenant
  • 2009 EWCA Civ 852 2009 32 EG 68 (CS)
  • Tenant of 30 years standing, 5 children aged 26
    to 19
  • Demoted due to ASB by household - 8 June 2007,
    two asbos, blackmail, dwd, poa offences
  • 6 June 2008 MCC served possession notice based
    on events of 22 Sept 07 and 18 Jan 08

41
Pinnock
  • 29 When, as here, the conduct of the tenant or
    those residing with or visiting him has been so
    serious as to justify a demotion order, very
    little is required to justify the landlords
    decision to obtain possession.
  • It would be wholly wrong, and inconsistent with
    the statutory scheme, to scrutinise the
    landlords decision at the second stage with the
    rigour required of the county court at the first
    stage

42
Pinnock
  • Proportionality at the second stage is not a high
    test
  • decision must not be one that no reasonable
    person would consider justifiable
  • good reason
  • Now the best part -gt

43
Pinnock
  • Further landlords decision at the second stage
    is not subject to the requirement of
    proportionality 32
  • Simply extended rationality 47 on JR
    challenge
  • And note CC has no JR jurisdiction in demotion
    cases 49-52
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