Title: Wireless Security
1Wireless Security
2802.11
- 802.11 a, b,
- Components
- Wireless station
- A desktop or laptop PC or PDA with a wireless
NIC. - Access point
- A bridge between wireless and wired networks
- Radio
- Wired network interface (usually 802.3)
- Bridging software
- Aggregates access for multiple wireless stations
to wired network.
3802.11 modes
- Infrastructure mode
- Basic Service Set
- One access point
- Extended Service Set
- Two or more BSSs forming a single subnet.
- Most corporate LANs in this mode.
- Ad-hoc mode (peer-to-peer)
- Independent Basic Service Set
- Set of 802.11 wireless stations that communicate
directly without an access point. - Useful for quick easy wireless networks.
4Infrastructure mode
Access Point
Basic Service Set (BSS) Single cell
Station
Extended Service Set (ESS) Multiple cells
5Ad-hoc mode
Independent Basic Service Set (IBSS)
6Open System Authentication
- Service Set Identifier (SSID)
- Station must specify SSID to Access Point when
requesting association. - Multiple APs with same SSID form Extended Service
Set. - APs broadcast their SSID.
7MAC Address Locking
- Access points have Access Control Lists (ACL).
- ACL is list of allowed MAC addresses.
- E.g. Allow access to
- 0001420E121F
- 000142F172AE
- 0001424FE201
- But MAC addresses are sniffable and spoofable.
- Access Point ACLs are ineffective control.
8Interception Range
Station outside building perimeter.
100 metres
Basic Service Set (BSS) Single cell
9Interception
- Wireless LAN uses radio signal.
- Not limited to physical building.
- Signal is weakened by
- Walls
- Floors
- Interference
- Directional antenna allows interception over
longer distances.
10Directional Antenna
- Directional antenna provides focused reception.
- D-I-Y plans available.
- Aluminium cake tin.
- 11 Mbps at 750 meters.
- http//www.saunalahti.fi/elepal/antennie.html
11802.11b Security Services
- Two security services provided
- Authentication
- Shared Key Authentication
- Encryption
- Wired Equivalence Privacy
12Wired Equivalence Privacy
- Shared key between
- Stations.
- An Access Point.
- Extended Service Set
- All Access Points will have same shared key.
- No key management
- Shared key entered manually into
- Stations
- Access points
- Key management a problem in large wireless LANs
13RC4
- Refresher
- RC4 uses key sizes from 1 bit to 2048 bits.
- RC4 generates a stream of pseudo random bits
- XORed with plaintext to create ciphertext.
14WEP Sending
- Compute Integrity Check Vector (ICV).
- Provides integrity
- 32 bit Cyclic Redundancy Check.
- Appended to message to create plaintext.
- Plaintext encrypted via RC4
- Provides confidentiality.
- Plaintext XORed with long key stream of pseudo
random bits. - Key stream is function of
- 40-bit secret key
- 24 bit initialisation vector (more later)
- Ciphertext is transmitted.
15Initialization Vector
- IV must be different for every message
transmitted. - 802.11 standard doesnt specify how IV is
calculated. - Wireless cards use several methods
- Some use a simple ascending counter for each
message. - Some switch between alternate ascending and
descending counters. - Some use a pseudo random IV generator.
16WEP Encryption
IV Cipher text
Initialisation Vector (IV)
PRNG
Key Stream
?
Seed
Secret key
Plaintext
32 bit CRC
ICV
Message
17WEP Receiving
- Ciphertext is received.
- Ciphertext decrypted via RC4
- Ciphertext XORed with long key stream of pseudo
random bits. - Check ICV
- Separate ICV from message.
- Compute ICV for message
- Compare with received ICV
18Shared Key Authentication
- When station requests association with Access
Point - AP sends random number to station
- Station encrypts random number
- Uses RC4, 40 bit shared secret key 24 bit IV
- Encrypted random number sent to AP
- AP decrypts received message
- Uses RC4, 40 bit shared secret key 24 bit IV
- AP compares decrypted random number to
transmitted random number
19Security - Summary
- Shared secret key required for
- Associating with an access point.
- Sending data.
- Receiving data.
- Messages are encrypted.
- Confidentiality.
- Messages have checksum.
- Integrity.
- But SSID still broadcast in clear.
20Security Attacks
- Targeted network segment
- Free Internet
- Malicious use of identity
- Access to other network resources
- Malicious association
- Host AP
- Interference Jamming
- Easy to jam the signals
- DOS through repeated, albeit unsuccessful access
requests (management messages are not
authenticated. Egs. Wlan-jack) - DoS through disassociation commands
- Interference with other appliances (2.4 G
spectrum) - Attack against MAC authentication
- Can spoof MAC with loadable firmware
- Defense?
- Vulnerability through ad hoc mode
21802.11 Insecurities
- Authentication two options
- Open
- Shared-key
- Shared-key more insecure?
- Static key management
- If one device is compromised/stolen, everyone
should change the key - Hard to detect
- WEP keys
- 40 or 128 can be cracked in less than 15 minutes
22IV Collision attack
- If 24 bit IV is an ascending counter,
- If Access Point transmits at 11 Mbps, IVs
exhausted in roughly 5 hours. - Passive attack
- Attacker collects all traffic
- Attacker could collect two encrypted messages
- If two messages EM1, EM2, both encrypted with
same key stream ( same key and same IV) - EM1 ? EM2 M1 ? M2
- Effectively removes the key stream
- Can now try to derive plaintext messages
23Limited WEP keys
- Some vendors allow limited WEP keys
- User types in a password
- WEP key is generated from passphrase
- Passphrases creates only 21 bits of 40 bit key.
- Reduces key strength to 21 bits 2,097,152
- Remaining 19 bits are predictable.
- 21 bit key can be brute forced in minutes.
24Brute Force Key Attack
- Capture ciphertext.
- IV is included in message.
- Search all 240 possible secret keys.
- 1,099,511,627,776 keys
- 200 days on a modern laptop
- Find which key decrypts ciphertext to plaintext.
25128 bit WEP
- Vendors have extended WEP to 128 bit keys.
- 104 bit secret key.
- 24 bit IV.
- Brute force takes 1019 years for 104-bit key.
- Effectively safeguards against brute force
attacks.
26IV weakness
- WEP exposes part of PRNG input.
- IV is transmitted with message.
- Initial keystream can be derived
- TCP/IP has fixed structure at start of packets
- Attack is practical.
- Passive attack.
- Non-intrusive.
- No warning.
27Wepcrack
- First tool to demonstrate attack using IV
weakness. - Open source
- Three components
- Weaker IV generator.
- Search sniffer output for weaker IVs record 1st
byte. - Cracker to combine weaker IVs and selected 1st
bytes.
28Airsnort
- Automated tool
- Does it all!
- Sniffs
- Searches for weaker IVs
- Records encrypted data
- Until key is derived.
29Safeguards
- Security Policy Architecture Design
- Treat as untrusted LAN
- Discover unauthorised use
- Access point audits
- Station protection
- Access point location
- Antenna design
30Wireless as Untrusted LAN
- Treat wireless as untrusted.
- Similar to Internet.
- Firewall between WLAN and Backbone.
- Extra authentication required.
- Intrusion Detection
- WLAN / Backbone junction.
- Vulnerability assessments
31Discover Unauthorised Use
- Search for unauthorised access points or ad-hoc
networks - Port scanning
- For unknown SNMP agents.
- For unknown web or telnet interfaces.
- Warwalking!
- Sniff 802.11 packets
- Identify IP addresses
- Detect signal strength
- May sniff your neighbours
32Location of AP
- Ideally locate access points
- In centre of buildings.
- Try to avoid access points
- By windows
- On external walls
- Line of sight to outside
- Use directional antenna to point radio signal.
33IPSec VPN
- IPSec client placed on every PC connected to the
WLAN - Filters to prevent traffic from reaching anywhere
other than VPN gateway and DHCP/DNS server - Can combine user authentication also
34IEEE 802.11i
- A new framework for wireless security
- Centralized authentication
- Dynamic key distribution
- Will apply to 802.11 a,b g
- Uses 802.1X as authentication framework
- Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), RFC
2284 (EAP-TLS LEAP) - Mutual authentication between client and
authentication server (RADIUS) - Encryption keys dynamically derived after
authentication - Session timeout triggers reauthentication
35802.11i Encryption Enhancements
- Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP)
- RC4 still used
- Per-packet keys
- Hash functions for MIC instead of CRC 32
- Only firmware upgrade required
- AES
- AES cipher replaces RC4
- Will require new hardware