Title: RISK, AMBIGUITY, GAINS, LOSSES
1RISK, AMBIGUITY, GAINS, LOSSES
- Sujoy Chakravarty
- Department of Humanities and Social Sciences
- Indian Institute of Technology,
- Hauz Khas, New Delhi 110019, India
- Jaideep Roy
- Department of Economics,
- Lancaster University,
- Lancaster LA1 4YW, United Kingdom.
2The Concept of Ambiguity
50 RED 50 YELLOW
100 RED YELLOW
URN A RISKY
URN B AMBIGUOUS
- Bet on a colour.
- Pick a bead.
- If the colour of the bead matches the colour you
bet on, you receive 100. - Otherwise you get nothing
3The Concept of ambiguity (2)
- Knight (1921)
- Risk measurable uncertainty which may be
represented by precise odds or probabilities - Ambiguity immeasurable uncertainty which cannot
be readily represented by precise odds or
probabilities - Einhorn and Hogarth (1986)
- Casual empiricism suggests that people tend to
impute numerical probabilities related to their
beliefs regarding likelihood of outcomes
(Ellsberg 1961). Thus ambiguity has been referred
to as subjective risk about objective risk - Camerer (1995)
- Ambiguity with respect to events as known to
be missing information, or not knowing relevant
information that could be known .
4Utility Theory
- Savage-Bayes Approach
- Expected Utility Theory (vNM 1944) and
- Subjective Expected Utility Theory (Savage 1954).
- Essential implication of this approach
- Probabilistic Sophistication requirement on part
of a decision maker to posses a complete and
exhaustive list of all the possible states of the
world along with a subjective assessment of
likelihood of uncertain events that can be
represented by a unique and additive probability
distribution. -
- Experimental evidence since Ellsberg (1961)
demonstrated the inability of SEU theory to
describe behaviour under ambiguity.
5A theory of Smooth AmbiguityKlibanoff,
Marinacci, Mukerji 2006
- Three separate virtues of a decision maker in
face of uncertainty - Attitude towards risk utility function u for
money - Attitude towards ambiguity a smooth value f for
expected utility for each given possibility of
the urn - Subjective beliefs additive beliefs regarding
the probability of occurrence of a particular
state. - Thus, the Value of an ambiguous prospect V- is
the expected value of f given subjective beliefs
over nature of urns.
6A theory of Smooth Ambiguity (2)
- Let us represent a
simplified Ellsberg Urn B given as, - (10, 0, 9, 1,,1,
9,0, 10), using KMM theory.
10 RED and 0 YELLOW 9 RED and 1 YELLOW 8 RED
and 2 YELLOW 7 RED and 3 YELLOW 6 RED and 4
YELLOW 5 RED and 5 YELLOW 4 RED and 6 YELLOW
3 RED and 7 YELLOW 2 RED and 8 YELLOW 1 RED
and 9 YELLOW 0 RED and 10 YELLOW
Possible Distributions of RED and YELLOW
7A theory of Smooth Ambiguity (3)
- Given that there are 11 potential distributions
of R and Y, letting u(.) represent the decision
makers utility function, s, the additive
probabilistic belief about the likelihood of
occurrence of each of these distributions, and
the f function, the curvature of which gives a
decision makers attitude to ambiguity, we can
write the value of the expected value of the
ambiguous urn as,
8A theory of Smooth Ambiguity (4)
Possible Distribution Win100 Win 0 EU f
1 1 0 u(100) f u(100) 1/10
2 0.9 0.1 0.9u(100)0.1u(0) F0.9u(100)0.1u(0) 1/10
3 0.8 0.2 0.8u(100)0.2u(0) F0.8u(100)0.2u(0) 1/10
4 0.7 0.3 0.7u(100)0.3u(0) F0.7u(100)0.3u(0) 1/10
5 0.6 0.4 0.6u(100)0.4u(0) F0.6u(100)0.4u(0) 1/10
6 0.5 0.5 0.5u(100)0.5u(0) F0.5u(100)0.5u(0) 1/10
7 0.4 0.6 0.4u(100)0.6u(0) F0.4u(100)0.6u(0) 1/10
8 0.3 0.7 0.3u(100)0.7u(0) F0.3u(100)0.7u(0) 1/10
9 0.2 0.8 0.2u(100)0.8u(0) F0.2u(100)0.8u(0) 1/10
10 0.1 0.9 0.1u(100)0.9u(0) F0.1u(100)0.9u(0) 1/10
11 0 1 u(0) f(u(0)) 1/10
Beliefs
9A theory of Smooth Ambiguity (5)
- In our experimental study we use a (1, 0, 0,
1) version of the Ellsberg Urn
Possible Distributions of RED and YELLOW
10 RED and 0 YELLOW 0 RED and 10 YELLOW
10Experimental Questions
- Are our attitudes towards risk different across
gains and losses? - Has been asked, answered by Kahneman and Tversky
(1979) using mostly unpaid questionnaires who
claimed that we are risk averse in gains and risk
seeking in losses. - Results from recent paid experiments by Holt and
Laury (2005) challenge the above claim. - We check again and use it in our calibrations for
ambiguity attitudes. - Are our attitudes towards ambiguity different
across gains and losses? - never asked with the exception of Einhorn and
Hogarth (1986) unpaid experiments - but they used single binary betting decision
problems a la Ellsberg (1961). Such
experiments, even if paid, do not allow us to
systematically measure the extent of ambiguity
aversion as it differs from individual to
individual. They merely allow us to gauge whether
or not an individual is ambiguity averse, neutral
or seeking. - Are our attitudes in risk and ambiguity really
independent virtues? - never asked
11Design of the Experiment
- 85 subjects from Indian Institute of Management,
Ahmedabad predominantly with engineering and
computer science backgrounds. - Multiple Price List procedure Holt and Laury
(2002), Harrison et al. (2005), Chakravarty et al
(2005) - A total of 4 tasks, 2 for risk, 2 for ambiguity.
Each subject made 40 paired decisions, total of
3400 binary decisions. - All subjects performed the risk tasks first.
- Half were given loss tasks first, the other half
was given gains task first controlling for
order effects two independent sessions - As MPL method may suffer from anchoring Anderson
et al. (2005), Bosch and Silvestre (2005), the
reverse MPL scheme was administered to
approximately half the subjects
12Design of the Experiment (2)
- Each subject could earn a maximum total of Rs.500
(PPP USD 55). Could never owe anything to the
experimenter, but could see that an act would
certainly lead to losing money. - They earned on average Rs.275 (PPP USD 30).
- Net payments were made at the very end when all
tasks were performed. Hence, no possibility of
updating current wealth. - All tasks has independent randomization rules
no possibility of hedging - Subjects were educated in MPL tasks through
questionnaires
13Risk Task (Gain)
Decision Option A Option B Your Choice (Circle A or B)
1 Die Roll 1-5 Rs 40 Die Roll 6-10 Rs 60 Die Roll 1-10 Rs. 0 A B
2 Die Roll 1-5 Rs 40 Die Roll 6-10 Rs 60 Die Roll 1-9 Rs 0 Die Roll 10 Rs 100 A B
3 Die Roll 1-5 Rs 40 Die Roll 6-10 Rs 60 Die Roll 1-8 Rs 0 Die Roll 9-10 Rs 100 A B
4 Die Roll 1-5 Rs 40 Die Roll 6-10 Rs 60 Die Roll 1-7 Rs 0 Die Roll 8-10 Rs 100 A B
5 Die Roll 1-5 Rs 40 Die Roll 6-10 Rs 60 Die Roll 1-6 Rs 0 Die Roll 7-10 Rs 100 A B
6 Die Roll 1-5 Rs 40 Die Roll 6-10 Rs 60 Die Roll 1-5 Rs 0 Die Roll 6-10 Rs 100 A B
7 Die Roll 1-5 Rs 40 Die Roll 6-10 Rs 60 Die Roll 1-4 Rs 0 Die Roll 5-10 Rs 100 A B
8 Die Roll 1-5 Rs 40 Die Roll 6-10 Rs 60 Die Roll 1-3 Rs 0 Die Roll 4-10 Rs 100 A B
9 Die Roll 1-5 Rs 40 Die Roll 6-10 Rs 60 Die Roll 1-2 Rs 0 Die Roll 3-10 Rs 100 A B
10 Die Roll 1-5 Rs 40 Die Roll 6-10 Rs 60 Die Roll 1 Rs 0 Die Roll 2-10 Rs 100 A B
14Risk Task (Loss)
Decision Option J Option K Your Choice (Circle J or K)
1 Die Roll 1-5 -Rs 60 Die Roll 6-10 -Rs 40 Die Roll 1-10 -Rs 100 J K
2 Die Roll 1-5 -Rs 60 Die Roll 6-10 -Rs 40 Die Roll 1-9 -Rs 100 Die Roll 10 Rs 0 J K
3 Die Roll 1-5 -Rs 60 Die Roll 6-10 -Rs 40 Die Roll 1-8 -Rs 100 Die Roll 9-10 Rs 0 J K
4 Die Roll 1-5 -Rs 60 Die Roll 6-10 -Rs 40 Die Roll 1-7 -Rs 100 Die Roll 8-10 Rs 0 J K
5 Die Roll 1-5 -Rs 60 Die Roll 6-10 -Rs 40 Die Roll 1-6 -Rs 100 Die Roll 7-10 Rs 0 J K
6 Die Roll 1-5 -Rs 60 Die Roll 6-10 -Rs 40 Die Roll 1-5 -Rs 100 Die Roll 6-10 Rs 0 J K
7 Die Roll 1-5 -Rs 60 Die Roll 6-10 -Rs 40 Die Roll 1-4 -Rs 100 Die Roll 5-10 Rs 0 J K
8 Die Roll 1-5 -Rs 60 Die Roll 6-10 -Rs 40 Die Roll 1-3 -Rs 100 Die Roll 4-10 Rs 0 J K
9 Die Roll 1-5 -Rs 60 Die Roll 6-10 -Rs 40 Die Roll 1-2 -Rs 100 Die Roll 3-10 Rs 0 J K
10 Die Roll 1-5 -Rs 60 Die Roll 6-10 -Rs 40 Die Roll 1 -Rs 100 Die Roll 2-10 Rs 0 J K
15Ambiguity Task (Gain)
Your choice of colour to bet on (circle your choice) GREEN BLUE
16Ambiguity Task (Loss)
Your choice of colour to bet on (circle your choice) RED YELLOW
17Results
- 1. Risk (Pooling sessions 1, 2, 3 and 4)
- Subjects are risk averse in both gains and
losses, though they are more so in gains (as
found in Holt and Laury, 2005). No reflection
effect (contrary to what claimed by Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979)
18Results (2)
- Observed Parameters, Risk Tasks over Gains and
Losses - Average r over gains 0.56 (risk averse)
- Average s over losses 0.65 (risk averse)
- Per subject number of safe choices (Gains) 6.14
- Per subject number of safe choices (Losses)
5.62 - These are different using both parametric (paired
t-test, p. value 0.0005) as well as
non-parametric (Wilcoxon test, p. value 0.0004)
- Similar to Holt and Laury (2005)
19Results (3)
- Ambiguity (Pooling sessions 1, 2, 3 and 4)
- Subjects are risk averse in the domain of gains
but mildly seeking in the domain of losses. So,
there is a weak reflection effect. - Average a over gains 0.99 (ambiguity averse)
- Average b over losses 0.99 (ambiguity seeking)
- We cannot use the number of non-ambiguous choices
to compare behaviour as the neutral flip point is
6 for gains and 7 for losses.
20Results (4)
- We use instead ambiguity preference scores
- Define the Ambiguity Preference Scores
- SG (6- Observed Switch Point) for gains and
- SL (7- Observed Switch Point) for losses,
- Where SG -5, -4, -3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5
and - SL -4, -3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,
6 - Average SG -0.48
- Average SL 0.67
- These are different over gains and losses using a
parametric 2-sided paired t-test (0.0000) and a
non-parametric 2-sided Wilcoxon test (0.0000)
21Results (5)
- The Ellsberg Decision
- We also compare the distribution of choices
between the ambiguous and non-ambiguous prospects
at the neutral point (decision 5 for gains and 6
for losses) where the same prize amounts (0 and
100 for gains and -100 and 0 for losses) result
from losing or winning the bet, when drawing from
either the non-ambiguous (0.5, 0.5) urn or the
ambiguous (1, 0) (0, 1) urn. - Pooling all four sessions,
- 71 out of 85 subjects (84) chose the
non-ambiguous prospect at the neutral decision in
gains. - 40 out of 85 subjects (47 ) chose the
non-ambiguous prospect in losses. - Pooling all observations at this neutral point,
the choice of the non ambiguous prospect over
gains statistically and significantly exceeds
that over losses at the one percent level using
both parametric and non-parametric tests (p-value
0.0000). - Similar results to Einhorn and Hogarth (1986)
22Results (6)
- 4. Risk-Ambiguity connection
- Pooling all observations over all four sessions,
we find a positive and significant relationship
between the attitude to ambiguity and the
attitude to risk over the domain of gains Cor
(r, a) 0.36, p-value 0.0008 but no such
significant relationship over the domain of
losses. - Risk and ambiguity attitudes have been in the
past reported to be uncorrelated in studies by
Cohen et al. (1985) and Einhorn and Hogarth
(1990).
23Reflection Effects
Risk Tasks
24Reflection Effects (2)
GAINS
AVERSE NEUTRAL SEEKING
AVERSE 44.7 0 7.05
LOSSES NEUTRAL 0 0 0
SEEKING 22.35 0 25.88
25Reflection Effects (3)
Ambiguity
26Reflection Effects (4)
GAINS
AVERSE AVERSE NEUTRAL SEEKING
AVERSE 42.35 42.35 0 4.7
LOSSES NEUTRAL 0 0 0 0
SEEKING 28.23 28.23 0 24.71
27Conclusions
- RISK
- In the aggregate over risky prospects, subjects
are risk averse over both losses and gains, so no
reflection effect. - However subjects are more risk averse over gains
compared to losses. - When individual behaviour is examined, almost 30
of the subjects do display a reflection effect,
majority of who are averse in gains and seeking
in losses.
28Conclusions (2)
- AMBIGUITY
- In the aggregate, subjects are ambiguity averse
over gains and ambiguity seeking over losses, so
there is a weak reflection effect. - This aggregate reflection effect is confirmed at
the individual level with almost 30 displaying
ambiguity aversion over gains and ambiguity
seeking over losses. - RISK/AMBIGUITY CONNECTION
- Attitudes towards risk and ambiguity are
positively correlated over the domain of gains
and almost unrelated over the domain of losses.
29Future Research
- Develop procedures that allow us to estimate
subjects beliefs over the likelihood of
occurrence of an event in a situation of
ambiguity. - Study the risk and ambiguity connection in a
deeper way.