Gender bias

1
Gender bias parental choice

• Foetal sex determination selective abortions
• Sex ratio in census biased against girls
• Jha et al (Lancet, 2006) -- survey of 1.1 million
  households in India
• Difference in sex ratios of additional child
  depending on sex of previous children
• Interpreted as evidence of selective abortion
• 10 million missing female births over 20 years

2
Elsewhere?

• China 40 million girls are missing
• Evidence of gender preferences in US
• Probability of having 3rd child highest for
  parents with 2 girls
• Lower for parents with 2 boys, lowest for 1B 1G

3
Dahl-Moretti

• divorce rate higher if first child is a girl
  (fathers seem to prefer boys)
• Shotgun marriage rate higher when first child is
  boy (ultrasound)
• Prob. Of second child higher when first is girl
• Survey evidence fathers prefer boys

4

• Gallup poll of 2129 adults, 2000 2003
• Suppose you could have only 1 child, what gender
  would you prefer?
• Women 35 G, 30 B
• Men 19 G, 48 B

5

• How can this imbalance persist?
• Market failure in the marriage market?
• Parents failing to realize that future market
  conditions may be very different from todays?

6
Is parental choice good?

• Dharma Kumar (1983) given discrimination,
  parental choice can reduce gender bias by
  improving womens position in marriage market
• Contrary view -- sex determination selective
  abortion illegal in India.

7
How should we think about welfare

• If abortion is finewhat about selective
  abortions?
• If foetus has no rights, then does not enter
  welfare calculation
• Welfare in terms of parents and surviving
  children

8
Bride Price/dowry

• Let q be the bride price that clears the marriage
  market
• Two models
• a) Walrasian markets
• b) Frictional search market

9
Walrasian Market
10
Rational expectations equilibrium

• Parents make decisions at t0
• At t1, marriage market operates
• Bride price q transfer from boy to girl

11
Rational expecations eq

• Price sex ratio (q,r) anticipated at t 0
• Parents make choices to maximize payoffs
• Payoff from boy is U(r)-q
• Payoff from girl is V(r)q

12

• Unique REE ratio is r1
• Many possible bride prices in equilibrium
• One possible bride price is q such that
• U(1)-qV(1)-q
• Parents indifferent between boys and girls at
  this price.
• Other bride prices also possible, where
• U(1)-V(1)-2q 2c and V(1)2q-U(1) 2c
• Equilibrium is efficient

13
Frictional market
14
Marriage market with frictions

• Price determined thru decentralized bargaining.
• If r1, q0.
• If rlt1 but close to 1, q will be positive but
  small
• (small imbalances have small price effects)
• In equlibrium, rlt1 and qgt0

15
Welfare

• Welfare increasing in x at x
• Congestion externality still obtains
• (efficient ratio not necessarily 1)

16
Policy

• Ban on selective abortion unworkable?
• Incentives for having girls tax on boys
• Removing gender discrimination in workplace
• Future social problems arising from sex ratio
  (externalities of other sorts)
• Liberalizing of laws, e.g. on homosexuality

17
Extensions

• Heterogeneity in wealth
• poor boys may be worst off in marriage market
• imperfect foresight?

18
Conclusion

• In the absence of prices, parental choice reduces
  welfare due to congestion externality
• With bride prices, the sex ratio will be balanced
  in REE if the marriage market is Walrasian
• With prices and a frictional market, the sex
  ratio can be unbalanced, and inefficient.
  Congestion externality in marriage market.

19
Implications for UK and DCs

• Allowing gender choice for family balancing
  reasons
• May or may not result in aggregate imbalances
• If no aggregate effects, then choice improves
  welfare
• May be offset by aggregate effects
• E.g. if parents with 1 girl more likely to select
  than those with 1 boy.