Meaning as Use

1
Meaning as Use

• Wittgenstein, Sellars, Brandom

2
Alternative to Propositions

• According to Relationalism, Propositions, as
  abstracta bear a relation to sentences
• Wittgenstein argues that relationalism is
  factually incorrect
• Meanings are how sentences are used in the game
  of communication
• To know the expressions meaning is just to know
  how to deploy the expression appropriately in
  conversational settings

3
Sellars Alternative

• Sellars inferentialism
• Inferring is central the complexity of patterns
  of inference that allows the use theorist to
  accommodate long, novel sentence. On this view,
  one sentence entails another, not because the two
  express propositions but because it is
  socially expected that ones neighbor would
  perform the act of inferring the second from the
  first. (89)

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Lycans Objections to Use theory

• 1. Explaining how language use differs from
  ordinary conventional rule governed activity such
  as chess that generate no meaning
• 2. Explaining how a sentence can mean that
  so-and-so (as S in German means that-S in
  English)

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Background

• Frege, Russell shared assumptions language to be
  studied mathematically dealt in genuine abstract
  entities, propositions, etc.
• Wittgensteins later view Reject naming
  theories, abstract entities

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Early Wittgenstein

• Tractatus
• Picture theory of meaning attempt to spell out
  correspondence theory of truth
• Most of language stands for something
  propositional form reveals structure of reality

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Later Wittgenstein

• Criticisms of earlier views
• Names die if bearer dies
• Ostensive definition cannot work for first
  language
• Reject Fregean distinctions
• Major stress on variety of uses of language and
  how language doesnt fit the traditional paradigm
  (games share only a family resemblance)

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Positive use-theories

• We are trained in language, not something
  explained to us
• We are trained in Language-games (92) a
  complicated form of social behavior
• Linguistic expressions are like chess pieces
• Sellars language-entry and exit rules
  language-language rules concerned with inference
  (93)
• Brandoms development
• These are alternatives to reference/proposition
  etc. Do without notion of representation.

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Lycans objections to use-theories

• Objection 1 Twin Earth issue of individuating
  games
• Reply different higher order uniformities
• Objection 2 Proper names the rules are
  difficult to identify
• Reply Lycan assumes univocity
• Objection 3 Compositionality most sentences so
  meaning must depend on composition.
• Reply math is a game and its compositional
• Objection 4 The undergraduateCant distinguish
  parroting jargon and using language with
  meaning/understanding, so how is the distinction
  to be made.
• Reply success is parasitic upon an already
  existing game
• Continued -

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Lycans objections to use-theories

• Objection 5 Real games are rule-governed but
  nothing analogous to meaning. Where does this
  come from?
• Reply Intuition pump. Lycans fanciful game
  couldnt exist unless it was parasitic upon
  existing game.
• Reply Use theory doesnt eliminate reference
  it merely makes it non-relational or, in the case
  of picturing, language dependent
• Objection 6 Moves in real games dont say
  that-S.
• Reply Lycan confuses formal games with
  language games. Nobody said language is formal
  game, its a Strawman argument.

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Holism

• All uses or some uses?
• Use-theories tend towards all.
• Our account of language must allow it to be
  learnable
• But how so if all (possible) uses are in
  question?
• If each new word alters meaning of all the rest?
• Detailed explanations push us towards Fregean
  mechanisms.

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Conceptual role semantics

• Another development from use.

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Conventions

• Everyone conforms to R.
• Everyone believes that the others conform to R.
• This belief that the others conform to R gives
  everyone a good and decisive reason to conform to
  R himself....
• General preference for general conformity to R
  rather than slightly-less-than-general conformity
  in particular, rather than conformity by all
  but any one.

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Conventions 2

• 5. R is not the only possible regularity meeting
  the last two conditions.... This condition
  provides for the characteristic arbitrariness of
  conventions.
• 6. The various facts listed in conditions (1) to
  (5) are matters of common (or mutual) knowledge

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Linking formal language with use

• the convention whereby a population P uses a
  language is a convention of truthfulness and
  trust in . To be truthful in is to act in a
  certain way to try never to utter any sentence
  of that are not true in .... To be trusting in
  is to form beliefs in a certain way to impute
  truthfulness in to others, and thus to tend to
  respond to another's utterance of any sentence of
  by coming to believe that the uttered sentence
  is true in .

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Chomsky

• I-language versus E-language
• Grammar description of system in each one of us
  that assign status to range of noises/shapes