Risk Analysis

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Risk Analysis Aviation Security

• Bad security looks a lot like good security on
  the surface.
• Anonymous

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Security

• Security (a) the state that is achieved when a
  stable and safe system exists, in which
  individuals or groups can pursue their ends and
  objectives without disruption or harm and without
  fear of loss or injury.
• Security system designed to keep people from
  creating problems or hurting people or property.
• Security (b) a condition that results from the
  establishment and maintenance of a system that
  ensures protection against violation from hostile
  acts or influences.

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Layered Security

• Not unique to aviation
• The failure of a single layer of security does
  not mean the entire system will be breached.
• Purposefully designed to put enough obstacles in
  the way of perpetrators of violence that they
  will be deterred from trying to attack the system.

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Layered Security on 9/11

• The practice was in place, but was ineffective.
  Terrorists were successful on that day because
  they had to breach only 3 poorly designed layers
  of security.
• Layer One CAPS
• 11 hijackers were identified by the system for
  further search
• Mandated a thorough search of checked baggage
  only not carry on bags.
• Layer Two weapons of choice
• Box cutter were legal to carry onboard commercial
  aircraft.
• Even if they had been confiscated, the hijackers
  could have easily obtained similar items at
  kiosks, retail stores, or restaurants after
  clearing security.
• Layer Three Flimsy cockpit doors
• Despite over 2 dozen cockpit intrusions in the 24
  months before the attack, nothing was done to
  make the door sturdier to an attack.
• Flawed policies of having flight attendants carry
  cockpit keys and cockpit personnel exit the
  flight deck to investigate disruptions also left
  the cockpits vulnerable.
• Once these layers were breached, nothing stood in
  the way of the terrorists carrying out their
  mission.

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Layered Security Post 9/11

• In response to 9/11, the TSA set out to put as
  many impediments as possible in the way of
  potential terrorists so that the events of that
  fateful day could not be repeated.
• First, it increased the sheer number of layers of
  security that future terrorists would have to
  negotiate.
• Second, it gave those layers more strength and
  depth.
• However, merely increasing layers without regard
  to an assessment of the overall effectiveness of
  the new layers does not increase security.

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• Layer 1 Higher screening standards
• Standards for screening are stricter, but large
  numbers of prohibited items still get through.
• Layer 2 Increased Profiling
• Newer, more advanced CAPS II which subjects
  selected passengers to greater scrutiny and
  intensive searches including both carry-ons and
  checked bags.
• Layer 3 Better Screening at Checkpoints
• Better-trained, better-paid, better-motivated
  federal employees
• Layer 4 Reinforced Cockpit Doors
• Supposedly will keep any potential hijacker pout
  and prevent him from turning the plane into a
  flying missile.

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• Layer 5 Air Marshals
• Chances are increased that a well-trained marshal
  will be able to take out a potential hijacker
  long before he can work his way into the cockpit
  door.
• Layer 6 Armed pilots
• There is a good possibility that if a terrorist
  makes it into the cockpit, one of the pilots will
  be armed and trained to shoot the hijacker and
  stop the plane from being taken over.
• Layer 7 Passenger Action
• It is likely that passengers and flight crew will
  ultimately intervene and take down the hijackers.
• Layer 8 Shoot down policy
• F-15 F-16 fighters are standing by at military
  bases across the country waiting for the call to
  scramble and, if necessary, shoot down a hijacked
  aircraft.

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Security Layers In Theory..

• In theory, all of these new layers should reduce
  the likelihood of another 9/11 type attack to
  almost zero.
• There are at minimum 6 layers, and if air
  marshals and armed pilots are present then there
  are 8 layers.
• Therefore, in theory, a terrorist would have to
  be imprudent or demented to try to breech the
  system.

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In practice..

• But lets look at the layers through the eyes of
  the terrorist, instead of through the eyes of the
  TSA
• Layer 1 Higher Screening Standards
• Layer 2 Increased Profiling
• Layer 3 Better Screening at Checkpoints
• Layer 4 Reinforced Cockpit Doors
• Layer 5 Air Marshals
• Layer 6 Armed Pilots
• Layer 7 Passenger Action
• Layer 8 Shoot-down Policy

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In reality.

• Reality 1 The aviation security system is only
  as strong as its weakest point.
• A single part of the system allows a real threat
  to successfully exploit a previously unaddressed
  vulnerability
• Reality 2 Aviation will always be attacked.
• Aviation has and always will serve as an
  attractive target for criminals and terrorists.
• Reality 3 The aviation system is complex and
  getting even more so every day.
• Annually 1.5 billion passengers and several
  billion tons of cargo are moved
• Transported by 25,000 commercial airliners
• To 1500 commercial airports around the world

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• Reality 4 Magic bullets are never the answer.
• Magic bullets are characteristically easy to
  implement for planners, simple to explain to the
  public and compatible with the industrys needs
  for convenience and customer service.
• They fail to address the needs of the entire
  system, leaving many vulnerabilities unaddressed
• Reality 5 Technology does not provide us a
  fail-safe system processes do.
• Relying almost exclusively on technology fails to
  recognize the human element in both attacking the
  system as well as preventing, detecting, and
  responding to those potential attacks.
• Reality 6 Aviation security measures often do
  things we didnt expect them to do.
• Unintended consequences of an aviation security
  measure must always be planned for and counted on
  to happen.

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Risk Analysis Aviation Security

• Risk Analysis a process that an organization
  goes through to determine its risk exposure.
• Risk the possibility that damage could be
  inflicted upon a system
• The goal of a risk analysis is to determine the
  probability of potential risks in order to
  reasonably integrate security tactics and methods
  to effectively manage those risks.
• Managing risk involves choosing among various
  alternatives to reduce the effects of risk.

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• Real security is a process, not merely a series
  of countermeasures launched against perceived
  threats.
• Conceptualizing aviation security as merely an
  arena for countermeasures sets up the system to
  be compromised in the future.

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Examples of how post 9/11 security measures
created further risk

• In order to get more air marshals in the skies,
  the original 12 week training of new recruits was
  cut to 6 weeks. Consequently, instead of having
  a well-disciplined force patrolling the skies, we
  saw in several instances that the new air
  marshals were not much more than vigilantes with
  guns who lacked the knowledge to operate within
  the confines of an aircraft cabin.
• Deploying National Guardsmen at the nations
  airports for 9 months cost billions of dollars
  and did nothing to significantly improve airport
  security. Despite their valiant efforts, the NG
  are not trained in aviation security and know
  next to nothing about the real threats and
  vulnerabilities of the system.
• The shoot-down policy has put almost a dozen
  airliners in jeopardy of being mistakenly shot
  down because of the simple fact that F-15 fighter
  jets and commercial planes cannot communicate
  with each other.

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Managing Risk

• A security system that is founded upon managing
  risk doesnt require perfection. It only needs
  to be able to fail securely and safely.
• Such a system succeeds based upon human
  prevention, detection, and response to threats.
• Countermeasures and technologies provide tactics
  that are used to accomplish higher security
  standards centered around human intelligence and
  analysis.

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Conducting Risk Analyses

• There is no such thing as 100 security. There
  will always remain risks to the system.
• A risk analysis is centered on 3 main activities
• Identifying potential threats
• If threats are not accurately identified, the
  risks they represent cannot be managed or
  eliminated.
• Historically, 3 groups have perpetrated violence
  on the system terrorists, criminals, and
  disruptive passengers.
• Determining existing and possible vulnerabilities
• Elements that make a system more prone to attach
  by a threat or allow an attack to have a higher
  degree of success or impact.

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• 3. Discerning measures, as necessary, that lead
  to risk reduction.
• Actions that can work toward reducing or
  eliminating the causes or reducing the effects of
  one or more vulnerabilities.
• These measures are identified and integrated into
  a scenario, and the risk rating for that scenario
  is recalculated to account for the effect of it.
• Measures can be prioritized by considering a
  number of factors such as
• What security problems does the measure solve?
• How well does the measure solve the security
  problem?
• What other problems might the measure cause?
• What are the costs of the measure?
• Do the costs of the control justify its
  implementation?