Demographic transitions in Europe and the Mediterranean: Some introductory remarks

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Demographic transitions in Europe and the
Mediterranean Some introductory remarks

• Chris Wilson
• Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research
• Wilson_at_demogr.mpg.de
• Paper presented at REMSH Seminar, Durham, UK, 3
  July 2004

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A demographic perspective

• Demographic trends underlie a great many social,
  economic and other processes. However, because
  populations often change rather slowly,
  demography is often taken for granted and its
  impact under-appreciated.
• I will focus principally on changes in fertility,
  mortality and age-structure, and address
  migration in less depth. I hope that in doing so
  I can provide a context for the more detailed
  discussion of migration later in this session.

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Europe and the Mediterranean

• In this presentation I mostly look at trends in
  two aggregates of countries EU-25 and Med-10.
• The European Union as of 1st May 2004 EU-25.
• Ten countries running from Turkey to Morocco,
  excluding Israel Med-10.
• North Africa Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya,
  Egypt. Eastern Mediterranean Turkey, Syria,
  Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan.

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Demographic transition

• In association with the many other changes of
  modernization, every population undergoes the
  demographic transition.
• At some point in the past every population had
  high fertility and high mortality. With the
  spread of modern medicine and public health,
  mortality improves as family planning becomes
  the norm, fertility drops.
• Usually mortality falls first, with a delay
  before fertility decline. This produces an era of
  rapid population growth until the two come back
  into balance.
• These changes happened first in Europe and the
  Neo-Europes overseas, and became a global process
  after World War II.

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Population growth 1950-2050

• In 1950 the total population of the Med-10
  countries was about 70 million. At that time the
  countries which now comprise the EU-25 had 350
  million.
• By 2000 the Med-10 had grown to over 230 million
  and the EU-25 to 450 million.
• Although the future is to some degree uncertain,
  continued substantial growth is very likely for
  the Med-10 and very unlikely for the EU-25.
• Population projections by both the United Nations
  and the US Census Bureau suggest that the two
  populations will be roughly equal by 2050. UN
  data are graphed.

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Fertility

• Total fertility the average number of children
  born per woman.
• In order to replace themselves exactly, a cohort
  of women need to have a little over two children
  each. (2.1 is often taken as equalling
  replacement level.)
• Total fertility is a convenient way to relate
  current fertility levels to this level.
• In 2002 total fertility in the EU-25 was 1.4,
  i.e. about 2/3 of what is needed for replacement.
  
• In the Med-10 it was 2.6, i.e. about 1/4 more
  than replacement.
• Data graphed come from the UN and the Council of
  Europe.

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Fertility trends

• Fertility was very high in the Med-10 until the
  1960s (around 7 children per woman). It has been
  falling steadily since the 1970s and is likely to
  reach about replacement level by 2010-15.
• Fertility was much lower in Europe. However, even
  the levels there were enough to produce
  substantial population growth in 1950s and 1960s.
  (The Baby Boom).
• Fertility has since fallen to levels well below
  replacement level. It is 1.2 to 1.3 children per
  woman in most of Southern and Eastern Europe.
• Fertility has stayed closer to replacement level
  in some parts of Northern European, e.g. UK and
  France.

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Mortality

• Life expectancy how long does an average
  individual live.
• As in many other developing countries, life
  expectancy has risen rapidly in the Med-10 since
  World War II, from 43 in 1950 to 70 today.
• Life expectancy continues to rise in Europe.
  Scholars once believed that European populations
  were close to a biological limit. Now life
  expectancy is predicted to keep on increasing for
  the foreseeable future.
• Under Communism life expectancy stagnated in
  Eastern Europe, but is now rising rapidly towards
  Western levels.
• Data graphed come from the UN.

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Age structure

• The past experience of fertility and mortality is
  written into a populations age structure.
• The high fertility and rapid population growth in
  the Med-10 countries gives them a very young
  population.
• The fluctuations in fertility in Europe produce
  large swings in the size of different birth
  cohorts.
• Population pyramids provide an overview of the
  age-structure.
• Data graphed are from US Census Bureau and
  Council of Europe.

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Ageing

• All populations that have long life expectancy
  and low long-run population growth will
  experience ageing. The timing and speed of ageing
  depends mostly on the timing and speed of
  fertility decline.
• In Europe this long term process has been given a
  boost by the rapid decline in fertility since the
  Baby Boom. So Europe will experience a form of
  super-ageing over the next 40-50 years.
• A sensible policy goal would be to try to
  stabilise the base of the age-structure. If
  fertility is far below replacement level, this is
  very difficult.

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Ageing, fertility and migration

• Migrants can fill gaps in the age-structure, but
  the long-term effect depends on how many children
  the migrants have.
• Since the migrants too will grow old, they only
  reduce long-term ageing if they have higher
  fertility than the native-born.
• Most evidence suggests that the fertility of
  migrants tends to converge with that of their
  hosts. Moreover, fertility will soon be close to
  or below replacement in the Med-10.
• Low fertility is a global phenomenon half the
  worlds population now lives in countries where
  fertility is 2.1 or less.

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Future population growth

• A populations age-structure imposes constraints
  on future growth. A process of demographic
  momentum means that a population which has been
  growing rapidly will tend to keep on growing.
• The Med-10 countries have very young populations,
  over 40 are under age 20. Even if these cohorts
  only have two children per woman, this will lead
  to substantial population growth.
• In the opposite direction, the very small cohorts
  born recently in Southern Europe cannot produce
  substantial population growth, even if they go
  back to replacement level fertility.

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Demographic projections

• Although the future is uncertain to some degree,
  demographic projections are reasonably accurate
  for many populations over the medium-term, 30-40
  years.
• The key to any forecast are the assumptions
  concerning fertility, mortality and migration.
  The data graphed come from US Census Bureau.
• Assumptions
• steady increase in life expectancy in Europe and
  Med-10
• modest net migration into Europe
• rising fertility in Europe (from 1.4 at present
  to about 1.7)
• continuing fall in fertility in the Med-10
  levelling off at 1.9

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Ageing and economic challenges for Europe
Ageing is not, in itself, necessarily a problem.
However, it poses great challenges for Europe
because our social and economic institutions are
not well set up to cope with it. Europes
welfare state regimes were largely created during
the Baby Boom era between World War II and the
First oil shock in 1973. This was an era of
increasing population and rapid economic growth
(over 5 per capita per year in Continental
Europe). The pension and health care systems
were created assuming that similar conditions
would persist.
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The demography of the labour force
The low fertility of recent decades implies that
the EU-25s working-age population will decline
substantially in coming decades. The impact will
be much greater in Southern Europe than in
countries such as France or the UK. There are
essentially two ways in which the impact of this
can be mitigated 1) by increasing the
participation rate of the population in the
relevant ages and 2) by migration. Neither of
these options is universally popular. Persuading
more women to work (especially in Southern
Europe) and delaying retirement for both sexes
may be just as controversial as encouraging more
migrants.
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Demographic dividend for the Med-10

• The demographic transition produces a one-off
  bonus in terms of the working population which
  economists often term the demographic dividend.
• Fertility decline leads to fewer children (and so
  a lower youth dependency rate), but significant
  ageing does not occur until much later when the
  big, pre-fertility-decline cohorts retire.
• Thus, for 30-40 years the relative size of the
  labour force increases, boosting economic growth.
  The Med-10 countries are just beginning to get
  the benefit.

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Demography and migration

• The contrasting demographic futures of the EU-25
  and the Med-10 provide the context within which
  migration will occur.
• The underlying demographic forces at work suggest
  that migration into the EU-25 will increase
  substantially, much of it from the Med-10.
• The way in which this occurs will be crucially
  determined by the nature of relationships between
  the EU and Med-10 countries.
• Auguste Comte was not correct to assert that
  Demography is destiny, we can still choose our
  future to a substantial degree. However,
  demography does impose constraints that cannot be
  ignored.