MONETARY POLICY

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MONETARY POLICY

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Title: MONETARY POLICY


1
32
MONETARY POLICY
CHAPTER
2
Objectives
  • After studying this chapter, you will be able to
  • Distinguish among the instruments, ultimate
    goals, and intermediate targets of monetary
    policy and review the Feds performance
  • Describe and compare the performance of a
    monetarist fixed rule and Keynesian feedback
    rules for monetary policy
  • Explain why the outcome of monetary policy
    crucially depends on the Feds credibility
  • Describe and compare the new monetarist and new
    Keynesian feedback rules for monetary policy

3
What Can Monetary Policy Do?
  • In 2001, real GDP shrank and unemployment
    increased.
  • Alan Greenspan cut the interest rate to stimulate
    production and jobs.
  • Were these actions the right ones?
  • Can and should monetary policy try to counter
    recessions?
  • Or should monetary policy focus on price
    stability?

4
Instruments, Goals, Targets, and the Feds
Performance
  • To discuss monetary policy if we distinguish
    among
  • Instruments
  • Goals
  • Intermediate targets

5
Instruments, Goals, Targets, and the Feds
Performance
  • The instruments of monetary policy are
  • Open market operations
  • The discount rate
  • Required reserve ratios
  • The goals of monetary policy are the Feds
    ultimate objectives and are
  • Price level stability
  • Sustainable real GDP growth close to potential
    GDP

6
Instruments, Goals, Targets, and the Feds
Performance
  • The Feds instruments work with an uncertain,
    long, and variable time lag.
  • To assess its actions, the Fed watches
    intermediate targets.
  • The possible intermediate targets are
  • Monetary aggregates (M1 and M2, the monetary
    base)
  • The federal funds rate
  • The Feds intermediate target is the federal
    funds rate.

7
Instruments, Goals, Targets, and the Feds
Performance
  • Price Level Stability
  • Unexpected swings in the inflation rate bring
    costs for borrowers and lenders and employers and
    workers.
  • What Is Price Level Stability?
  • Alan Greenspan defined price level stability as a
    condition in which the inflation rate does not
    feature in peoples economic calculations.
  • An inflation rate between 0 and 3 percent a year
    is generally seen as being consistent with price
    level stability.

8
Instruments, Goals, Targets, and the Feds
Performance
  • Sustainable Real GDP Growth
  • Natural resources and the willingness to save and
    invest in new capital and new technologies limit
    sustainable growth.
  • Monetary policy can contribute to potential GDP
    growth by creating a climate that favors high
    saving and investment rates.
  • Monetary policy can help to limit fluctuations
    around potential GDP.

9
Instruments, Goals, Targets, and the Feds
Performance
  • The Feds Performance 19732003
  • The Feds performance depends on
  • Shocks to the price level
  • Monetary policy actions

10
Instruments, Goals, Targets, and the Feds
Performance
  • Shocks to the price level during the 1970s and
    1980s made the Feds job harder
  • World oil price hikes
  • Large and increasing budget deficits
  • Productivity slowdown
  • These shocks intensified inflation and slowed
    real GDP growth.

11
Instruments, Goals, Targets, and the Feds
Performance
  • Shocks in the 1990s made the Feds job easier.
  • Falling world oil prices
  • Decreasing budget deficits (and eventually a
    budget surplus)
  • New information economy brought more rapid
    productivity growth.

12
Instruments, Goals, Targets, and the Feds
Performance
  • Figure 32.1 summarizes monetary policy 1973-2003.

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14
Instruments, Goals, Targets, and the Feds
Performance
  • There is a tendency for the federal funds rate to
    fall as an election approaches and usually the
    incumbent President or his partys successor wins
    the election.
  • Two exceptions
  • In 1980, interest rates increased, the economy
    slowed, and Jimmy Carter lost his reelection bid.
  • In 1992, interest rates increased, and George
    Bush lost his reelection bid.

15
Instruments, Goals, Targets, and the Feds
Performance
  • Presidents take a keen interest in what the Fed
    is up to.
  • And as the 2004 election approached, the White
    House was watching anxiously, hoping that the Fed
    would continue to favor a low federal funds rate
    and keep the economy expanding.

16
Instruments, Goals, Targets, and the Feds
Performance
  • Figure 32.2 provides a neat way of showing how
    well the Fed has done in shooting at its target.

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18
Achieving Price Level Stability
  • There are two price level problems
  • When the price level is stable, the problem is to
    prevent inflation from breaking out.
  • When inflation is already present, the problem is
    to reduce its rate and restore price level
    stability while doing the least possible damage
    to real GDP growth.

19
Achieving Price Level Stability
  • The monetary policy regimes that can be used to
    stabilize aggregate demand are
  • Fixed-rule policies
  • Feedback-rule policies
  • Discretionary policies

20
Achieving Price Level Stability
  • Fixed-Rule Policies
  • A fixed-rule policy specifies an action to be
    pursued independently of the state of the
    economy.
  • An everyday example of a fixed rule is a stop
    sign--Stop regardless of the state of the road
    ahead.
  • A fixed-rule policy proposed by Milton Friedman
    is to keep the quantity of money growing at a
    constant rate regardless of the state of the
    economy.

21
Achieving Price Level Stability
  • Feedback-Rule Policies
  • A feedback-rule policy specifies how policy
    actions respond to changes in the state of the
    economy.
  • A yield sign is an everyday feedback ruleStop
    if another vehicle is attempting to use the road
    ahead, but otherwise, proceed.
  • A monetary policy feedback-rule is one that
    pushes the interest rate ever higher in response
    to rising inflation and strong real GDP growth
    and ever lower in response to falling inflation
    and recession.

22
Achieving Price Level Stability
  • Discretionary Policies
  • A discretionary policy responds to the state of
    the economy in a possibly unique way that uses
    all the information available, including
    perceived lessons from past mistakes.
  • An everyday discretionary policy occurs at an
    unmarked intersection--each driver uses
    discretion in deciding whether to stop and how
    slowly to approach.
  • Most macroeconomic policy actions have an element
    of discretion because every situation is to some
    degree unique.

23
Achieving Price Level Stability
  • A Monetarist Fixed Rule with Aggregate Demand
    Shocks
  • If monetary policy follows a monetarist fixed
    rule in the face of an aggregate demand shock
  • Aggregate demand fluctuates
  • Real GDP and the price level fluctuate between
    recession and boom.

24
Achieving Price Level Stability
  • Figure 32.3 shows this outcome.
  • On the average, the economy is on aggregate
    demand curve AD0 and short-run aggregate supply
    curve SAS.
  • The price level is 105, and real GDP is 10
    trillion.

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Achieving Price Level Stability
  • Aggregate demand fluctuates between ADLOW and
    ADHIGH.
  • Real GDP and the price level fluctuate between
    recession and boom.

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28
Achieving Price Level Stability
  • A Keynesian Feedback Rule with Aggregate Demand
    Shocks
  • The Keynesian feedback rule raises the interest
    rate when aggregate demand increases and cuts the
    interest rate when aggregate demand decreases.

29
Achieving Price Level Stability
  • Figure 32.4 illustrates the behavior of the price
    level and real GDP under this feedback-rule
    policy if the policy is implemented well.

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31
Achieving Price Level Stability
  • When aggregate demand decreases to ADLOW, the Fed
    cuts the interest rate to send aggregate demand
    back to AD0.
  • When aggregate demand increases to ADHIGH, the
    Fed raises the interest rate to send aggregate
    demand back to AD0.

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33
Achieving Price Level Stability
  • The ideal feedback rule will keep aggregate
    demand close to AD0 so that the price level
    remains almost constant and real GDP remains
    close to potential GDP.
  • A feedback policy might be implemented badly with
    greater fluctuations in the price level and real
    GDP than with a fixed rule.

34
Achieving Price Level Stability
  • Policy Lags and the Forecast Horizon
  • The effects of policy actions taken today are
    spread out over the next two years or even more.
  • The Fed cannot forecast that far ahead.
  • The Fed cant predict the precise timing and
    magnitude of the effects of its policy actions.
  • A feedback policy that reacts to todays economy
    might be wrong for the economy at that uncertain
    future date when the policys effects are felt.

35
Achieving Price Level Stability
  • Stabilizing Aggregate Supply Shocks
  • Two types of shock occur to bring fluctuations in
    aggregate supply
  • Productivity growth fluctuations
  • Fluctuations in cost-push pressure

36
Achieving Price Level Stability
  • Monetarist Fixed Rule with a Productivity Shock
  • A productivity growth slowdown decreases long-run
    aggregate supply.
  • With a fixed rule, aggregate demand is unchanged
  • Real GDP decreases and the price level rises.

37
Achieving Price Level Stability
  • Figure 32.5 shows this outcome.
  • With no shock, aggregate demand is AD0 and
    long-run aggregate supply is LAS0.
  • The price level is 105 and real GDP is 10
    trillion at point A.

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39
Achieving Price Level Stability
  • A productivity growth slowdown shifts the
    long-run aggregate supply curve leftward to LAS1.
  • With a fixed rule, aggregate demand remains at
    AD0.
  • Real GDP decreases to 9.5 trillion and the price
    level rises to 120 at point B.

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41
Achieving Price Level Stability
  • Feedback Rules with Productivity Shock
  • Real GDP stability conflicts with price stability
    in the face of a productivity shock.
  • So there are two possible feedback rules
  • Rule to stabilize real GDP
  • Rule to stabilize the price level

42
Achieving Price Level Stability
  • Feedback Rule to Stabilize Real GDP
  • Suppose that the Feds feedback rule is When
    real GDP decreases, cut the interest rate to
    increase aggregate demand.
  • This policy brings a rise in the price level but
    does not prevent the decrease in real GDP.
  • Figure 32.6 shows this outcome.

43
Achieving Price Level Stability
  • When real GDP decreases to 9.5 trillion, the Fed
    cuts the interest rate and increases aggregate
    demand to AD1.
  • Real GDP remains at 9.5 trillion and the price
    level rises to 125 at point C.
  • This case the attempt to stabilize real GDP has
    no effect on real GDP but destabilizes the price
    level.

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45
Achieving Price Level Stability
  • Feedback Rule to Stabilize the Price Level
  • Suppose that the Feds feedback rule is When the
    price level rises, raise the interest rate to
    decrease aggregate demand.
  • In this case, the price level is stable and real
    GDP is unaffected by the monetary policy
  • Again, Figure 32.6 shows the outcome.

46
Achieving Price Level Stability
  • When the price level rises above 105, the Fed
    increases the interest rate and decreases
    aggregate demand to AD2.
  • The price level remains at 105 and real GDP
    remains at 9.5 trillion at point D.

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48
Achieving Price Level Stability
  • When a productivity shock occurs, a feedback rule
    that targets the price level delivers a more
    stable price level and has no adverse effects on
    real GDP.

49
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50
Achieving Price Level Stability
  • Monetarist Fixed Rule with a Cost-Push Inflation
    Shock
  • If the Fed follows a monetarist fixed rule, it
    holds aggregate demand constant when a cost-push
    inflation shock occurs.
  • Real GDP decreases and the price level
    risesstagflation.

51
Achieving Price Level Stability
  • Figure 32.7(a) shows this outcome.
  • The economy starts out at full employment at
    point A.
  • A cost-push inflation shock shifts the SAS curve
    leftward from SAS0 to SAS1.

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53
Achieving Price Level Stability
  • The Fed takes no policy action and the aggregate
    demand curve remains at AD0.
  • The price level rises to 115, and real GDP
    decreases to 9.5 trillion at point B.
  • The economy has experienced stagflation.

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55
Achieving Price Level Stability
  • There is a recessionary gap that eventually
    lowers the money wage rate and returns the
    economy to full employment.
  • But this adjustment takes a long time.

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57
Achieving Price Level Stability
  • Feedback Rules with Cost-Push Inflation Shock
  • Again, there are two feedback rules
  • Rule to stabilize real GDP
  • Rule to stabilize the price level

58
Achieving Price Level Stability
  • Feedback rule to stabilize real GDP
  • When a cost-push inflation shock occurs, the Fed
    cuts the interest rate and increases aggregate
    demand.
  • The price level rises and real GDP returns to
    potential GDP.
  • If the Fed keeps responding to repeated cost-push
    shocks in this way, a cost-push inflation takes
    hold.
  • Figure 32.7(b) shows this outcome.

59
Achieving Price Level Stability
  • When a cost-push inflation shock sends the
    economy to point B, the Fed cuts the interest
    rate and increases aggregate demand to AD1.
  • The price level rises to 120, and real GDP
    returns to 10 trillion at point C.
  • The economy has experienced cost-push inflation
    that could become an ongoing inflation.

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61
Achieving Price Level Stability
  • Feedback Rule to Stabilize the Price Level
  • A cost-push inflation shock leads the Fed to
    raise the interest rate and decreases aggregate
    demand.
  • The Fed avoids cost-push inflation but at the
    cost of deep recession.
  • Figure 32.7(c) shows this outcome.

62
Achieving Price Level Stability
  • A cost-push inflation shock sends the economy to
    point B
  • The Fed raises the interest rate and decreases
    aggregate demand to AD2.
  • The price level falls to 105, and real GDP
    decreases to 8.5 trillion at point D.
  • The Fed has avoided cost-push inflation but at
    the cost of recession.

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Policy Credibility
  • A policy that is credible works much better than
    one that surprises.
  • Contrast two cases
  • A surprise inflation reduction
  • A credible announced inflation reduction

65
Policy Credibility
  • A Surprise Inflation Reduction
  • Figure 32.8(a) shows the economy at full
    employment on aggregate demand curve AD0 and
    short-run aggregate supply curve SAS0.
  • Real GDP is 10 trillion, and the price level is
    105.

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67
Policy Credibility
  • The expected inflation rate is 10 percent.
  • So next year, aggregate demand is expected to be
    AD1 and the money wage rate increases to shift
    the short-run aggregate supply curve SAS1.

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69
Policy Credibility
  • If expectations are fulfilled, the price level
    rises to 115.5a 10 percent inflationand real
    GDP remains at potential GDP.
  • Now suppose that the Fed unexpectedly decides to
    slow inflation.

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71
Policy Credibility
  • The Fed raises the interest rate and slows
    aggregate demand growth.
  • The aggregate demand curve shifts rightward to
    AD2.
  • Real GDP decreases to 9.5 trillion, and the
    price level rises to 113.4an inflation rate of 8
    percent a year.

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Policy Credibility
  • Figure 32.8(b) shows the same events using the
    Phillips curve.
  • The economy at full employment on long run
    Phillips curve, LRPC, and short-run Phillips
    curve, SRPC0.
  • Inflation is 10 percent and unemployment 6
    percent.

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Policy Credibility
  • When the Fed increases the interest rate, the
    economy moves along the short-run Phillips curve
    SRPC0 as unemployment rises to 9 percent and
    inflation falls to 8 percent a year.

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Policy Credibility
  • The Feds policy has succeeded in slowing
    inflation, but at the cost of recession.
  • Real GDP is below potential GDP, and unemployment
    is above its natural rate.

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Policy Credibility
  • A Credible Announced Inflation Reduction
  • Suppose the Fed announces its intention to slow
    inflation to 5 percent.
  • Suppose also that the Feds policy announcement
    is credible and convincing.
  • The expected inflation rate becomes 5 percent a
    year.

80
Policy Credibility
  • In Figure 32.8(a), the SAS curve shifts to SAS2.
  • Aggregate demand increases by the amount
    expected, and the aggregate demand curve shifts
    to AD2.
  • The price level rises to 110.25inflation is 5
    percentand real GDP remains at potential GDP.

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82
Policy Credibility
  • In Figure 32.8(b), the lower expected inflation
    rate shifts the short-run Phillips curve downward
    to SRPC1, and inflation falls to 5 percent a
    year, while unemployment remains at its natural
    rate of 6 percent.

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84
Policy Credibility
  • A credible announced inflation reduction lowers
    inflation but with no accompanying recession or
    increase in unemployment.

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86
Policy Credibility
  • Inflation Reduction in Practice
  • When the Fed in fact slowed inflation in 1981, we
    paid a high price.
  • The Feds policy action to end inflation was not
    credible.
  • Could the Fed have lowered inflation without
    causing recession by telling people far enough
    ahead of time that it did indeed plan to lower
    inflation?
  • The answer appears to be no.
  • People expect the Fed to behave in line with its
    record, not with its stated intentions.

87
New Monetarist and New Keynesian Feedback Rules
  • A monetarist rule
  • Prevents cost-push inflation at the cost of
    recession
  • Brings price level fluctuations in the face of
    productivity shocks
  • Brings price level and real GDP fluctuations in
    the face of aggregate demand fluctuations

88
New Monetarist and New Keynesian Feedback Rules
  • A Keynesian feedback rule that targets real GDP
  • Brings cost-push inflation
  • Might not moderate fluctuations in the price
    level and real GDP that stem from aggregate
    demand shocks
  • A Keynesian feedback rule that targets the price
    level
  • Prevents cost-push inflation but at an even
    greater cost of recession than that of a
    monetarist fixed rule.

89
New Monetarist and New Keynesian Feedback Rules
  • None of these rules work well, and none is a
    sufficiently credible rule for the Fed to commit
    to.
  • In an attempt to develop a rule that is credible
    and that works well, economists have explored
    policies that respond to both the price level and
    real GDP.
  • Two such policy rules are the
  • McCallum Rule
  • Taylor Rule

90
New Monetarist and New Keynesian Feedback Rules
  • The McCallum Rule
  • Suggested by Bennett T. McCallum, an economics
    professor at Carnegie-Mellon University, the
    McCallum rule says
  • Make the monetary base grow at a rate equal to
    the target inflation rate plus the 10-year moving
    average growth rate of real GDP minus the 4-year
    moving average of the growth rate of the velocity
    of circulation of the monetary base.

91
New Monetarist and New Keynesian Feedback Rules
  • If the Fed had a specific target for the
    inflation rate, the McCallum rule would tell the
    Fed the growth rate of monetary base that would
    achieve that target, on the average.
  • Figure 32.9 on the next slide shows how the
    monetary base has grown and how it would have
    grown if it had followed the McCallum rule.

92
New Monetarist and New Keynesian Feedback Rules
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94
New Monetarist and New Keynesian Feedback Rules
  • The Taylor Rule
  • Suggested by John Taylor, formerly an economics
    professor at Stanford University and now
    Undersecretary of the Treasury for International
    Affairs in the Bush administration, the Taylor
    rule says
  • Set the federal funds rate equal to the target
    inflation rate plus 2.5 percent plus one half of
    the gap between the actual inflation rate and the
    target inflation rate plus one half of the
    percentage deviation of real GDP from potential
    GDP.

95
New Monetarist and New Keynesian Feedback Rules
  • Figure 32.10 shows the federal funds rate and the
    rate if the Taylor rule were followed.

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97
New Monetarist and New Keynesian Feedback Rules
  • Differences Between the Rules
  • The McCallum rule and the Taylor rule tell a
    similar story about the inflation of the 1970s
    and the price level stability of the 1990s and
    2000s.
  • During the 1970s, the quantity of money grew too
    rapidly (McCallum rule) and the federal funds
    rate was too low (Taylor rule).

98
New Monetarist and New Keynesian Feedback Rules
  • Differences Between the Rules
  • During the 1990s and 2000s, both the growth rate
    of the quantity of money (McCallum rule) and the
    federal funds rate (Taylor rule) were consistent
    with low inflation and price level stability.
  • But the two rules differ in two important ways
  • Strength of response to output fluctuations
  • Targeting money versus the interest rate

99
New Monetarist and New Keynesian Feedback Rules
  • Choosing Between the Rules
  • Monetarists favor targeting the monetary base
    because they believe that it provides a more
    solid anchor for the price level than does the
    interest rate.
  • Keynesians say that targeting the quantity of
    money would bring excessive swings in the
    interest rate, which in turn would bring
    excessive swings in aggregate expenditure.
  • For this reason, Keynesians favor interest rate
    targeting.
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