Title: Distributed Selfish Replication under Node Churn
1Distributed Selfish Replication under Node Churn
- Eva Jaho, Ioannis Koukoutsidis,
- Ioannis Stavrakakis, Ina Jaho
Advanced Networking Research Group National and
Kapodistrian University of Athens ?ctober 2007
2Overview
- Setting of a distributed replication group
- N nodes, M objects
- rij request rate of node j for object i
- Cj capacity of node j
- tl local access cost, tr remote access cost,
ts access cost from an origin server - Presence of node churn
- each node is active or available with a
certain probability (ON probability) pj
3Access cost of a node under a given placement
- Pj set of objects replicated by node j
- global placement P P1, P2, , PN
- P-j P - Pj
- mean access cost per unit time for node j
- (the cost for an unsuccessful query is negligible)
4Game formulation
- At the beginning of the game, each node has
stored Cj objects in decreasing order of rij
values - During the game, nodes play sequentially and make
changes to their placements so as to decrease
their access cost at the end of the game - Each node knows the global placement P prior to
making its move (some kind of communication
exists) - The game is studied as a dynamic noncooperative
game
5Strategies
- Greedy local strategy nodes locally replicate
their most requested objects - Greedy churn-unaware strategy nodes change their
initial placements to minimize their imminent
access cost. However, they falsely consider other
nodes to be always ON - Greedy churn-aware strategy nodes change their
initial placements to minimize their imminent
access cost, considering the probabilities with
which other nodes are ON
6Greedy churn-aware strategy
- Each node changes its initial placement to
minimize its average access cost immediately
after its move - For an object e replicated at node j, define the
average eviction cost as - For an object i not replicated at node j, define
the average insertion gain as
7Greedy churn-aware strategy (contd.)
- Set of eviction candidates of node j,
- ?j e1j, e2j, , e?jj
- Eviction candidates indexed by increasing costs
Le1,j Le2,j Le?j,j - Set of insertion candidates of node j,
- Ij i1j, i2j, , iIjj
- Insertion candidates indexed by decreasing costs
Gi1,j Gi2,j GiIj,j - Node j makes a maximum number mj of changes ekj
lt- ikj, k1,,mj s.t - (mj min(?j , Ij))
8Greedy churn-aware strategy with multiple rounds
- Each node applies the greedy churn-aware strategy
in each round of the game - The same order of the play is maintained in each
round
Theorem the algorithm ends in a finite number of
rounds irrespective of the order of play in each
round Proof At each step, each player may evict
an object owned by a number of nodes to insert an
object owned by a) a smaller number of nodes (or
none) b) a larger number of nodes with smaller
probability that at least one of them is ON
Hence, at a certain epoch in the future either
all nodes have no objects in common, or no
further replacements are possible
9Equilibrium properties
- The strategy may not arrive in a Nash equilibrium
- Proof
- . . . . .
- 1 2 N-2 N-1
N - We show that the greedy churn-aware strategy
is not always sequentially rational for player
N-1. Suppose both N-1, N evict the same object
e. That is, the following conditions hold - Gi,N-1 gt Le,N-1
- Gi,N gt Le,N (i may be equal to i)
- If Gi,N-1 lt Le,N, then the move e lt- i is not
sequentially rational for node N-1 (Le,N gt
Le,N-1)
10Mistreatment under the greedy churn-aware strategy
Given that the churn-aware strategy is followed
by all nodes, we say a node is mistreated when
its incurred access cost is higher than its
greedy-local cost
- for N2 nodes, mistreatment never occurs (the 2nd
node only evicts objects belonging to the 1st
node, so the access cost of node 1 is not
decreased) - for N3, mistreatment may occur
11Mistreatment under the greedy churn-aware
strategy (contd.)
- In the homogeneous case (rij ? ri for all i, j,
Cj C), where less reliable nodes play first (p1
p2 pN) - If the set of objects evicted by node j1 are
also evicted by node j, for all j 1,, N-1, the
greedy churn-aware strategy is mistreatment-free. - The proof follows by showing that subsequent
nodes have decreasing gain when making the kth
feasible replacement, k 1,2,
12Numerical evaluation
- We study cases where nodes have similar request
rates for objects, so that mutual benefits emerge
by cooperation - Request rates drawn from Zipf distribution
-
- s0.8-0.9
- tl1, tr10, ts100
- N10, M50
- C10
13Case studies
- Case I
- Nodes have the same request rates for each object
- Case II
- Nodes have different request rates and different
priorities for objects
14Access costs (case I)
- Under an LRF order, the greedy churn-aware
strategy significantly improves performance - When all nodes follow the greedy churn-unaware
strategy, MRF better than LRF order - Repeating the greedy churn-aware strategy for
multiple rounds only yields a small benefit to
some nodes
15Access costs (case I-cntd.)
16Potential gains of nodes by playing again after 1
round (case I)
Node 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
LRF 1.52 1.61 0.83 1.93 0 0 0 0 0 0
MRF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Random order 2.81 2.73 0 2.94 2.69 0 0 0 0 0
pj0.5 ?j1N 0.35 0.40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
17Participation gain (case I)
- Gain of a node if it follows the common
churn-aware strategy, vs. keeping the greedy
local placement
18Access costs (case II)
19Mistreatment example
- Set of objects 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, set of nodes
1, 2 - C14, C21
- r10.5, 0.4, 0.3, 0.2, 0.1, r20.4, 0.3, 0.5,
0.2, 0.1 - p10,9, p2 variable
- tl1, tr10, ts100
- Placements
- greedy local P11, 2, 3, 4, P23
- greedy churn-unaware when node 1 plays first
P11, 2, 4, 5, P23 - Greedy churn-aware when node 1 plays first
- P11, 2, 3, 4, P25 when p2 0.74
- P11, 2, 4, 5, P23 when p2 gt 0.74
20Mistreatment example (cntd.)
- The greedy churn-unaware strategy causes
mistreatment - to node 1 when p20.74
- The greedy churn-aware strategy is always better
than - the greedy local
21Conclusions
- In the majority of test cases, the greedy
churn-aware strategy - reduces access cost over the greedy local and
greedy churn-unaware strategy in most of the
nodes - alleviates mistreatment problems
- the LRF order is fair and incites nodes to
participate in the game