Title: Asian crisis
1Asian crisis IMFs role
MSc International Finance Course
International Finance Course Leader Dr. Michel
Henry Bouchet
Group 2 Sigve Dyrnes, Ivar Moesman, Eirik
Mjelde, Clint Hogestyn Espen Øyen
2Asian crisis
- The floating of the Thai Bath 2nd July 97 was
followed by an immediate fierce depreciation - A series of speculative attacks on the Bath
- Realisation of the serious underlying economic
conditions - Stock and real-estate prices plummeted
- Panic and loss of confidence
- Capital flight
3Background
What happened?
IMFs intervention
Critisism of IMFs intervention
Lessons learned
4Countries directly involved
- Indonesia
- Thailand
- South Korea
- Philippines
- Malaysia
5Background on the asian region
- High growth because of optimism both from
domestic and foreign investors, money pouring in - Low inflation, solid growth in exports, healthy
government economy, including huge reserves in
foreign assets(capital account), current account
surplus. - High saving rate 30 of GDP
6Background of the crisis
- Failure to dampen overheating preassures
- Lax prudential rules and financial oversight
- No collateralised loans
- Large inflows
- No risk assesment
- Moral hazard problem
- Fixed exhange-rates to the dollar
7Background of the crisis
- Dollar appreciated against yen 95-97
- Tigers less competitive
- CA deficits widened
- Realisation of the bad economic conditions-
despite the previous high growth - Highly leveraged firms(unable to pay off the
debt, red.exports) - Risky, non-profitable investments
- Highly inflated prices on real-estate,
stock-prices (moral hazard, explanation?) - Bad governance
- Short-term borrowing
8Yield
Invest LT
Spread
Borrow ST
Time
9Short term bank liabilities rose before the crisis
Source Bouchet, Clark, Groslambert, 2001
10Background
What happened?
IMFs intervention
Critisism of IMFs intervention
Lessons learned
11Outbreak
- Creditors refused to roll-over short term debt
- Foreign investors sold their Asian stocks
- Devaluation of the asian currencies
- Stock-prices, real-estate prices tumbled
- Panic spread rapidly with spill-over effects
towards Eastern Europe and Latin America - Bankruptcies
12Currency depreciated
Source IMF
13Stock markets
Source IMF
14Background
What happened?
IMFs intervention
Critisism of IMFs intervention
Lessons learned
15IMFs role
- Crisis prevention and short-term financing of
temporary balance of payments problems with
macro-economic stabilization programs
16IMFs immediate response
- Helping Indonesia, Korea and Thailand by
arranging programs of economic stabilisation and
reforms that could restore confidence and be
supported by the IMF
17The program consisted of 3 parts
IMF program
Structural
Macroeconomic
Financial
18The IMF provided US35B
- The IMF gave financial support to eliminate the
liquidity squeeze in Indonesia, Korea and
Thailand - Short term debt, roll-over problems
- To avoid the liquidity problem to turn into
solvency problems - A further US85B was provided by other sources
19Source IMF
20Monetary and fiscal policy was tightened
- Increase of the interest rate
- Prevent further depreciation
- Halt inflation
- Encourage equity financing
- Depreciation vs increase of interest rate
- Companies with foreign denominated debt is likely
to suffer far more from a pro-longed currency
depreciation than a temporary Increase of
interest rates - Fiscal tightening in Thailand to reverse an
increase of the deficit
21Interest rates
Source IMF
22Exhange rates
Source IMF
23Structural reforms were initiated
- Financial sector reforms
- the closure of insolvent financial institutions
- the recapitalization of potentially viable
financial institutions - close central bank supervision of weak financial
institutions - a strengthening of financial supervision and
regulation, to prevent a recurrence of the
fragilities that had led to the crisis - Corporate debt restructuring
24The signs of recovery came late
- The IMF programs were inititally less succesful
than hoped - Capital outflows
- Further depreciation
- The countries experienced much deeper recessions
than projected - Collapse in domestic spending
- Financial markets stabilized early 1998 in Korea
and Thailand, and in late 1999 in Indonesia
25Background
What happened?
IMFs intervention
Critisism of IMFs intervention
Lessons learned
26The IMF did not predict the crisis
- Implied volatilities were same or higher than
those at the height at Latin America crisis in
early 1990 - International lenders weighted towards shorter
maturities as an exit strategy - the crisis was expected by the market
27Reforms were too tough?
- Interest rates settled too high
- Strangled complete economy
- Standard IMF policy is not sufficient for huge
crisis - Fiscal policy too tight
- Decline in private demand
- Lost total confidence in growth
- Deflationary effect in the region
28- When the IMF acted, it reacted instinctively
- without proper research to find the underlying
reasons for the crisis - The IMF tightened domestic credit
- in economies already at risk from slumping
demand, currencies in free fall and depleted
reserves - Standard IMF policy
- This crisis had different characteristics from
the crisis the IMF was used to dealing with.
Usual crisis - 1 !large! budged deficet (not the case)
- 2 Hyper-inflation (not the case)
- Fiscal policy
- The taxes were too high, or the government
spending too low
29Inaccurate focus
- Program did not focus enough on the financial
sector and corporate issues - Capital controls were imposed too late, corporate
governance
30IMF intervention leads to Moral hazard?
- Far fetched notion
- Country would not deliberately court such a
crisis - Investors also bear losses
- Firms and Financial institutions go bankrupt
- Lenders forced to write down claims
31IMF does not have the adequate resources to deal
with such a crisis
- The IMF functions are limited
- Supervisory role
- Temporary financing
- Much of the debt in Asia was private
- Governments were reluctant to take on the package
provided by the IMF mostly due to the tough
demands
32Background
What happened?
IMFs intervention
Critisism of IMFs intervention
Lessons learned
33Stronger efforts at crisis prevention
- Strengthened surveillance, particularly with
regard to the vulnerability of the exchange rate
and the financial system - Greater transparency of economic and financial
developments
34IMF did their best given available information
- IMFs main role is to attack BoP problems
- IMF expected a minor slowdown
- When they realised that the region suffered from
more serious problems, they eased the measures - Should IMF in the future have greater
responsiblility concerning private sector
supervision? - More cooperation between the different
supervisory institutions
35Q As