Title: Unit Outline Qualitative Risk Analysis
1Unit OutlineQualitative Risk Analysis
- Module 1 Qualitative Risk Analysis
- Module 2 Determine Assets and Vulnerabilities
- Module 3 Determine Threats and Controls
- ? Module 4 Matrix Based Approach
- Module 5 Case Study
- Module 6 Summary
2Module 4Matrix Based Approach
3Matrix Based ApproachLearning Objectives
- Students should be able to
- Understand how to determine risk posture.
- Comprehend a risk aggregation model.
- Recognize the need for optimization of risk.
- Use the matrix-based approach to determine risk
4Matrix-Based ApproachRisk Posture
- Individual risks aggregated Total risk posture
- True comparison of relative risks of different
organizations - Mathematical approach for aggregation provided
- Methodology standardized
- Data needs to be customized to organization
- Controls can reduce the cost of exposure
- Need to determine optimum
- controls for organization
- Methodology for determining
- controls shown next slide
- Analysis should be undertaken to see
- the impact of new projects on security
5Matrix-Based ApproachModel
- Let
- A be a vector of loss of an asset where al is the
lth asset, s.t., 0 lt l lt L - V be a vector of vulnerabilities where vk is the
kth vulnerability, s.t., 0 lt k lt K - T be a vector of threats where tj is the jth
asset, s.t., 0 lt j lt J - C be the vector of controls where ci is the ith
control, s.t., 0 lt i lt I - Also Ma be the matrix that defines the impact of
vulnerabilities (breach in security) on assets,
where, akl is the impact of kth vulnerability on
the lth asset - Also Mß be the matrix that defines the impact of
threats on the vulnerabilities, where, ßjk is the
impact of jth threat on kth vulnerability - Also M? be the matrix that defines the impact of
a controls (breach in security) on the threats,
where, ?ij is the impact of ith control on the
jth threat
The notation is graphically explained in the next
few slides
6Matrix-Based ApproachModel, contd.
A (Assets)
- Data Collection
- Primary Data from corporations that track
financial losses due to different attacks - Secondary Data from the reports of financial loss
from organizations like CERT, CSI/FBI and AIG - Data specific to a corporation, could perhaps be
classified into different groups of companies
akl
V (Vulnerabilities)
L
K
- Where akl is the Impact of vulnerability k on
given asset l. - i.e. fraction of the asset value that will be
lost if the vulnerability is exploited
7Matrix-Based ApproachModel, contd.
V (Vulnerabilities)
- Data Collection
- Threat data and frequency of threats is
information that is routinely collected in CERT
and other such agencies. - Log data and collected data from the organization
itself can be another source of information - Data can also be collected via use of automated
monitoring tools
bjk
T (Threats)
K
J
bjk is the probability that threat j will exploit
vulnerability k
8Matrix-Based ApproachModel, contd.
T (Threats)
- Data Collection
- Approximate control data can be procured from
various industry vendors who have done extensive
testing with tools. - Other sources of data can be independent agencies
which do analysis on tools.
gij
C (Controls)
J
I
gij is the fraction by which controls reduce the
frequency of a threat exploiting a vulnerability
9Matrix-Based ApproachModel, contd.
Then losses if no control exist
Then losses if controls exist
10Risk AggregationOptimization
If ? is the maximum allocated budget for controls
the optimization problem can be formulated as
11Matrix Based ApproachMethodology
- Consists of three matrices
- Vulnerability Matrix Links assets to
vulnerabilities - Threat Matrix Links vulnerabilities to threats
- Control Matrix Links threats to the controls
- Step 1
- Identify the assets compute the relative
importance of assets - Step 2
- List assets in the columns of the matrix.
- List vulnerabilities in the rows within the
matrix. - The value row should contain asset values.
- Rank the assets based on the impact to the
organization. - Compute the aggregate value of relative
importance of different vulnerabilities
12Matrix Based ApproachMethodology
- Step 3
- Add aggregate values of vulnerabilities from
vulnerability matrix to the column side of the
threat matrix - Identify the threats and add them to the row side
of the threat matrix - Determine the relative influence of threats on
the vulnerabilities - Compute aggregate values of importance of
different threats - Step 4
- Add aggregate values of threats from the threat
matrix to the column side of control matrix - Identify the controls and add them to the row
side of the control matrix - Compute aggregate values of importance of
different controls
13Matrix Based ApproachDetermining L/M/H
- There needs to be a threshold for determining the
correlations within the matrices. For each
matrix, the thresholds can be different. This can
be done in two ways - Qualitatively
- determined relative to other correlations
- e.g. asset1/vulnerability1 (L) is much lower than
asset3/vulnerability3 (H) correlation.
asset2/vulnerability2 correlation is in-between
(M) - Quantitatively
- determined by setting limits
- e.g. if no correlation (0), if lower than 10
correlation (L), if lower than 35 medium (M), if
greater than 35 (H)
14Matrix Based ApproachExtension of L/M/H
- Although the example provided gives 4 different
levels (Not Relevant, Low, Medium, and High),
organizations may choose to have more levels for
finer grained evaluation. - For example
- Not Relevant (0)
- Very Low (1)
- Low (2)
- Medium-Low (3)
- Medium (4)
- Medium-High (5)
- High (6)
15Matrix Based ApproachAssets and Vulnerabilities
Assets Costs
Scale Not Relevant - 0 Low 1 Medium 3 High 9
Relative Impact
Value
Vulnerabilities
- Customize matrix to assets vulnerabilities
applicable to case - Compute cost of each asset and put them in the
value row - Determine correlation with vulnerability and
asset (L/M/H) - Compute the sum of product of vulnerability
asset values add to impact column
16Matrix Based ApproachVulnerabilities and Threats
Vulnerabilities
Scale Not Relevant - 0 Low 1 Medium 3 High 9
Relative Threat Importance
Value
Threats
- Complete matrix based on the specific case
- Add values from the Impact column of the previous
matrix - Determine association between threat and
vulnerability - Compute aggregate exposure values by multiplying
impact and the associations
17Matrix Based ApproachThreats and Controls
Threats
Value of Control
Scale Not Relevant - 0 Low 1 Medium 3 High 9
Value
Controls
- Customize matrix based on the specific case
- Add values from the relative exposure column of
the previous matrix - Determine impact of different controls on
different threats - Compute the aggregate value of benefit of each
control
18Matrix-Based ApproachSummary
- Many methodologies are available for qualitative
risk analysis. - A matrix-based methodology incorporates a model
which allows for aggregation of risks. This
approach - Brings transparency to risk analysis process
- Provides a comprehensive methodology
- Easy to use
- Allows organizations to work with partial data
- More data can be added as made available
- Risk posture can be compared to other
organization's - Determines controls needed to improve security