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Belgian federalism: balancing good governance and solidarity

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... for autonomy or self-rule in Flanders; ... (1997) only 6 % between Flanders & Wallonia ... 17 percent higher in Flanders compared with national average; ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Belgian federalism: balancing good governance and solidarity


1
Belgian federalism balancing good governance
and solidarity
  • Dr. Wilfried Swenden
  • Politics
  • University of Edinburgh

2
Overview
  • 1. Socio-economic differences between Flanders,
    Brussels Wallonia
  • 2. Territorial Transfers
  • Social security
  • Public employment
  • Mechanisms in fiscal federalism
  • 3. Political Agency
  • 4. Is there a solution to the current deadlock?

3
Belgium Flanders/Brussels/Wallonia
4
Socio-economic indicators
  • Belgium a federation of three Regions and three
    Communities (but economic data usually displayed
    at a Regional or sub-Regional level)
  • 2006 (mean average taxable income)
  • 14.026 (Flanders)
  • 12.357 (Wallonia)
  • 11.309 (Brussels)
  • Growth rate of economy (in GNP percentages 00-04)
  • 2.18 (Flanders), 1.9 (Brussels), 1.75 (Wallonia)
  • Unemployment versus share of population
  • 32/58 (Flanders), 52/32 (Wallonia), 16/10
    (Brussels)
  • Conclusion Affluent Flanders, poor Wallonia and
    in terms of average taxable income, also
    relatively poor Brussels

5
Combined with variations in regional identity
  • 1999 elections Linz-Moreno 5 point scale
  • Exclusive or predominant identification with
    Flanders 31.3 percent
  • Exclusive or predominant identification with
    Wallonia 11.9 percent
  • Flemish Belgium 42.2 / WalloniaBelgium 41.8
  • Exclusive or predominant identification with
    Belgium (in Flanders) 28.4
  • Exclusive or predominant identification with
    Belgium (in Wallonia) 44.5

6
Gives rise to
  • Stronger demands for autonomy or self-rule in
    Flanders
  • In a context of relative affluence frequently
    takes the form of we want our money back
  • size of transfers from North to South should be
    diminished
  • Regional spending autonomy should be matched by
    higher levels of fiscal autonomy

7
Transfers North-South
  • Figures are contested (examples)
  • Welfare expenditures roughly in proportion to
    regional population, but contributions fall
    disproportionally on Flemish shoulders (63gt58.1)
  • 92.1 billion BEFr (1999), 0.98 GDP, of which
    roughly 75 benefit Wallonia 25 percent BRU
  • Territorial variations in social security
    expenditures count for less than 20 percent
    transfer
  • Bulk transfer is the product of higher
    contributory capacity Flemish population
  • Van Gompel annual transfers from Flanders amount
    to 6.6 billion (2003), or 4.2 percent of
    primary income 57 percent originate from social
    security, 23.6 percent as a result of federal
    budget operations and only (19.9 percent)
    through funding of Regions Communities

8
Funding regional entities (primarily shared
taxes) SML
9
However, transfers contribute to alleviating
poverty in Francophone Belgium
  • Study by Cantillon, De Maesschalk, Rottiers
    Verbist (WEP, 2006 1034-1056)
  • Composition of disposable income
  • Per capita difference (1997) only 6 between
    Flanders Wallonia
  • However, in Flanders 64 generated through work,
    28 through social security (income replacement
    schemes or cost-covering benefits)
  • In Wallonia, comparable figures are respectively
    57 and 34 percent
  • Earned income 17 percent higher in Flanders
    compared with national average
  • Transfers contribute to narrow income
    inequality between Flanders and Wallonia by 75
    percent
  • If taxes and social contributions in Flanders are
    levelled to the Walloon level, and income from
    social security in Wallonia is lowered to the
    Flemish level, average household income in
    Flanders would increase by 7 percent and decrease
    in Wallonia by 4 percent poverty risk would rise
    in Wallonia from 13 to 18 percent (Cantillon
    et.al, 2006 1046)

10
Balancing solidarity good governance
  • Francophone arguments for retaining the SQ
  • Decentralizing social security or increasing
    regional fiscal autonomy will increase poverty
  • A poorer Wallonia cannot be in the interest of
    Flanders
  • Flemish arguments for more autonomy
  • Walloon economy lacks incentives to do better
  • Labour cost is too high for current health
    Walloon economy, social regulations are too
    generous
  • Universal social protection hinders labour and
    capital mobility
  • Flanders is forced to pay the price for more
    cost-incentive policies of Wallonia, for instance
    in child allowances (higher education) or
    unemployment benefit (due to regionalization
    monitoring)
  • Echoed by some international institutions
    (example IMF in its most recent report on
    Belgium)

11
Transfers Political Agency
  • Flemish Parliament Five Resolutions 1999
  • The role of political agency
  • Antagonism between Flemish and Francophone
    parties starts to rise sharply in 2004
  • Regional elections won in Flanders by Vlaams
    Belang, and Flemish Christian-Democrats
  • Flemish Christian-Democrats in Flemish government
    but in federal opposition
  • Prior to 2007 federal elections, electoral
    alliance with hard line left-over of Volksunie
  • Nationalist outbidding works due to absence of a
    statewide party system or with the exception of
    Brussels (and periphery) impossibility to
    sanction parties from other language group ?
    moderate stance is too costly
  • Roland Noury show how linguistic divide has
    become more pronounced after 2003 in federal
    parliament and forms a second cleavage alongside
    government-opposition divide
  • Francophone parties see themselves increasingly
    as legitimate voice for Belgian interest, and
    portray doom scenario, in part fuelled by RTBF
    fake news report on Bye, Bye, Belgium
    December 2006

12
Flanders autonomy is a matter of Good
Governance (degelijk bestuur)
  • homogeneous policy packages example science
    policy
  • Tailor policies to regionally divergent
    priorities (transport)
  • Adjust policies to very different circumstances
    on the ground (youth versus old age unemployment)
  • Responsive/accountable government (fiscal
    autonomy) Flanders raises only 15 percent of
    what it spends

13
Examples from Flemish party manifestoes
  • Vlaams Belang
  • Federalism is a strategy to of the Francophone
    parties to gain concessions from the Flemish
  • The priority of the Francophone parties is to
    prune away Flemish welfare and to frenchify
    Flemish Brabant
  • NVA
  • Belgium is governed by the Parti Socialiste
  • Belgium should become a weak confederation of two
    Communities
  • Flanders sustains welfare dependent culture of
    Wallonia
  • CDV
  • Genuine solidarity implies more equitable
    distribution of public investments and a more
    objective allocation of social security revenues
  • Regions should be authorised to levy personal
    income and corporate income tax
  • Regions or Communities should control health care
    and family allowances, employment, public
    transport, telecommunications, science, justice
    policing
  • Similar demands are raised by some interest
    groups (especially VOKA, Flemish chamber of
    commerce industry), VEV, Flemish economic union

14
Francophone Belgium
  • Parti Socialiste the unity and identity of our
    country are clearly undermined when one seeks to
    regionalize competencies such as labour, health
    care of family allowances. We touch here upon the
    core of our social solidarity (PS 2007)
  • Point at reverse direction of transfers in the
    past
  • Point at solidarity in different matters
    (reduction of gas emissions, Flanders relies on
    Wallonia for at least a quarter of its water
    supply)
  • MR policy fragmentation may be solved by
    returning powers to the centre or co-operation
    between regions should be enhanced (for instance
    employment agencies in order to increase labour
    mobility) yet social security in all its
    dimensions health insurance, pensions, family
    allowances, unemployment insurance, health and
    safety at the workplace) should remain an
    essential mission of the federal state

15
But, also support from
  • Unions
  • We oppose a system of allowances to which
    supplementary schemes could be added which vary
    from one region to another As a matter of
    principle, we can only succeed in safeguarding
    inter-personal solidarity and equal rights by
    keeping labour agreements, labour legislation and
    our social security federal. At a time when we
    are seeking to build a social Europe, we will not
    tolerate the unravelling of our Belgian model
    (Labour Day Speech, Rudy De Leeuw, 1 May 2007)
  • Public Opinion (survey Feb 2007)
  • 92 percent believe that Belgian social security
    sets example for other countries 87 W 80 FL
  • But 54 Fl respondents agree with statement
    that our social security system is the source
    of unacceptable transfers between North and
    South (dismissed by 64 FR)

16
Flemish parties of the left
  • And Flemish political parties (of the left)
  • SP.A transfers grounded in differences in
    economic development and unemployment are fair
  • Decentralization of supplementary (i.e.
    non-income replacement) social schemes can raise
    problems for Brussels
  • However, support regionalization of labour market
    policy regional employment agencies are in a
    better position to assess who is fit to enter the
    labour market, what social assistance the
    regionally unemployed require and who should
    require vocational support.
  • Coordination mechanisms at federal level should
    ensure that Regions are held responsible for
    regional labour market policies (i.e. monitor the
    implications of their policies on social security
    expenditures)

17
Outcome
  • Clash of opinions prior to elections
  • Centre-right government, but with inclusion PS
  • Absence of agreement on conclusive state reform
    resulted in interim federal government (Christmas
    2007 Easter 2008)
  • Due to mutual veto position both language
    communities, no prospect yet of a substantial
    state reform the jury is out (July 2008)
  • Interim agreement (25 February) envisages
  • Regionalization of labour market policy, without
    touching upon inter-personal solidarity, and
    especially social security
  • A discussion on some aspect of health care policy
    or family policy
  • A reform that seeks to strengthen the
    participation and co-decision of regions at the
    federal level (Senate, IMC, Deliberation
    Committee), as well as a federal electoral
    district
  • Reconsider funding of Brussels fiscal autonomy
    regions.
  • In parallel commission set up to strengthen
    institutional ties between French Community and
    Walloon Region

18
Furthermore, Brussels periphery
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