Title: Belgian federalism: balancing good governance and solidarity
1Belgian federalism balancing good governance
and solidarity
- Dr. Wilfried Swenden
- Politics
- University of Edinburgh
2Overview
- 1. Socio-economic differences between Flanders,
Brussels Wallonia - 2. Territorial Transfers
- Social security
- Public employment
- Mechanisms in fiscal federalism
- 3. Political Agency
- 4. Is there a solution to the current deadlock?
3Belgium Flanders/Brussels/Wallonia
4Socio-economic indicators
- Belgium a federation of three Regions and three
Communities (but economic data usually displayed
at a Regional or sub-Regional level) - 2006 (mean average taxable income)
- 14.026 (Flanders)
- 12.357 (Wallonia)
- 11.309 (Brussels)
- Growth rate of economy (in GNP percentages 00-04)
- 2.18 (Flanders), 1.9 (Brussels), 1.75 (Wallonia)
- Unemployment versus share of population
- 32/58 (Flanders), 52/32 (Wallonia), 16/10
(Brussels) - Conclusion Affluent Flanders, poor Wallonia and
in terms of average taxable income, also
relatively poor Brussels
5Combined with variations in regional identity
- 1999 elections Linz-Moreno 5 point scale
- Exclusive or predominant identification with
Flanders 31.3 percent - Exclusive or predominant identification with
Wallonia 11.9 percent - Flemish Belgium 42.2 / WalloniaBelgium 41.8
- Exclusive or predominant identification with
Belgium (in Flanders) 28.4 - Exclusive or predominant identification with
Belgium (in Wallonia) 44.5
6Gives rise to
- Stronger demands for autonomy or self-rule in
Flanders - In a context of relative affluence frequently
takes the form of we want our money back - size of transfers from North to South should be
diminished - Regional spending autonomy should be matched by
higher levels of fiscal autonomy
7Transfers North-South
- Figures are contested (examples)
- Welfare expenditures roughly in proportion to
regional population, but contributions fall
disproportionally on Flemish shoulders (63gt58.1) - 92.1 billion BEFr (1999), 0.98 GDP, of which
roughly 75 benefit Wallonia 25 percent BRU - Territorial variations in social security
expenditures count for less than 20 percent
transfer - Bulk transfer is the product of higher
contributory capacity Flemish population - Van Gompel annual transfers from Flanders amount
to 6.6 billion (2003), or 4.2 percent of
primary income 57 percent originate from social
security, 23.6 percent as a result of federal
budget operations and only (19.9 percent)
through funding of Regions Communities
8Funding regional entities (primarily shared
taxes) SML
9However, transfers contribute to alleviating
poverty in Francophone Belgium
- Study by Cantillon, De Maesschalk, Rottiers
Verbist (WEP, 2006 1034-1056) - Composition of disposable income
- Per capita difference (1997) only 6 between
Flanders Wallonia - However, in Flanders 64 generated through work,
28 through social security (income replacement
schemes or cost-covering benefits) - In Wallonia, comparable figures are respectively
57 and 34 percent - Earned income 17 percent higher in Flanders
compared with national average - Transfers contribute to narrow income
inequality between Flanders and Wallonia by 75
percent - If taxes and social contributions in Flanders are
levelled to the Walloon level, and income from
social security in Wallonia is lowered to the
Flemish level, average household income in
Flanders would increase by 7 percent and decrease
in Wallonia by 4 percent poverty risk would rise
in Wallonia from 13 to 18 percent (Cantillon
et.al, 2006 1046)
10Balancing solidarity good governance
- Francophone arguments for retaining the SQ
- Decentralizing social security or increasing
regional fiscal autonomy will increase poverty - A poorer Wallonia cannot be in the interest of
Flanders - Flemish arguments for more autonomy
- Walloon economy lacks incentives to do better
- Labour cost is too high for current health
Walloon economy, social regulations are too
generous - Universal social protection hinders labour and
capital mobility - Flanders is forced to pay the price for more
cost-incentive policies of Wallonia, for instance
in child allowances (higher education) or
unemployment benefit (due to regionalization
monitoring) - Echoed by some international institutions
(example IMF in its most recent report on
Belgium)
11Transfers Political Agency
- Flemish Parliament Five Resolutions 1999
- The role of political agency
- Antagonism between Flemish and Francophone
parties starts to rise sharply in 2004 - Regional elections won in Flanders by Vlaams
Belang, and Flemish Christian-Democrats - Flemish Christian-Democrats in Flemish government
but in federal opposition - Prior to 2007 federal elections, electoral
alliance with hard line left-over of Volksunie - Nationalist outbidding works due to absence of a
statewide party system or with the exception of
Brussels (and periphery) impossibility to
sanction parties from other language group ?
moderate stance is too costly - Roland Noury show how linguistic divide has
become more pronounced after 2003 in federal
parliament and forms a second cleavage alongside
government-opposition divide - Francophone parties see themselves increasingly
as legitimate voice for Belgian interest, and
portray doom scenario, in part fuelled by RTBF
fake news report on Bye, Bye, Belgium
December 2006
12Flanders autonomy is a matter of Good
Governance (degelijk bestuur)
- homogeneous policy packages example science
policy - Tailor policies to regionally divergent
priorities (transport) - Adjust policies to very different circumstances
on the ground (youth versus old age unemployment) - Responsive/accountable government (fiscal
autonomy) Flanders raises only 15 percent of
what it spends
13Examples from Flemish party manifestoes
- Vlaams Belang
- Federalism is a strategy to of the Francophone
parties to gain concessions from the Flemish - The priority of the Francophone parties is to
prune away Flemish welfare and to frenchify
Flemish Brabant - NVA
- Belgium is governed by the Parti Socialiste
- Belgium should become a weak confederation of two
Communities - Flanders sustains welfare dependent culture of
Wallonia - CDV
- Genuine solidarity implies more equitable
distribution of public investments and a more
objective allocation of social security revenues - Regions should be authorised to levy personal
income and corporate income tax - Regions or Communities should control health care
and family allowances, employment, public
transport, telecommunications, science, justice
policing - Similar demands are raised by some interest
groups (especially VOKA, Flemish chamber of
commerce industry), VEV, Flemish economic union
14Francophone Belgium
- Parti Socialiste the unity and identity of our
country are clearly undermined when one seeks to
regionalize competencies such as labour, health
care of family allowances. We touch here upon the
core of our social solidarity (PS 2007) - Point at reverse direction of transfers in the
past - Point at solidarity in different matters
(reduction of gas emissions, Flanders relies on
Wallonia for at least a quarter of its water
supply) - MR policy fragmentation may be solved by
returning powers to the centre or co-operation
between regions should be enhanced (for instance
employment agencies in order to increase labour
mobility) yet social security in all its
dimensions health insurance, pensions, family
allowances, unemployment insurance, health and
safety at the workplace) should remain an
essential mission of the federal state
15But, also support from
- Unions
- We oppose a system of allowances to which
supplementary schemes could be added which vary
from one region to another As a matter of
principle, we can only succeed in safeguarding
inter-personal solidarity and equal rights by
keeping labour agreements, labour legislation and
our social security federal. At a time when we
are seeking to build a social Europe, we will not
tolerate the unravelling of our Belgian model
(Labour Day Speech, Rudy De Leeuw, 1 May 2007) - Public Opinion (survey Feb 2007)
- 92 percent believe that Belgian social security
sets example for other countries 87 W 80 FL - But 54 Fl respondents agree with statement
that our social security system is the source
of unacceptable transfers between North and
South (dismissed by 64 FR)
16Flemish parties of the left
- And Flemish political parties (of the left)
- SP.A transfers grounded in differences in
economic development and unemployment are fair - Decentralization of supplementary (i.e.
non-income replacement) social schemes can raise
problems for Brussels - However, support regionalization of labour market
policy regional employment agencies are in a
better position to assess who is fit to enter the
labour market, what social assistance the
regionally unemployed require and who should
require vocational support. - Coordination mechanisms at federal level should
ensure that Regions are held responsible for
regional labour market policies (i.e. monitor the
implications of their policies on social security
expenditures)
17Outcome
- Clash of opinions prior to elections
- Centre-right government, but with inclusion PS
- Absence of agreement on conclusive state reform
resulted in interim federal government (Christmas
2007 Easter 2008) - Due to mutual veto position both language
communities, no prospect yet of a substantial
state reform the jury is out (July 2008) - Interim agreement (25 February) envisages
- Regionalization of labour market policy, without
touching upon inter-personal solidarity, and
especially social security - A discussion on some aspect of health care policy
or family policy - A reform that seeks to strengthen the
participation and co-decision of regions at the
federal level (Senate, IMC, Deliberation
Committee), as well as a federal electoral
district - Reconsider funding of Brussels fiscal autonomy
regions. - In parallel commission set up to strengthen
institutional ties between French Community and
Walloon Region
18Furthermore, Brussels periphery