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Initial Public Offerings

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Private companies are usually smaller (but think of IKEA, Mittal Steel (Ispat ... than investors signaling by underpricing as a response to the lemons problem ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Initial Public Offerings


1
Initial Public Offerings
  • Private and Public companies
  • Private (privately held) companies have fewer
    shareholders and their shares are NOT freely
    traded
  • Public (publicly held) companies have their
    shares traded publicly on a stock exchange
    without restrictions, they have large number of
    shareholders
  • Private companies are usually smaller (but think
    of IKEA, Mittal Steel (Ispat International) until
    1997)
  • Public companies are subject to much stricter
    rules and regulations (e.g. disclosure, financial
    reporting), must have a board of directors
  • IPO is the first sale of stock by a company to
    the public.

2
A bit on the mechanics of IPO
  • 3 players
  • Issuer
  • Investment Bank (Underwriter)
  • Investors
  • Issuer supply audited financial statements and
    prepare a prospectus (details of the company)
  • Investment Bank conducts a due diligence
    investigation and helps to price and place the
    offer
  • Road Show presentation of securities to
    potential buyers (mainly institutional investors)

3
Reasons for Going Public(see Röell (1996))
  • New Finance
  • Direct. Funds raised at IPO
  • Indirect. Helps to raise funds in the future
  • Reduction in leverage (mitigates debt overhang
    and other problems of debt). But why not private
    placement? ??
  • Increase in liquidity of stock and
    diversification.
  • Liquidity is valuable per se, but in addition it
    helps to raise funds in the future (more precise
    information about a firms value helps to attract
    finance)
  • Increased competition among suppliers of finance

4
Reasons for Going Public (cont-d)
  • Greater dispersion of ownership mitigates the
    problem of overmonitoring of managers by
    shareholders (will be discussed in detail at the
    end)
  • Enhanced company image and publicity
  • Visibility of the company and its products
  • Motivating management and employees
  • E.g. through conditioning compensation on the
    stock price (stock-based compensation)
  • Cashing in
  • Exploiting mispricing
  • Timing issues to take advantage of swings in
    investor sentiment
  • Other benefits (unexpected side effects)
  • Closer working relationships with professional
    advisers (esp. brokers)
  • Formulation of a clearly defined strategy for
    growth
  • Improved management and organizational and
    financial structure

5
Costs of Going Public
  • Direct costs (underwriting, auditing and legal
    fees, effort)
  • Cost of information disclosure
  • Underpricing
  • Cost of constraining business decisions
  • Tax implications
  • Greater transparency of accounts may lead to more
    taxes paid
  • Danger of loss of control

6
Underpricing at IPO
  • Widely documented phenomenon offering price is
    typically lower than the market price of the
    shares right after the IPO
  • Ritter and Welch (2002), US data (but the same
    seems to be true for other countries too)
  • In the sample of 6,249 IPOs from 1980 to 2001 the
    average first-day return is 18.8 percent.
  • About 70 percent of the IPOs end the first day of
    trading at a closing price greater than the offer
    price and about 16 percent have a first-day
    return of zero.

7
Some Theories of Underpricing
  • Theories based on asymmetric information
  • Issuer is better informed than investors
    signaling by underpricing as a response to the
    lemons problem
  • Good firms separate themselves from bad ones by
    offering underpriced stock
  • Some investors are more informed than others and
    the issuer (e.g. about market demand for shares)
  • Winners curse uninformed investors are afraid
    to buy unless the price is sufficiently low. If
    they buy, but informed investors dont, that
    means that they lose money and they do not share
    the losses with informed investors, because
    informed investors DONT buy exactly when the
    issue is overpriced.At the same time, the gains
    in case the issue is underpriced are shared with
    informed investors

8
Some Theories of Underpricing (cont-d)
  • Underwriter is more informed than the issuer
  • To exert better effort, he needs to be
    compensated for using his superior information by
    allowing to offer the issue at easier conditions,
    i.e. at lower price.
  • Informational cascades
  • An investor is looking at whether other investors
    are buying the shares. If there are sufficiently
    many others buying, he concludes that the stock
    is worth buying. If the initial price is too
    high, the firm risks that nobody will start
    buying the shares, hence no cascade will start
  • Some other theories
  • Avoiding legal liabilities (more relevant for the
    US).
  • Drops in prices may trigger lawsuits. So its
    better to have a lower price from the start.
  • Achieving greater liquidity through greater
    ownership dispersion

9
Decision to Go Public
  • The decision to go public should be based on the
    comparison of the mentioned benefits and costs
    (direct and indirect) of doing an IPO
  • Many models focusing on specific costs and
    benefits.
  • In Corporate Finance II we will discuss Zingales
    (1995). In the presence of a prospective
    acquirer, going public first maximizes aggregate
    proceeds from selling a company.
  • Today we will discuss Pagano and Röell (1998)

10
Key References
  • Ritter (1998), Initial Public Offerings,
    bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/rittipo1.pdf
  • Röell (1996), The Decision to Go Public An
    Overview, European Economic Review 40, pp.
    1071-1081
  • Ritter and Welch (2002), A Review of IPO
    Activity, Pricing, and Allocations, Journal of
    Finance, August 2002, pp. 1795-1828
  • Pagano and Röell (1998), The Choice of Stock
    Ownership Structure Agency Costs, Monitoring,
    and The Decision to Go Public, The Quarterly
    Journal of Economics, February 1998, pp. 187-225.
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