Title: The Path to Safe
1The Path to Safe Reliable Care
- Michael Leonard, MD
- Colorado Patient Safety Coalition
- November 9, 2006
2The Healthcare Horizon
- The Perfect Storm increasing demand, decreasing
providers, resource constraints - Safety Quality harm, variation, clinical
outcomes - Changing Expectations providers / patients
- Transparency regulators, business, the public
3LEADERSHIP
PATIENTS
HUMAN FACTORS
RELIABILITY
4What Does Exceptional Leadership Look Like ?
5Effective Leaders
- Model the values
- Their actions are consistent with their messages
- Tell front line workers safe care is important
and their core business - Are the difference between success and failure
6Effective Leaders
- Connect with front line staff
- Know the elevator speech
- Drive a very crisp, focused message through the
organization with uniform consistency - Are confident, but humble
- Listen more than they talk
7Engaging Physicians
- Lets do it differently and better
- Lets make your day simpler, safer and easier
- What are the things that get in the way of you
delivering optimal care? - WIIFM
8Why Collaboration Teamwork is Essential to Safe
Care Good People Working in Complex Systems
9Human Cognition
- Human are reproducibly fallible
- We think on 3 levels
- -Automatic
- -Rule Based
- -Knowledge based
- Each thinking level leads to errors
- -Slips and Lapses
- -Rule Based Errors
- -Knowledge Based Errors
- Rasmussen and Reason
10Inherent Human Limitations
- Limited memory capacity 5-7 pieces of
information in short term memory - Negative effects of stress error rates
- Tunnel vision
- Negative influence of fatigue and other
physiological factors - Limited ability to multitask cell phones and
driving
11Complex System
12Systemic Migration of Boundaries Deviation is
Normal
VERY UNSAFE SPACE
LOW Individual Benefits HIGH
ACCIDENT
HIGH Production Performance
LOW
Rene Amalberti, MD, PhD
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14Fair and Just Culture
- What are the rules?
- Does everyone know them?
- How do we differentiate an individual with a
problem from a good person set up to fail in an
unsafe system? - The critical importance of having one set of rules
15Drawing the Bright Line
Malicious Substance Use Violation of Rules
Repeat Events
remediate
Competency Substitution Test
Safe Harbor Systems Approach
Reason, J.
16Effective Teamwork and Communication
17Effective Communication Requires
- Structured communication SBAR
- Assertion/ Critical Language key words, the
ability to speak up and stop the show - Psychological safety an environment of respect
effective leadership
18The Need for Teamwork
- Clinical medicine is an extremely complex
environment with - Surprises
- Uncertainty
- Incomplete information
- Interruptions and multitasking
- What are the surprises in your world?
19Where do Things Fall Through the Cracks ?
- Systems information, tests, diagnoses
- Communication especially hand-offs
- Failure of planning
- Failure of recognition
- Failure to rescue
20Real Risk Management
- Catastrophic birth injury
- Missing MIs in clinics and ERs
- Surgical misadventure
- Failure to diagnose breast, lung, colon,
prostate, skin
21What Do Patients Want After a Medical Error ?
- An honest explanation.
- An apology.
- A guarantee it wont happen to anyone else.
- Lexington VA experience.
22A Simple Arthroscopy
- 45 y/o healthy woman, wanted to ski more
- Friday afternoon, last case for Chief of
Orthopedics - OR running late, 26 rooms
- Two nurses moved to ortho to do no brainer case
- They have never worked in orthopedics
23- Repeatedly interrupted
- Team disrupted by anesthesiologist wanting EKG
recording paper - Working with people they didnt know
- Loud music in the room
- .. with epi
24MD RN Different Communication Styles
- Nurses are trained to be narrative and
descriptive - Physicians are trained to be problem solvers
what do you want me to do just give me the
headlines - Complicating factors gender, national culture,
power distance, prior relationship - Perceptions of teamwork depend on your point of
view
25Reliable Processes of Care
- Current state lots of variation
- Do the basics every time
- Support the expertise dont waste it on
busywork - Toyota Lean, Six Sigma
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27The Aviation Experience
- Safety initiative (CRM) began in 1979 after
series of crew error accidents - 70 of accidents - flight crew error
- Majority of accidents - captain flying
- Today - captain manages problem, first officer
flies
28High Reliability
- Preoccupation with Failure
- Reluctance to Simplify
- Commitment to Resilience
- Deference to Expertise
- Sensitivity to Operations
29Rapid Response Teams
- Hospitalist/ intensivist, ICU nurses, RT
- Early warning system
- Primary indication provider is uncomfortable
- Australian experience 65 reduction in-hospital
cardiac arrest, 24 reduction in overall hospital
mortality
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32What Difference can an RRT Make?
- 50 reduction in non-ICU arrests (Buist, BMJ 02)
- Reduced post-operative emergency ICU transfers
(44) and deaths (37) (Bellomo, CCM 04)
- Reduction in arrest prior to ICU transfer (4
v 30 ) (Goldhill, Anest 99)
Rothschild, 2004
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34The Vertical High Risk
- OR briefings, teamwork, observation
- OB teamwork, standards, simulation
- ICU daily goals, teamwork
- ED standardize high risk care, teamwork
- Med- Surg RRT, teamwork, literacy
- Others
35Highly Reliable Perinatal Unit
- SBAR to communicate
- MD always comes when RN/ midwife requests
- Definition of fetal well being
- Common definition of fetal heart tracing
- Practicing for emergencies
36Safety and Reliability in the ED
- Discrete list of high risk diagnoses
- Do the basics every time
- Link systematic processes of care with effective
teamwork and communication
37ICU Safety
- Teamwork and communication
- Where are the pebbles in your shoes?
- Daily goals are they the same by the next
morning - What are the reliable processes of care
- What does the culture look like?
38Surgical Safety
- Human Factors briefings, critical language,
everyones names on the board, debriefing - The Glitch Book
- Systematic processes- antibiotics, normothermia,
glucose control, DVT, beta blockers
39What Lessons Can We Learn From Excellence in
Industry ?
- Truly exceptional organizations Southwest
Airlines, Toyota, Alcoa all have the same
properties - Everyone is treated with respect every day
- Employees have the tools and flexibility to do
the job - The work is recognized and acknowledged
40Patients Families in the Game
41What Does it Look Like to the Patient ?
- Do they understand?
- Do we care?
- Do we know what we are doing?
- Do we take the time for relationships?
42Health Literacy
- Do you have a systematic approach to detecting
and managing this problem? - Its a huge problem silent, pervasive, huge
ramifications - Rx Ask Me Three, Teach Back
43HUMAN FACTORS
- Briefings
- Appropriate Assertion
- Situational Awareness
- Debriefing
- Common Mental Model
44Setting the Stage
- Vascular surgeon doing new, complicated procedure
endovascular aortic stent - in CV lab - I dont have any pride invested here. I just
want to get this right, so if you think of
anything helpful or see me doing anything wrong,
please let me know.
45I know the names of all the personnel that I
worked with during my last shift
of respondents who agreed
46Briefings - Key Elements Checksheet
- Got the persons attention
- Made eye contact, faced the person
- Introduced self
- Used persons name familiarity is key !
- Asked knowable information
- Explicitly asked for input
- Provided information
- Talked about next steps
- Encouraged ongoing monitoring and cross-checking
47One Example of Collaborative Care
- Interdisciplinary (everyone present at one time)
- Patient and family included as part of the team
- Consistent pattern of communication and decision
making (Collaborative Communication Cycle) - Respectful, open environment flat hierarchy
- Specific attention to system glitches
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49All Case Operative Mortality Concord Expected
(NNE Risk Model) Concord Observed Salem
Observed
(Onset of collaborative care at red arrow)
(Onset of collaborative care at green arrow)
All Case Mortality (percent)
(4.8) Concord Expected
(2.1) Concord Observed
(0.3) Salem Observed
50Time to extubation (Concord )
Hours 10
8
6
4
2
1998 1999 2000 2001
51Briefing Example
52Situational Briefing Model
- S-B-A-R
- Situation
- Background
- Assessment
- Recommendation
53SBAR Example
- Situation We have a 48 year-old man with aortic
valve endocarditis that may involve the proximal
aorta - Background He developed endocarditis after
dental work one month ago without antibiotics.
His echo shows multiple vegetations and an
abscess between the aortic and mitral annulae
54- Assessment Fulminant endocarditis that may
extend into the artic root. He may need both an
aortic valve and root replacement. Extremely high
risk - I have quoted him a 50 mortality - Recommendation Well get femoral arterial access
in case his aorta is too rotten to clamp. Once we
can explore the abscess well know how big this
is going to be
55Assertion - What is it?
- Individuals speak up, and state their
information with appropriate persistence until
there is a clear resolution.
56Assertion
- Model to guide andimprove assertion inthe
interest of patient safety
57Expert Decision Making
- Expert pattern matching against large mental
library, quick, accurate if confirm correct
answer - Novice library is empty slow, error prone
process - Certain Diagnoses are Favored- Frequent, Recent,
Serious - Heuristics
58Critical Language
- Key phrases understood by all to mean stop and
listen to me we have a potential problem - United Airlines CUS program Im concernedIm
uncomfortablethis is unsafe Im scared - Allina I need some clarity