U'S' Government

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U.S. Government Education and Training Policy
Formulation and Program Execution Case Study
ACRI/ACOTA and EIPC Models Presented by John
Christiansen
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DISCLAIMER

• THE VIEWS AND OPINIONS EXPRESSED BY THE PRESENTOR
  AND THOSE CONTAINED WITHIN THIS DOCUMENT DO NOT
  REPRESENT OFFICIAL U.S. GOVERNMENT POSITIONS

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Todays Presentation Will Cover Two Important,
Intertwined Topics

• the U.S. Government Interagency model used
  internally to develop and implement peace
  operations capacity enhancement programs
• a look at two different programmatic outputs of
  that process ACRI/ACOTA and EIPC.
• Does the Interagency process work and should
  others use it, and are the two programs effective
  models for others to follow?

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Some General Terms

• Stabilization Operations (e.g., peace operations,
  humanitarian interventions)
• Reconstruction (e.g., post-conflict relief,
  humanitarian assistance, rebuilding,
  institutional development)
• Disaster Response (e.g., emergency lifesaving
  response, recovery, reconstruction)

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Backdrop Facing Todays International
Challenges

• A new dynamic has been evolving in international
  stability and reconstruction operations.
• Systemic improvements urgently needed to address
  increasing, and evolving, challenges to
  international operations.
• Capacity enhancement efforts now needed more
  urgently than ever before, especially in light of
  the new dynamic at work.

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Facing Todays International Challenges...continue
d

• Concerned countries and international, regional
  and sub-regional organizations need to assume
  responsibility for these efforts.
• The Challenge to collectively resolve hot spots
  of instability around the world.
• An Effective Solution build international
  capacity to perform collective stabilization
  operations and reconstruction.

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Institutional Assumptions

• Institutions are alive.
• Institutions have cultural attributes.
• Institutions possess biases.
• Institutional inertia and biases must be overcome
  to effectively formulate and implement national
  policies.

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In Search of Solutions The U.S. Interagency
Process Formulates National Policies

• The President of the United States insists that a
  cooperative and collaborative process of policy
  formulation and implementation be undertaken
  within the Executive Branch of the USG.
• Why?
• -- to eliminate gaps in capabilities, wasteful
  overlap of efforts, structural inefficiencies,
  and institutional inertia
• -- to create consensus building, collective
  buy-in, effective decision making and
• -- helps to effectively manage scarce resources.

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Teamwork, Teamwork, Teamwork

• USG Interagency process exists to collectively
  develop policies to either solve problems or
  explore new opportunities.
• The Institutional Players
• - White House/National Security Council
• - State Department and its Embassies
• - Defense Department and its Combatant
• Commanders

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Needed An Honest Broker And A Transparent
Process The NSC and Its Coordinating Role

• We are dealing with bureaucracies each
  department has an institutional bias.
• Policy formulation and program execution is most
  efficiently done in a transparent system.
• The USG model is an NSC-led process of
  collaborative coordination and development.
• Synergy a desired attribute of the
• of the interagency process

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U.S. Interagency Model Forces Collaboration

• The NSC forms Interagency Working Groups (IWGs)
  between Departments at the Assistant
  Secretary/Deputy Assistant Secretary levels.
• IWGs -- basic working bodies -- formulate courses
  of action and recommend options.
• Deputies Committee -- standing body of each
  departments 2 decision maker.
• When necessary, Deputies forward issues to the
  Principals Committee for decision -- Principals
  Committee heads of each affected department.

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The U.S. Interagency Process Recognizes That ...

• Several models of capacity enhancement can be
  used, to varying degrees of effectiveness.
• Two standing models
• -- target tailored education, training, and
  equipping programs to specific needs when time
  sensitive, emergent crises dictate
• -- more broadly applied regional and
  sub-regional institutional development and
  capacity enhancement programs, usually in
  anticipation of future requirements.

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EIPC Building Capacity On A Global Basis

• Throughout 1996, the Interagency process debated
  ways to build peace operations capacities in
  selected countries around the world with
  demonstrated intent and a minimal level of
  capability to join coalition and UN operations.
• DoD developed EIPC concept and convinced other
  members of the Interagency to support the
  concept.
• Joint State-DoD program developed.

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EIPC And The Interagency

• Joint DoD-State chaired IWG (unusual).
• Highly structured USG policy formulation, program
  development, and execution review process led by
  an interagency IWG since inception in 1996.
• Excellent example of close coordination between
  State and Defense Departments on capacity
  enhancement.

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EIPC A Model of, And For, Sustained Cooperation

• Joint State-DoD IWG to oversee program.
• State-DoD co-chairs (unusual).
• State-funded, DoD executed.
• Advantage speaking to Congress w/one unified
  voice.
• Helped protect program funding w/in
  Administration and Congress.
• Focus on high-level institutional development,
  generally Chapter 6 flavored.

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EIPC Gradual Evolution

• At inception, twin thrust of training and
  equipping -- international participants receive
  EIPC well.
• During first years, a somewhat strong emphasis on
  provision of computer related equipment to enable
  networking.
• In reaction to the need for institution building,
  a minor course correction was taken in 2000 when
  a greater emphasis was placed on education with
  designation of CCMR, Monterey, as Lead Agent for
  EIPC education.

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African Crisis Response InitiativeBuilding a
Standing Force In Africa

• Program developed by Interagency based on a DoD
  concept in reaction to Rwanda genocide.
• At inception, polar opposite from EIPC strong
  emphasis on Chapter 7 and equipping and training
  battalions.
• Large budget given large goals (20 mil/per year
  over 5 years).

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ACRI In The Interagency

• No joint State-DoD co-chaired IWG as with EIPC.
• Strong State control DoD perceived being left
  out of the process.
• Stronger top-level support from White House and
  NSC ACRI viewed as Presidential Program.
• EIPC a lower profile program.

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ACRI Stumbles, Recovers

• Birthing Pains
• -- standing force an issue with European and
  African partners alike.
• -- strong unilateral U.S. push to get Europeans
  into equipping process failed.
• Interagency reassessment of program direction 6
  months after launch.

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ACRI and EIPC 8 Years Later

• ACRI trained battalions deploy, but not as often
  as initially hoped
• ACRI program emphasis abruptly shifted in 2003
  to focus more on institutional development.
• EIPC underwent gradual evolution and program is
  meeting its goals.

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Conclusions

• Education and training aimed at institutional
  development does more to enhance capacity than
  programs focused on equipping and training of
  units.
• Most countries appear more interested in
  participating in Chapter 6 style UN peacekeeping
  operations assistance efforts should be
  tailored to suit the requirements
• Still a role for specialized pre-deployment
  training, and equipping, to meet situational
  needs, even in a peace enforcement environment.

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Conclusionscontinued

• A collaborative system of coordination and
  communications between departments or ministries,
  at all levels, enforced by the top decision
  makers, is the most effective way to develop and
  implement policy and programs.

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• BACKUP SLIDES

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Strategic Architecture
National aims, e.g., international stability
Survival, Vital, Peripheral
National interests
Threats to national interests
Foreign and Domestic
National Objectives
National Strategy
if ... then
political, economic, military, environmental,
socio-cultural
Design
Implementation